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1'he thesis is conccn·ned vri th the problems vThich confront the 
practitioner 1vhen seek:ing to translate ca.pi tal budgeting theory 
into opero.tional terms. It argues that tbe lack of Hide spread 
acceptance in industry of the discounting model can. be attributed, 
in part at least, to the complexity and subjectivity of conventional 
recommended procedures. In particular, the practitioner is 
presented I'J:i.th hw central issues, the uncertainty about whether to 
use the Internal Rate of Return or the Net Present Value method, B.nd 
the apparently almost insurmountable problem of selecting the correct 
discount rate. The thesis seeks to establish: 
(!) that the internal rate of return is incorrect in -principle for 
choosing between Rlternative projects, and should be discarded 
as a primary criterion, 
that the cu.rrent yield on Government bonds is a satisf.s.cto1oy 
discount rate to U3e for evaluating any project, irr-8spective 
of 
(a) the project's riskiness, 
(b) the method of. financing,-
(c) the expected rate of inflation, 
(d) the tax deductibility of interest payments~ 
(e) the firm's dividend policy, 
(f) the flotation co;;;ts incurred in raising the finance. 
Contributjon of the thesis 
·------·-
Internal rate of return: 
1. Demonst:cating that the reinvestment o·p:po:ctunities for intermediate 
cash flOi-IS are irrelevant vlhen assessing J>rojects tmc.\.er 
nonrationing conditions. 
iv 
2. Indicating the theoretical irrelevatlce of a rate of return 
internal to a project for assessing its desirability. 
3. Proposing an alternative ratio to supplement the NPV which 
is consistent with the latter. 
The required rate of return: 
1. Demonstrating that the operation of the +ve NPV rule 
(a) invali<lates all empirical studies designed to ascertain 
ex ante required returns from analyses of ex post 
returns; 
(b) invalidates the assumption that maximisation of the 
share price is equivalent to maximisation of the value 
of the firm. 
2. Demonstrating 
(a) that rejection of the assumption of a risk-premium for 
equity investors is theoretically and empirically 
defe:csible; 
(b) that the cost of a corporate bond is independent of 
the bond's coupon rate; 
(c) that the practice of reducing the cost of d.ebt by 
the rate of corporation tax to reflect the tax 
deductibility of interest payments can lead to 
incorrect solutions, and 
(d) that the practice of adjusting the cost of capital 
to allow for flotation costs leads to incorrect 
solutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
11 \'fuile theo:r:ists recommend the IRR (or NPV) criterion of investment 
appraisal, this study confirms the prevalence of the payback period 
and the accounting profit criteria in practice~ The theorists 
must identify the reason why financial executives prefer these 
alternativ:e criteria and modify the IRR (or H:PV) method to make it 
more generally applicable." 
Je.mes C. T. Hao Journal of Finance, r1ay 1970, p.359 
The selection of capital projects is among the most critical 
decisions that businessmen are required to make. The pace and 
direction of the firm's growth and, in turn, the economic welfare 
of the nation, are dependent, in part, on the quality of the 
investment appraisal procedures employed. Yet it appears that a 
high proportion of firms in the U.K. employ theoretically inadequate 
methods of assessment. This thesis is concerned with the problem 
of making the correct appraisal techniques acceptable and cnmpre-
hensible to the significant number of firms which have not yet 
adopted them, without a material sacrifice of theoretical rigour. 
'I' c";. '"·-'· trhe'.'Jnanagement Of Capi ta.l''ehpendi tures COmprises a number Of 
'1 ) 
steps which ;.rere best summarised by Joel Dean, as folloHs: \ 
1. A creative search for investment opportunities 
2. Long-range plans and projections for the company's future 
development 
3. A short-range capital budget 
4. A correct yarc.stick of economic ;ororth 
5. Estimation of the economic worth of individual projects 
( 1 ) Dean, 1 954 
6. Screening and selection of proposals 
7. The control of authorised outlays 
8. Post-corrtp~etion audit 
9. Disposal of the project 
10. Forms and procedure 
Capital budgeting theory is prim.arily concerned 11i th step 4, the 
search for a correct measure of economic 110rth, and it is clear that if 
w1satisfactory yardsticks are used to evaluate potential investments 
there may be little incentive to carry out the other steps vTi th any 
degree of thoroughness. The effort needed to search for nel1f investment 
opportu.'li ties, for example, or to impr·ove the quality and flow· of 
information needed to evaluate them, may appear futile if their 
effectiveness is destroyed by inadequate assessment. :But, at the 
same time, it needs to be emphasised that vTha tever yardstick is used 1 it 
should be perceived as no more than a tool l'lhose function is to give 
the decision-maker an insight into an investment's desirability. It 
seems at times that the emphasis which academic writers have given to 
this stage of the investment decision process is disproportionately 
.large. To be effective, the selection criterion must not only be 
theoretically acceptable, it must also be practicable, and be capable 
of being understood, both by those v1ho use it, and, if possible, by 
those whose contribution to the investment process is affected by it. 
These goals of validity and simplicity may at times conflict with one 
another, particularly, when the desire by theoreticians to construct 
a completely satisfactory theoretical framework leads to the development 
of solutions which are inaccessible to the majority of practitioners. 
It must be ap?arcnt to readers of jo,~nals such as the Journal of 
Finance, the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, and the 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting etc., that the conflict 
between the tvTO goals may have already come to a head .. The investment 
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appraisal literature demands from executives t.he capacity to integrate 
a variety oi' management science techniques, including utility analysis, 
mathematical programming, pro ba bili ty and statistical methods, '"hils t 
at the same time, it exposes and leaves unr-eso).ved a series of 
conceptual and operational difficulties \·rhich conbine to give the 
recommended procedures a high susceptibility to vlide margins of 
error. There is an increasing danger that decision-makers may pay 
no more than a lip service to the ne\'rer teclmiques, vrhilst seeking 
refuge in the traditional more familiar rules of thumb for their 
primary guidance. There is some evidence( 2) that even among those 
firms >'lhich have adopted the discounted cash flovr approach, there are 
many \'rhich still employ payback and the accounting re.te of return as 
supportive if not primary criteria of selection. A large number of 
firms do not even pay lip service to the discounting methods, (3) 
presumably because they are ignorant of them, or because they believe 
that the derivation of data to be analysed involves such a range of 
possible errors that onl~ a rudimentary economic analysis is justified. 
If the economic principles 'iihich underly the quantitative techniques 
,,employed are incapable of being interpreted by the nonspecialist, the 
problem of balancing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the 
decision will be magnified to a degree that may allow the quantitative 
measures to dictate the decision rather than to inform the decision-
maker. It becomes increasingly important to guard against the danger 
that as the elegance and sophistication of the techniques increase, 
the investment decision \'Till be assumed to be capable of resolution 
entirely on a. quantitative basis, with the result that effective 
authority for making investment decisions could be transferred from 
(2) eog. see Klammer 
(3) see Cooper 1975 page 198 
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the man~gement team to the specific personnel responsible for 
manipulating the data. If vle accept the premise that the decision 
to undertake other than routine investments is too important a 
matter and has too many nonfinancial implications to be encompassed 
in a mathematical formula, ho'I'Tever elegant, it becomes a matter of 
importance that this trend be resisted. To some extent, at least, 
the tools recommended by scholars must be tempered to match management's 
capacity to use them. 
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to search for an approach 
to the analysis of capital expenditure, which is fundamentally consistent 
-vrith current theory and, at the same time, sufficiently straightfor~mrd 
to give the discounting technique a 1dder appeal, and a genuine 
significance for the non finance specialist. The search derives its 
inspiration from the conviction tha't the recent emphasis by theoreticians 
on the need to evaluate projects not as isolated financial events but as 
constituents of a portfolio of risky assets of unspecified range, is as 
potentially capable of providing a framework in which the selection 
criterion is reducible to a meaningful expression within the real 
und~r.standing of the nonspecialist, as it is capable, if not harnessed, 
of alienating him entirelyo 
One of the dangers of striving for a simplified framework to 
facilitate the task of practitioners in real 1•1orld decisions is that 
of appearing to wish to make light of the contribution which theory 
has to make. In no sense is that the intention of the present study. 
Indeed, it is precisely as a result of the very significant theoretical 
strides that have been made in recent yea::-s that the proposed framevrork 
finds its basis. Part of the task, of course, is to question a number 
of technicalities that have emerged in the literature and which appear 
not to justify their usefulness. And, by definition, the search for 
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simplification involves the rejection of certain refinements as 
being inappropriate to a basic model which is designed to be 
acceptable to a broad spectrum of corporate users. But the \'rri ter 
is aw·are that in a field l'Thich is expanding as rapidly as corporate 
finance, further significant developments can be expected. in the 
future, and, therefore, no solution can be presented 1-1hich is not 
amenable to improvement. It is important, therefore, that the 
frarael'wrk presented retains significant flexibility to allow 
refinements to be incorporated 1vhere appropriate, without, at 
the same time destroying the practicability of the basic model. 
Although the subject of the thesis concerns the practicability 
of recommended investment techniques, the research proe;eriure is 
essentially theoretical in character, apart from some empirical 
testing of investors' attitudes to risk, the findings of ;.rhich 
are reported in Chapter 5. A considerable proportion of the study 
consists of seeking to identify errors in accepted theory "vrhich have 
created unnecessary complications for the student and practitioner 
of capital budgeting, and the remainder consists of an attempt to 
develop a selection criterion which meets the test of practicability 
,~~ (;' !. ' :' I, ~ ~ ' I I , r r I • ' 
with the minimum sacrifice of theoretical rigour and integrity. 
In particular, the the sis is concerri-ed "iTi th the nature and validity 
of the internal rate of return criterion as an apparent alternative 
to the net present value approach to the eval~ation of investment 
proposals, and with exploring the possibility of justifying the use 
of a readily observable market-determined rate of interest as the 
appropriate discount or cut-off rate. 
The first chapter consists of an exposiUon of the fundamental 
tools recommended by academics to practitioners for the analysis and 
evaluation of investment proposals. Commencing with a brief account 
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of the historical development of accepted deciRion procedures, the 
chapter proceeds to identify the h-10 principal theoretical issues 
with which p:cactitioners are confronted, th8 choice between using 
the IRR and 1TV approaches, and the derivation of the relevant 
cost of capital for use as the discount rate. The chapter identifies 
and discusses at length the unresolved issues associated with these 
controversial topics. 
The second chapter focuses on the IRR, and seeks to establish 
that current theory has offered incorrect reasons for its failure 
to produce consistently correct signals, and concludes that the IRR 
is incorrect in principle, and has no effective relevance as a 
criterion for optimal investment decisions. An alternative 
profitability ratio is offered as a supplement to the NPV measure, 
which is consistent v1ith the economic rationale of the latter. 
The third and subsequent chapters are concerned with the 
theoretical and practical issues involved in the derivation of the 
firm's cost of capital. The cost of equity and the cost of debt 
are considered in turn, together vTi th the impact of the firm's 
J 'c~pftai' mix and di v:i..dend policy.' ; Clearly, these issues present 
enormous conceptual problems vThich m~y !lever be capable of being 
fully resolved, and it is far beyond the scope of this thesis to 
seek to do so. However, they are issues which create significant 
obstacles for the practitioner in his efforts to find operat~onal 
rules for applying the correct decision procedures, and the 
respective chapters address themselves principally to the task 
of finding compromise solutions acceptable to practitioners and 
theoreticians alike. The penultimate chapter considers the accounting 
implications of the previous chapters and seeks to demonstrate the 
dependency of the proposed solution on adequate publication of 
6 
relevant data. The final chapter draws together the findings of the 
previous sections, and after analysing their significance, presents 
the recomme:r.C:ed decision frameuork. 
7 
David J. Cooper 
Joel Dean 
T • Klammer 
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Chapter One 
THE ISSUES 
The ob,jectiye of..1b& Investm~ll:.t.Dec~sioYJ. 
The theory of business finance in general, and of capital 
budgeting in particular, is concerned "l'lith'the impact of tho firm's 
financial decisions on the welfare of one group of participants, 
the shareholders or residual O'Vmers of the firm. This is not 
to say that finance writers fail to recognise the existence of 
other goals or imply that firms do not have responsibilities other 
than to shareholders. But in a free enterprise society, it is 
desirable at times to abstract from the wider renponsibilities of 
the firm in order to focus on the implications of the firm's 
decisions as they affect those who supply the risk capital, and 
with whom traditionally rests the right to initiate or discontinue 
business operations, vfuilst it may be possible in the future to 
construct a theory which encompasses the firm's responsibilities 
to all interested groups including society at large, theoreticiaus 
have not yet succeeded in achieving an agreed operational frammwrk 
'' ~ )- . '' ; . ' . . . 
for the shareholder group. It is unlikely that we '\'Till be able to 
develop the proper perspective needed to ur1dertake the wider synthesis 
until we have successfully formulated the claims of the individual 
participating groups. Therefore, even in a mixed economy, the 
apparently narrow focus of capital budgeting theory can be validated. 
Shareholders' 1-1elfare is generally defined i.n terms of wealth 
maximisation or maximisation of the net worth of the firm.( 1) Wealth 
(1) e.g. See Van Horne, page 6 and '\'Teston and Brigham page 11 
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rather than profits is the relevant goal because the former 
reflects both the risk dimension of the firm's financial decisions 
and the time value of money. It is therefore in the context of 
this goal that the subsequent chapters ar':l developed. 
In order to achieve a valid measure of wealth, two ingredients 
are necessary, an appropriate income stream and a discounting 
procedure to convert the income stream into present value terms. 
The relevant income stream is now almost universally acknovrledged 
by theoriticians to be cash, because it is cash rather than profit 
which is needed to service capital. The main controversies are 
concerned vri th identifying a discounting procedure which conceptually 
and operationally is capable of achieving the agreed objective. 
Although compound interest as a mechanism for reflecting the 
time value of money dates from the Old Babylonian Period in 
Mesopotamia 1600 B.C.,(2) prior to the 19th century the application 
of discounting was substantially restricted to the evaluation of 
loans and life insurance. It uas not until there was a significant 
increase in the magnitude of investment. outlays, in particular 
~ ! :- . .)\ '; ' :• J ·. ) ' < \ '!"'I " " •: " .. ·' 
with the coming and development of the raihrays, that the 
importance of incorporating some allOi'lance for time in the 
evaluation of nonfinancial investments became recognised. Since 
the 1950s especially the sophistication of capital budgeting 
techniques has increased enormously. Yet certain fundamental 
issues rema:i.n unresolved, not least the fact that there are hro 
distinct methods of implementing the discounting principle, 
(2) For a brief history of the discounting approach cf. Parker 1969 
Chapter 3. 
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the internal rate of return (IRR) and the net present value 
approach (1TPV). The IRR is the rate of interest which equates 
the present value of future cash recei:r:;ts to the initial capital 
cost of the project, namely the solution r to the equation 
c = 0 ( 1) 
t = 1 
''l'here At is the net cash flovr at the end of year t; C is the 
capital outlay; and N is the expected life of the project. 
The IRR criterion states that a project should be accepted if 
its internal rate of return is above k the cost of capital to the 
firm. 
The equation for the net present value formula is 
N 
c (2) 
t = 1 
The NPV criterion, therefore, states that a project should be 
accepted if the value of its net present value is greater than 
zero, where the excess represents the contribution to the firm's 
present value. 
The IRR is variously known as the Time Adjusted Rate of 
Return; the Investor's Nethod; the Yield: and (misleadingly) the 
Discounted Cash Flmv Nethod. It is identical to Keynes' marginal 
efficiency of capital(3) but not identical, as Keynes erroneously 
assumed, (4) to Irving Fisher's marginal rate of return over. cost. (5) 
Keynes, page 140 
For a discussion see Alchian 1955 
Fisher, page 155 
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The latter ratio is essentially related to the comparison of 
alternative streams, Hhilst the former is the rate t'l'hich equates 
the present uorth of an income stream v1i th its expense stream~ 'l'he 
ranking of projects according to their'NPVs depends in part on the 
rate of interest used to discount the cash :flow·s. The :&'isher rate 
is the rate which brings the NPVs of two·investments into equality. 
It is the turning-point j.nterest rate, and for rates above the Fisher 
rate, the ranking of the tlvo projects is different from that given 
by rates belovr it. The Fisher rate is mentioned here because, 
although it has not been vd.dely used or recommended for use in the 
text-books, it has recently been cited in the journal literature(6) 
and by at least one text-book(?) to provide suppo1·'1i for the: IRR in 
the IRR v NPV controversy. The significance of the Fisher rate 
will be discussed in a later section of this chapter and again in 
Chapter 2 • 
. lli!L v NPV 
.-,;· ·· · '·" 'Under conditions of certainty the NPV measure is obtained 
simply by discounting the net cash flows at the pure rate of 
interest, and·the IRR is compared with the same rate. For 
simple accept or reject decisions it is a matter of indifference 
which of the two methods is used because theyboth provide 
consistently correct signals. In reality, of course, conditions 
are not so simple and significant problems arise fundamentally 
for two reasons (a) the investment decision is frequently not a 
simple one of 'accept or reject', but involves a choice between 
Carlton Dudley, pp 909 - 913 
See Hao, Quantitative Analysis of Financial Decisions, page 
234 
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projects, and (b) the future is not kno¥m 1·1ith certainty, and 
some allovmnce must be made for the degree of risk l·lhich projects 
are perceived to have. 
Before outlining the conceptual problems which the decision-
maker must face in practice 11hen choosing between the two methods, 
it should be stated that it cannot be argued that having two 
methods rather than one is in itself a source of strength. Even if 
the two approaches consistently produced correct solutions, there 
appears little merit in presenting practitioners with both, if 
by agreeing upon one of them, the decision process could be 
simplified. If in fact one method consistently produces correct 
solutions, and the other not, then clearly the former would appear 
to be the appropriate choice. This conclusion would seem even more 
forceful if the second (inconsistent) method gave rise to a nc~ber 
of theoretically complex issues which caused the decision-process 
to appear considerably more complicated than if the first method 
alone l'rere used. In practice the two methods do produce 
conflicting solutions and because there is strong support for 
each it remains to be established whether both have a valid role 
to play. 
Although much of the subsequent discussion will be concerned 
with the theoretical validity of each of the hro techniques, it 
should be noted that the arguments proposed in support of the 
respective approaches are frequently practical in character. Thus 
the IRR being a ratio of profitability is claimed to be understood 
by businessmen accustomed to thinking :i.n terms of percentages. (B) 
(8) Merrett and Sykes, The Finance an~ Analysis of Capital Projects, 
Page 123 
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Again, since by definition the IRR is the rate internal to the 
project, tho ranking it gives is independent of the cost of capital 
and it is daimed this has the advantage that the investment analysis 
can be delegated to lovrer management 'd thout the necessity of the 
latter being involved in the derivation of the firm's cost of 
capital. !•lore over the IRR is alleged to avoid the need to be 
specific about the cost of capital(g) the derivation of which is a 
difficult process. Those v-rho prefer the NPV method argue that the 
method measures the monetary contribution \vhich a project makes to 
the value of the firm, and is therefore more meaningful than a 
ratio of profitability. They argue also that there is no real 
advantage in ranking projects independently of the cost of capital 
since the relative desirability of a project frequently depends on 
the cost of capital. The NPV has also fe\ver problems of 
implementation than the IRR. On the other hand it is an important 
feature of the controversy that however strongly a particula.r 
writer might favour one of the two approaches, he invariably 
acknowledges a valid role for the alternative method under certain 
.conditions. 
The reinvestment ass~tion 
The most common explanation for the failure of the IRR to 
rank projects consistently in accordance with the NPV method is that 
the IRR assumes that the intermediate cash flo'lrs can be reinvested 
at the internal rate. (10) This is in contrast to the assumption 
inherent in the NPV method that the cash flovrs are reinvested at 
(9) Ibid, page 124 
(10) Weston and Brigham, page 292 
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the cost of capital. vllien the decision-maker elects to use one 
method rather than the other, it should be on the basis that the 
reinvestment assumption of the chosen method is more appropriate 
in the circumstances than the other.( 11 ) The decision is further 
complicated by the fact that not all writers agree abou·t the 
validity of this reinvestment hypothesis.. r•lerrett and Sykes, ( 12 ) 
for example, hold that the IRR carries no asswnption about 
reinvestment any more than the rate of overdraft interest carries 
an assumption about a bank's reinvestment opportunities. More 
recently, Dudley( 13) and Nao( 14) have argued that the relevant 
reinvestment rate is not the IRR but the Fisher rate, and that 
one project 1 s superiority over another depends on vrhethe:r the 
intermediate cash flows are reinvested at a rate above or belOI'l 
the Fisher intersection. In chapter 2 it vrill be argued that this 
reinvestment controversy is in fact quite misplaced because for the 
normal selection process the attractiveness of a project is independent 
of the reinvestment opportunities for its intermediate cash flows. 
~~ltiple yields etc. 
··~ ·~' •,. ~ . ' Not every investment has a unique internal rate of return, 
and this fact is used frequently by those seeking to discredit the 
IRR. Teichroew, Robichek and Montalbano( 15) have distinguished 
between simple investments '\>Those net cash outlays are restricted 
to the initial period, and nonsimple investments vrhich involve 
~g~ 
( 13·l ( 14 
( 15 
Van Horne, page 81 
}Terrett and Sykes Capital Budgeting and Company Finance · 
Dudley, op.cit., page 913 
Mao, op.cit., page 234 
Teichr·oew, Ro bichek and Montalbano, page 395 - 403 
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cash outlays in years subsequent to years of net cash inflows. 
Simple investments abmys have a unique internal rate of return, 
but nonsimple investments may not have a rate of return internal 
to the project, that is a rate vThich is independent of the cost 
of capital. For this purpose a further classification of 
. 
nonsimple investments can be made( 16) into pure and mixed 
investments, a classification which Hao holds is •critical for 
understanding the meaning of the IRR." A pure investment is one 
in "Vthich the outstanding capital invested at any point of time 
computed at the project's IRR is either zero or negative. A 
mixed investment is one which at a certain stage overdraws on its 
return and. is a 1 liability' to the project. 
Only in the case of a pure investment is the IRR independent 
of the cost of capital to the firm. A mixed investment is partly 
an investment and partly an overdraft or source of finance, and 
the return therefore varies with the cost of capital. 
An exam~le of a mixed investment which technically has a 
unique IRR, but '"hich requires a different interpretation from the 
''' "conve~ti'o~l sense of the term is cited by :r:.Iao, ( 17 ) as follows 
Year 
Cash flo1'1' 
The solution to the equation 
go 
-£10 + (1 + r) 
0 
-£10 
1 2 
+£40 -£40 
£40 = 0 
is r = 10o%. It is clear, how·ever, that if the cost of capital 
is O, the project has a negative net present value of -£10, and 
likewise if the cost of capital is ()o • 
Mao, op.cit., page 199 
~1ao , ibid, page 201 
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The project, in fact, 
vrill not have a positive value for any value of k and the IRR is 
the maximum value of the NPV function as depic:ted j_n figure 1. 
NPV 
10~ 
£10 FIGURE 1 
The best knolim characteristic of mixed investments, hmrever, 
is they are capable of producing multiple yields. The rate of 
return r, it will be recalled is a. solution to the equation 
a 
0 + + 
---
(1 + r) 0 (1 + r) 1 (1 + r) 2 
+ ..... a n = 0 (3) 
where a1t is the cash flow in year 1"!. If we multiply through (3) 
by qn, where q = (1 + r), we obtain 
n (n- 1) (n- 2) 
act +a, +an + a o- 1 '1. 2'1 • • • • n = 0 (4) 
Equation (4) is a polynomial equation of degree n and the IRR is 
... found f:rom the roots of this polynomial "Vrhen the NPV = 0. According 
to Descartes' Theorem( 18) there are as many positive real roots as 
there are changes in sign of the coefficients, or less by an even 
number. If there are two changes of sign there may be, though not 
necessarily, multiple roots. 
The possibility of obtaining more than one rate of return 
has been the source of much confusion in the capital budgeting 
literature, it led '\'Teston and Brigham( 19) to conclude that in 
(18) e.g. see Haley and Schall, page 69 
(19) Weston and Brigham, 3rd edition page 206 
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order to interpret the two rates of return, "the rates are simply 
exmnined, one is judged to be 'unreasonable 1 and the other is 
selected as being the appropriate one. 'Unreasonable' means that 
the cash flOi'l'S from the project cannot be reinvested at so high 
a rate." Van Horne on the other hand concludes( 20) that "neither 
rate is correct, because neither is a measure of investment worth." 
Others( 21 ) have even suggested that the IRR method is invalidated 
by the possibility of multiple rates, since clearly no project can 
have tvTO or more rates of' return. 
Finally, it is possible that a perfectly respectable and 
clearly desirable cash flovr pattern has no internal rate of return 
such as 
Year 0 1 2 
Cash flo;,rs +£1 ,000 -£3,000 +£2,500 
The graph of the NPV function has the shape depicted in figure 2. 
NPV 
£1,000 
500 
FIGURE 2 
A,:ttempts to vindicate the IJlli. 
Those vrri ters who take the view that the advantages of using 
t . rather than an absolute measure of investment a profitability ra ~o 
worth are such as to make the IRR fundamentally superior to the 
NPV method or at least a desirable supplement to it, have frequently 
(20) Van Horne, page 95 
(21) e.g. see Halford, page 269- 270 
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gone to great lengths to deal with the problems 1vhich it presents. 
These salvage attempts have taken the i'orm of attempting to 
identify the circumstances 1vhere the IRi\ is either inappropriate 
or should be used v1i th some degree of caution, and of proposing 
some modifications for those conditions v1here it fails to give a 
correct or unambiguous solution. Thus the IRR is alleged to be 
capable of being used to compare two or more projects vri th a 
reasonable degree of confidence, provided (a) the cash flmv patterns 
of the individual projects are of the pure investment type (b) the 
projects have equal outlays( 22 ) (c) the projects have equal 
lives( 23 ) and (d) the projects have not dissimilar cash flow 
patterns.(24) Hhen any one of these conditions is absent, it is 
necessary either to abandon the IRR or to modify it. Some of the 
modifications or techniques which have. been proposed include the 
Extended Yield, the Incremental Yield, and Fisher's Intersection. 
These will now be examined briefly. 
The Extended Yield 
(22) Bierman and Smidt, page 42 
(23) vleston and Brigham 5th edition, page 272 
(24) Ibid, page 272 
19 
,The F0"J~Q._ndecl Yield 
The extended yield has been proposed by ~'lerrett and Sykes (25 ) 
and othe1·s to r~ro·,rido a solution for projec~ts vrhose cash flovr 
pattern cor-responds to the 'mixed investment' category. The 
method consists of finding 
ur.rhe point from 1·lhich the future ·cash flmm (discounted 
at the yield rate) are negative. These cash flovrs are 
then all discounted at the normal cost of capital to 
bring them back in time to the point at which they are 
largely absorbed by the preceding positive cash flows. 
A revised yiet~6~s then performed on the cash flow·s modified in this W3.y • 11 
The technique is demonstrated in an example: 
Years 0 1 - 7 8 9 10 Yield 
Cash flows -£4,277 £1,000 £1,000 £1,000 -£2,000 15% 
Adjusted 
cash floi1S -£4., 277 £1,000 £188 0 0 
For the adjusted cash flovrs in line 2 above, a cost of capital 
of 7% is assumed at which rate the 'liability' of £2,000 is discounted 
to year 9, giving again a negative value of -£869, and this sum in 
turn is further discounted to year 8, providing a positive cash flow 
for that year of £188. 
Merrett and Sykes define the extended yield as the yield of 
a project 11based on the period over--1-l'hich the project is an asset 
and after making provision for meeting the future liabilities associated 
with the project." 
The rationale of the method is that in order to be able to meet 
the outflow of £2,000 in year 10, a 'sinking fund' is established in 
(25) The ]'inance and Analysis of Capital Projects, pages 135 - 139 
(26) Ibid, page 135 
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year 8 of £812 and in year 9 of £1,000, 'l'lhich vrill amount to £2,000 
I in year 10 if invested at the cost of capital 7~o. Merrett and 
Sykes reject the apparent IRR of 155:S, becausf, it is based on the 
assumption that the sinking fund earned 155'b 'l'rki..ch is unrealistically 
high in relation to the cost of capital. They conclude that it is 
invalid to compare the 15% to the cost of capital 7% in order to 
gauge the degree of safety vrhich the project has in relation to 
variations in the cost of capital. The conventional yield must 
be revised in accordance i'Ti th the above procedure to provide a more 
realistic comparison. 
The extended yield corresponds to the RIC (return on invested 
capital) described by Hao( 27 ) and the PIR (project investment return) 
of Teichroe'\'l, Robichek and Hontalbano. (28 ) It is, of course, not 
a rate of return 'internal' to the project, because its magnitude 
depends on the external cost of capital. 
The Incremental Yield 
One suggested solution to the situation vrhere the IRR fails 
to give a correct ranking of competing projects is the incremental 
> I',,,.· '\'.•··' "": •,u· •·'»'' ''{2 ) ' 
yield approach. 9 All projects are ranked according to the size 
of their initial investment starting with the smallest. The first 
project is chosen as the defender and the next alternative becomes 
the challenger. The cash flows of the second are deducted from 
those of the first, and the rate of return on the difference in 
the cash flow and outlay streaus is computed. If the resulting 
incremental yield exceeds the required rate of return, then the 
(27) op.cit. pages 201 - 211 
(28) Teichroew, Robichek and lo1ontalbano 
(29) e.g. Bierman and Smidt, page 43 
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challenger is preferred and itself becomes the defender to a new 
challenger, the third alternative. This procedure is continued 
down the list of potential projects until the victor is found. 
The incremental yield is of course equal to the rate which 
has already been identified as Fisher's intersection. It is 
the crossover point at 'I'Thich one project's NPV goes from a position 
of being greater than to being smaller than that of another. 
I1ao (30) and D-u.dley(31) argue that Fisher's intersection indicates 
the minimum reinvestment rate 'I'Thich must be assumed if project A 1 s 
NPV is to exceed that of project B in figu.re 3. 
NPV 
A 
B 
k 
If project A's intermediate cash flo,vs can be reinvested at a rate 
higher than 1Q10, then project A will be superior to B, and the 
ranking given by the IRR will be correct and accord t-ri th that 
given by their NPVs. 
•; l ·.i I • 
~~o ~oncludes(32 ) that this finding conflicts 
with the conventional claim that the IRR assumes that the 
reinvestment rate is equal to the-"rRR. The relevant assumption 
is that the reinvestment funds can be reinvested at a ret11rn higher 
than Fisher's return over cost. 
Hm·rever this approach has its limitations. I'Jhen two projects 
are so compared, they do not necessarily have any intersection, 
whilst others may have multiple intersections. 
g~l 
(32 
~mo, op.cit., page 234 
Dudlas, op.cit., page 913 
~~o, op.cit., page 234 
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Mao delineates the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the 
Fisher rate for pairs of investments: 
There 1fill be no Fisher intersection in the interval (O,r ) 
m 
where r = the smaller of the tvro rates of re:turn, if 
m 
( 1) a) 
b) 
c) 
(2) a) 
b) 
A's NPV) E's NPV at zero discount rate, and 
A's NPV decreases at a greater :rate than B's, 
response to a given increase in k 
A's IRR) B's IRR. 
A's NPV) B's NPV at zero discount rate, and 
A's NPV decreases at a lesser rate than B's in 
to a given increase in k. 
in 
response 
There will be a unique intersection between the two 1TV functions 
where: 
a) A's NPV > B' s NPV at zero discount rate, and 
b) A' s IRR < B I s IRR 
c) A's NPV decreases at a greater rate than B's in response to 
a given increRse in k. 
There may be multiple intersections if the HPV functions of the two 
projects do not satisfy the above conditions, in 'I'Thich case the 
difficulties of making generalisations about the Fisher's intersection 
are such as to cause lfuo to recommend for ranking purposes "the use 
of the NPV criterion or the method of ma thena tical programming. ,; ( 33) 
Thus the IRR presents a number of problems which make it far 
from being a simple decision tool, and bea:ring in mind that one of 
(33) Ibid, page 240 
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its alleged advantages is its understandibility to businessmen, the 
desirability of making the above refinements must give rise to some 
doubts by even the most ardent disciple of the yield approach. 
l-ioreover, the fact that the incremental yield gives rise to cash flow 
patterns that frequently produce the multiple yield problem which 
has so often been used to undermine the reputation of the discounting 
technique must also give cause for concern. The question has to be 
examined, therefore, not simply i<Thether the claim that the IRR is 
readily understood by businessmen is illusory, but whether, in fact 
the method can make an;)' valid contribution to the investment selection 
process \'Thich cannot be more simply and more effectively achieved by 
the NPV method alone. 
Certainly one of the greatest obstacles to the acceptance of the 
NPV approach is the argument that it requires a precise derivation of 
the cost of capital. This, of course is a spurious argument, because 
it misleadingly implies that the IRR can validly rank without reference 
to the cost of capital, which in the next chapter will be shown to be 
false. On the other hand, the problem of computing the cost of 
c~pita~ is a real one, and whilst the literature has made significant 
advances in recent years in identifying the issues involved, little 
-progress has been made in developing an operational measure of the 
cost of capital. Inlin Friend of the University of Pennsylvania, in 
his Presidential Address to the American Finance Association, 1972, 
remarked on the 'deplorable state of the arts in corporation finance' 
and added(34) 
"The measurement of even the average cost of capital to say 
nothing of the marginal cost of capital has not advanced greatly in 
recent years. One of the most substantial difficulties here is the 
absence of a satisfactory measure of the required rate of return on 
the market portfolio, or equivalently a measure of the risk 
differential between the risk-free rate and the average required 
return on coinmon stocks." 
(34) Iridn Friend, page 270 
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The hurdle rate which is most vridely advocated for measuring 
investment profitability is the firm's cGst of capital, or 
equivalently the return required by its suppliers of capital. 
Under conditions of certainty and 1-Ti th perfect capital markets, 
differences betv1een firm 1 s methods of ·raising finance v10uld have 
no significance with respect to cost, and all firms and all 
projects vrould have the same hurdle rate, namely the prevailing 
rate of interest. 
In the absence ·of certainty, the expected cash flovrs 
from both a company and its projects are not lmmm vii th complete 
assurance, and must therefore be derived by computing the mean of 
the probability distribution of cash flovrs. Depending on the 
degree of variability about the mean, that is to say, the 
variability vrhich investors are unable to diversify avmy in their 
personal portfolios, investors are assumed( 35 ) to require some 
compensation. The greater the variability, the greater the 
) )"· .;r: 
compensation. 
This compensation for risk can-be.incorporated into the 
analysis by adopting one of tvro approaches. The first, the 
certainty-equivalent method consists of adjusting the numerator of 
the present value equation by a factor vrhich reduces the cash 
flows to their certainty equivalent values. 
(35) e.g. See Sharpe, page 425 
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The equation for the net present value fonaula be cones t then 
N 
NPV = c 
t = 1 
where i is the riskless rate of interest. 
The alternative method, knO'Im as the risk-adjusted discotl_T'.t 
rate approach, consists of adjusting the denominator of the 
present ve.lue equation to incorporate a discount rate vrhich 
includes a premium representing investors' compensation for risk. 
This latter approach is the most 'I'Tidely used model in theory and. 
in practice(3G) although it has been sho'l'rn( 3'7) to suffer fro;n the 
serious deficiency of assuming that risk is a function of time 
by treating the futurity of the cash flows and their variability 
in the one process. 
Given that the purpose of this section is to examine the 
problems vrhich practitioners face vrhen trying to measure the 
compensation for risk necessary to satisfy the suppliers of 
capital, this deficiency of RADR must be borne in mind. On 
the other hand, most of the difficulties vrhich do exist apply 
whichever method is adopted, and the subsequent analysis 'Will 
proceed by focusing on the specific problems of RADR in vievr of 
the fact that it appears to have a greater intuitive appeal than 
the other, and is the one which most text-books favour. 
The most frequently recownended technique for estimating 
the appropriate discount rate is by measuring the firn's weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC). Nost writers(3S) take the vievr 
See Klam~er, page 391 
Robichek and Nyers, pp 79 - 93 
e.g. Weston and Brigham, page 595 
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that it is fallacious to argue that the appropriate cost of ce.pi tal 
is the explicit cost of the specific funds used to finance the 
project, since this uould imply that a prcject financed by 'cheap' 
debt required a lovrer acceptance criterion than an identical project 
financed by equity. \•lha tever particular financial instruments are 
issued to finance an investment, it is the 'l'reighted average or 
composite cost '\·rhich is the relevant discount rate. 
There are three steps required to compute this composite rate: 
(a) Identification of the components of the capital structure 
(b) Measurement of the costs of the individual components 
(c) Combination of the costs to produce the WACC. 
Identifying the components 
This might appear to be a straightfor'\·m.rd process, but in fact 
there are a number of unresolved issues. Only three categories 
of funds are usually identified, Debt, Equity, and Preference Shares, 
but there is lack of agreement as to what is included in debt. 
Merrett and Sykes,( 3g) for example, include short-term sources of 
capital. Mao( 4o) recommends that only interest-bearing debt 
.. , should ·be included, and that noninterest-bearing debt should be 
deducted from the gross value of the investment. Others 
recommend that only long-term sources should be considered. 
Not every source of capital is explicitly represented in the 
capital structure of the firm's balance sheet. Leasing, for 
example, can be a significant source of funds and should be logically 
included as a component of the WACC, yet it does not normally 
appear as a source of capital in the firm's balance sheet. 
(39) The Finance and Analysis of Capital Projects, page 95 
(40) op.cit., page 378 
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Likew·ise depreciation-gene:cated funds may provide a material 
proportion of the firm's annual budget,.but it remains a matter 
of controversy •·rhether such funds should b.s- perceived as an 
ingredient of the capital structure. Merrett and Sykes(41 ) argue 
that they should be included vrhilst others (42 ) take the vievr that 
since the alternative to reinvestment is to redistribute the deprec-
iation-generated funds to shareholders and debtholders in the 
proportions in vThich they have financed the firm's assets, the 
effective cost of the funds is substantially equal to the average 
cost of capital, and therefore their inclusion in the cost of 
capital calculation is superfluous. This latter m:·gument, hmvever, 
presupposes that the cost of capital is unaffected by the size of 
the capital budget. 
Measuring the individual costs 
Having identified the relevant components of the capital 
structure, the next operation is to assign costs to tho indiviclu.al 
items. The cost of equity is undoubtedly the most difficult of 
these to measure • 
. , ' :r~e cost of egui ty 
The conventional assumption is that all investors are averse 
to risk and seek to be reimrded in the form of higher ex ante 
returns. There are broadly two approaches to estimating the 
return required by investors for a specific company's shares. 
The first is to try to solve the equation for the well knovrn 
dividend valuation model 
D 
k 
e = p + g 
where g is the expected rate of growth in earnings, and dividends, 
D the current dividend, and P the market price of the shares. 
(41) The Fj~ance and Analysis of Capital Projects, page 114 
(42) e.g. Van Horne, page 117 
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The price of the firm's shares is observable in the market, as is 
the current dividend, and the solution therefore is a matter of 
estimating g. This approach is frequently. l'ecommended in the 
investment manuals( 43 ) but it suffers from certain defects: 
(1) It is oversimplistic in that it assumes that the company will 
grow at a fixed rate forever. Certainly for unseasoned 
companies, it may be unreasonable to assume a constant grm'lth 
rate, and the above equation lvould need to be modified to 
accommodate a varied growth pattern. A complete and highly 
complex model has been proposed by Hao. (44) 
(2) In order to estimate g for the 'normal' company in 'normal' 
times, a number of texts recommend simply extrapolating past 
grmvth rates in to the future. Hm'lever, apart from the obvious 
difficulty of defining and identifying normal times, it will 
be demonstrated in chapter 3 that even for the normal company, 
ex post returns cannot be used as a basis for estimating ex 
ante required returns. For 'abnormal' times or for 'abnormal' 
companies, the past is clearly a defective source, and the 
~ ~' ,,., .. , , , decision--maker is advised to drmr upon the security analyst to 
obtain estimates of investors' gro'irth expectations. (45 ) 
The second approach to estimating the cost of equity is to 
proceed in the framework of the capital asset pricing model of 
Sharpe(4G) and Lintner. (4?) According to this approach, the fact 
e.g. Abdelsammad, page 110 
r,fao, op.ci t.' page 402 
\'Teston and Brigham, page 605 
see Sharpe 1964 
see Laitner 1965 
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that the cost of equity comprises tiw elements, the risk-free 
rate and a premium for risk, is specifically recognised. The 
risk premium is determined by reference to the firm's correlation 
with the market's returns. All other risk ca~ be eliminated by 
diversification and is therefore irrel3vant. The expected return 
for a share j is derived from the following equation( 4B) 
k. = i + 
J 
(k - i) m 
\'There i = 
km = 
6j = 
Om = 
r. = Jm 
= 
the riskless rate of interest 
return on the market portfolio 
standard deviation of the probability distribution 
of possible returns for security j 
standard deviation of the probability distribution 
of possible returns for the market portfolio 
correlation of rates of return for j and the market 
-
= i+fl...(k -i) f..~ J m 
The beta coefficient is a measure of the share's systematic or 
-
nondiversifiable risk, and since (k - i) = the risk premium for 
m 
the market as a vrhole, then the term () . (k - i) represents the 
J m 
risk premium appropriate to the share. Therefore, in order to 
measure the risk premium for a particular company's shares it is 
necessary to be able to 
( 1) identify the 'market portfolio'. l1ost empirical studies 
identify the market as the Ne\'T York stock exchange or the 
U.K. market, but as will be argued in chapter 4, the relevant 
(48) For development of this equation see Francis and Archer, 
chapter 5. 
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market must be perceived in much 1-rider terms to include the 
world market of risky assets. 
(2) measure the market return. Apart f1•om the obvious 
diffioul ties of measuring the retu-rn for a market 1-1hich 
cannot be clearly defined, it 1'lill be argued that just as 
the realised returns of an individual security ccu111ot be 
used to discover the ex ante required return, nor can the 
realised return of the market portfolio be used to discover 
the market required return. 
(3) measure the covariance of the individual security's returns 
with those of the market9 
Clearly then the reputation \vhich the cost of equity has as 
being an exceptionally difficult task is well deserved. Ho~rever, 
contrary to common belief, other securities present theoretical 
problems which are scarcely less complicated. 
The cost of debt 
Assigning a cost to the company's bonds is normally assumed 
to be a straightforward undertaking. For a bond issued and 
' ,, "'''' matUring at 'par, the interest rate is taken to be the cost. 
For a bond issued or selling above or below par, the effective 
yield is the cost as measured approximately from the formula( 4g) 
= 
(P + I!fV)/2 
where kB = yield to maturity 
I = interest income 
D = the amount of discount 
n = years to maturity 
p 
= current market price of the bonds 
MV = the maturity value of the bond 
(49) See Archer and D'Ambrosio, page 182 
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·Al tho·ugh most textbooks do not consider the cost of debt 
to be anything more complicated than that implied by the above 
formula, some controversy has developed about vrhether I and HV 
are the relevant ingredients to be included. A distinction is 
sometimes made( 5o) between the promised cost of debt (the 
solution to kB in the above equation) and the expected cost 
which, for a risky bond, must be less than kB. Haley and 
Schall( 51 ) for example recommend the use of the expected cost, 
(r-2) 
whilst Brennan J argues that it is the promised cost of 
debt vrhich is relevant. Thi~ controversy will be taken up 
again in chapter 6 and will be sho\~ to have a fairly significant 
bearing upon the measurement of the cost of capital. 
One further issue \'l'hich appears to be ignored in the 
literature is \'Thether the cost of debt can properly be 
perceived as dependent on the maturity of the bond. If short 
term rates happen to be lovT and long term rates high, is it valid 
to consider a company which has financed its assets by short term 
bonds to have a lower cost of capital than one which has used 
long term bonds? 
Other components 
Apart from differences in taxation effects, preference shares 
are not dissimilar to bonds and the issues which apply to the one 
apply usually to the other, except that preference shares are 
normally issued in perpetuity. 
Se& Boness, pp 99 - 106 
Haley and Schall, page 295 
Brannan, page 27 
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Hybrid varieties of preference 
shares and bonds (that is, converttble securities and securities 
f\~to ~ Ccw'Juit~. 
issued with 1-mrrants attached.) Conve:etibles 1 for example, 
possess ch<lracteristics of both equity and debt, and assume the 
theoretic?.l problems associated i'li th each. In addition, the 
cost, if relevant, of depreciation-generated funds, of short 
term sources without explicit costs such·as trade credit, and 
non balance sheet items such as leasing present individual 
problems. 
QQrnJ?j.ping the indi y;idual cosi;s 
Once the individual components have been identified and 
their explicit costs determined, the next stage of the process 
is to introduce some mechanism for combining the individual 
costs into a composite rate. The usual recommendntion( 53) 
is to weight the individual costs according to the capital market 
values of the component securities. Market values are preferred 
because the individual costs are computed by reference to the 
(54' 
capital market returns expected by investors. H01·1eYer Lewellen 1 
and many of the management investment manuals(SS) suggest that 
.. ,, . , ''b'ook values should be used. Some argue that book values for 
debt and preferred stock should be used, with market Yalues for 
equity. (56 ) The arguments favouring book values tend to be 
influenced by practical considerations, and the market value 
approach appears to be theoretically more soundly based. With 
both approaches there is lack of agreement i'Thether the weights 
should be determined by reference to the capital structure l'lhich 
the firm perceives to be optimal and aspires to achieve in the 
(53) See Archer and D'Ambrosio, page 197 
(54) Lewellen, page 87 
(55) e.g. '\'!right, page 156 
(56) See Jl1ao, page 197 
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Finally, the literature offers l:tttle guidance to 
practitioflers in relation to the choico of market values to be 
used in the weighting process, i'l'hether, that is, in a volatile 
market the market values should be computed by reference to an 
average of the preceding six months or year r or vrhether they 
should be the most recent values available at the time of the 
decision., 
Tilit~ of \~ACC 
The three steps outlined above of identifying the correct 
components, measuring their costs and comb:ining them into a 
composite rate are essential to the process of determining the 
firm's WACC, and it would not be surprising if practitioners 
are sceptical about the reliability of the discount rate which 
emerges from such an undertaking. This uncertainty is further 
accentuated by the fact that although the l·lACC approach is 
advocated in most textbooks, the usefulr£ss of the technique 
has been seriously challenged on the grounds that it depends 
for its validity on a number of restrictive assumptionso 
These are 
(1) that the project under review does not change the firm's 
risk characteristics( 57 ) 
(2) that the px·oject consists of a constant perpetual stream of 
cash flOi'l'S ( 58) 
(3) that the adoption of the project will not change the debt-
equity ratio(Sg) 
(4) that the firm's existing assets ere expected to generate a 
l57) 58) 59) 
(60) 
constant perpetual stream of cash 
Haley and Schall, page 320 
Arditti, page 1004 
:r.ryers , 1 97 4, page 1 2 
Myers, ibid, page 12 
33 (b) 
(60) 
The first of these assumptions is in itself one of the most 
serious limi ta Uons of the \·TACC concep+.. The underlying premise 
of the risk-·premium hypothesis is that 88.Ch security has a risk 
premium appropriate to its systematic risk. But the systematic 
risk of the firm is a function of the average risk of the assets 
owned by the firm. For the \fACC to be a valid discount rate 
for a sp3cific project, it >wuld be necessary to assume that the 
project has the same risk characteristics as the firm's average 
existing assets. But this is exceedingly unlikely for most 
modern companies w·hich tend to be engaged in more than one 
product or industry. A nevT project is more likely to have its 
o1m risk characteristics or to have the risk characteristics of 
one of the firm's existing projects rather than that of the average. 
Hence an adjustment to the WACC may frequently be required to 
satisfy the conditions of the risk-premiu~ framework. This 
leads to the fundamental question whether it is necessary to 
compute the WACC in the first place, because if an adjustment needs 
to be made and the mechanism is available for determining the 
appropriate adjustment, it should be possible to derive the final 
discount rate without undertaking the intermediate step. 
(61) -Lindsay and Sametz have advocated as an alternative to 
WACC a marginal-sequential costing-of-funds approach, in which 
the marginal cost curve is constructed by reference to individual 
sources of finance, beginning ''lith the cheapest first (debt) 
followed by retained earnings and then ne''~' equity. The marginal 
cost curve is then smoothed and plotted against the marginal 
(61) LiUQsay and Sametz 1967, page 327 
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efficiency-of-investment curve on the same graph. as in figure 4 
% Investment cvJ.'Ve 
~'-
FIGURE 4 
The intorsectinn of the hro curves detc-rmines the cut-off point 
for investments. The objection to this approach is that it does 
not lend itself to present value analysis, and the measure of 
profitability is confined to the internal rate of return. (62 ) 
Hore recently StevTart Hyers (63 ) has p~oposed an alternative 
procedure called the Adjusted Present Value appreo.ch 1-rhich purports 
to avoid some of the problems raised by the traditional "~<reighted 
average cost approach. It consists of calculating the project's 
basic contribution, by assuming that the firm is all-equity 
financed, with the rcsul t that the after-· tax cash fl01m are 
discounted at the rate appropriate to a pure equity company of 
the risk class. To this base value is added the present value of 
the contribution which the project makes to the firm's debt 
capacity. Finally, from the sum of these tv10 values is deducted 
the present value of transaction costs of planned equity issues 
and, if relevant, other penalty costs such as ban..'..cruptcy costs 
or tax penalties associated with dividend payments. In effect, 
the objective of the Myers approach iR to separate the various 
aspects 
(62) See Van Horne, 1st edition, page 134 
(63) op.cit., pp 1 - 25 
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of the investment ciecision into diffe:cent segments, and to ascertain 
:i..n present value terms the significance of each segment rather 
than to .seek to capture the interacticn.s of the financing and 
investment decisions in a single step by attempting to construct 
an all-inclusive discount rate. The Hyers' approach 
has clearly interesting possibilities. For example, in a 
subsequent paper( 64) Nyers and Pogue developed a linear programming 
model based on the APV framevrork. HoVTever, Nyors admits ( 65 ) that 
the extra complications of the APV rule do not make it suitable 
for decision-makers concerned ·with run":"of-the-mill projects. He 
also concedes that the technique contains certain iru1erent 
deficiencies vrhich wust be balanced against the disadvantages of 
using the traditional capital budgeting rulesc 
Inflation 
A further complication has been highlighted in recent years 
namely the impact of inflation on the investment decision process. 
Market rates of interest are assumed to contain an element vihich 
is designed to compensate investors for expected changes in the 
value of money. If the viei'i is taken that the cash flovrs of a 
project should be expressed in a stabilised monetary unit(66 ) 
then the discount rate should like1dse be expressed without 
an inflationary element. Thus vrha tever method is used to derive 
the firm's cost of capital, a further adjustment i'lOUld be necessary 
to 'deflate' the rate to arrive at the net-of-inflation discount 
rate. I1ost >·rri ters, ( 67 ) hovrever, recommend using both nominal cash 
May 1974 
Nyers, Harch 1974, page 22 
e.go see Brom\-Tich, page 39 
e.g. see Wilkes, pp 46 - 53 
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flows and nominal discount rates, and do not advocate an adjustment 
of the na tur8 desc:r-ibad. 
~inj ti.Qn_of risk and risk--free 
''le have so far considered some of the difficulties 1vhich 
confront management in deciding 1·rhat discount rate to use to 
evaluate prospective investments. A number of factors have been 
identified vrhich appear to ma.l<e the 'going rate of interest 1 
criterion of the perfect market model unacceptable. Of these 
factors risk undoubtedly presents the greatest challenge. 
Whichever approach is used to derive the appropriate discount 
rate, the underlying problem springs from the assumption that the 
return required from a financial security depends on the variabj.li ty 
of the returns from the assets which it is used to finance, and 
possibly on the relationship which the financial security has to 
other securities in the capital structure. The problems of 
measuring the premium for risk are so fundamental that there is 
not even universal agreement about the definition of risk. 
Although the standard deviation of return is the most frequently 
advocated measure, particularly because of its use in portfolio 
--
analysis and because of its susceptibility to mathematical 
manipulation, other definitions have been proposed, for example 
semi-variance as suggested by Narkowitz(GS) on the grounds that 
only belovr average returns are risky; semi-interquartil.e deviation, 
because it is not affected by extreme values; Baumol's lower 
confidence limit;( 69) Sharpe's beta coefficient as an index of 
systematic or nondiversifiable risk. 
(68) see Markovritz, chapter 9 
(69) Baumol, 1963 
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Indeed there is not even agreement as to >·rhat is the appropriate 
risk-free rate of inter~st to 1·rhich the risk premium is added. In 
capital asset pricing theory, the risk-free rate is commonly held 
to be the short term government bond rate(7o) but it is far from 
clear that the required equity return should be perceived as a 
short term rate plus, if relevant, a premium for risk. 
If management does decide to undertake the recommended 
procedures for computing the risk-adjusted discount rate outlined 
in this chapter, it has to be borne in mind that because the risk-
free rate is constantly changing, so therefore presumably is the 
risk-adjusted rate. Indeed the relationship of the risk-premium 
with the risk-free rate may reasonably be assumed to vary with the 
level of the latter, and vrith changes in investors' psychology. 
It is not unlikely that vrhen int.erest rates are high the risk-
premium has a relatively different magnitude than uhen interest rates 
are low. It folloT,rs that the heavy dependence of the recommended 
procedures on analysis of ex post returns is unlikely to yield 
a rate which is very relevant to. current needs. But even if one 
can avoid the dependency on the past, the fact that the risk-free 
rate is observed to clmnge frequently necessitates that the risk-
adjusted rate itself be calculated frequently, however laborious 
the process, :i.f the discount rate is to maintain its relevance. 
To illustrate this point, figure 5 depicts the movement in interest 
rates during the tvTelve months period to Harch 1975. A represents 
the rate of interest on three-month 
(70) e.g. See Weston and Brigham, page 669 
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money market deposits over the period and B the yield on undated 
Goverrunent stocks. \fuichever rate is considered to be the 
appropriate base upon which to append n risk-premium it is clear 
that a significant variation in the re~mlting discount rate must 
be assumed to take place within the h1elve month period. It 
follows that the procedures 1-rhich are advocated in the text books 
for deriving the investment discount rate need to be undertaken 
regularly for an authentic rate reflecting underlying interest 
rate movements to be achieved. 
The follovling conclusions appear to emerge from analysis of 
· available studies relating to the practice of capital budgeting 
techniques 
(1) A large number of fj_rms do not use discounting techniques 
in any form or use them only as secondary standards of 
selection. Klammer, (?1) for example, found :i.n 1970 tr...at 
of a sample of 369 fairly large firms vTi th sizable and 
continuing capital expenditure programmes and which 
lH-'; ''Kitll•• '''''it'vlOUld,be'expected'to'make relatively heavy USe Of the 
more sophisticated capital_ budgeting techniques, 11 only 
57% used discounting as a primary standard of evaluation, 
and more than half of these used in addition other 
theoretically less satisfactory criteria such as payback. 
(2) Firms which do use discounting techniques tend to use the 
IRR in preference to the NPV approach(?2) 
(71) Klammer, page 393 
(72) e.g. See Bower and Lessard, page 323 
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(3) Few firms make use of a probabilistic frarnmwrk for investment 
analysis(73 ) 
(4) Only a small minority of firms treat risk formally in the 
evaluation process (74) and for the fevl v1hich employ a risk-
adjusted discount rate approach, the discount rate is 
formulated vri thout reference to investors' ability to 
diversify through their own portfolios.(7S) Klammer found 
that only 3% of firms interviewed took account of the 
covariance of projects. (76 ) 
(5) Few· of the firms >'rhich do compute a cost of capital update 
their calculations more frequently than annually(7?) 
(6) The range of overall after-tax costs of capital employed by 
firms in selected industries appears to vary significantly. 
For example, in the U.S. textile industry, the after-tax 
cost of capital computed by firms appeared to range betvreen 
2.% and 1$7b during 1970. (78) 
It would seem therefore that considerable progress has still 
to be made in translating the 'correct' decision procedures into 
terms i'Thich busi:o.essmen i'rill accept. Whilst the \'Triter is of the 
! p' "'\•; ' ' ~ .. ~: ; ) ~· .' ' J\"'. ' • 
opinion that the practical and theoretical problems (multiple 
yields, reinvestment assumption etc.). primarily associated with 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
~m 
Mao "Survey", page 356 
David Cooper, page 198 and Bower and Lessard 
Mao, "Survey", page 352 
Ibid, page 391 
e.g. See Abdelsammad, page 106 
Ibid, page 115 
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the IRR must operate as a significant deterrent to businessmen 
from 1·1holeheartedly accepting the discounting approach, it is 
ironic that the IRR is the method preferred by those l'lho use 
discounting. But this is partly due to tho fact that 
investment manuals frequently present the IRR as the primary 
method( 7g) possibly because the authors believe that businessmen 
will be attracted by a ratio of profitability~ and because they 
believe the IRR relieves the decision maker of the need to make 
a precise estimation of the cost of capital. Certainly tho 
evidence suggests that efforts to derive the appropriate cut-off 
rate appear to be arbitrary and crude, and to have little relation-
ship 1-ri th the theoreticians 1 pure rate of interest plus premium 
for systematic risk.' Heston and Brigham observe(eo) that the 
capital asset pricing model as a framework for measuring the cost 
of capital is today where the discounted cash florr budgeting 
teclmiques were about t'l'mnty years ago. Hopefully, hm·rever, the 
practice of perceiving investors' required returns in a portfolio 
context rrill more quickly gain widespread acceptance in industry. 
As noted in the introduction, this broader perception of the 
) l ' . \.'' .-i • ' '\-' -~ ~ : 
cost of capital has the potentiality of making the discount model 
appear even more remote to the major~ty of firms, but equally it 
has the potentiality of providing the basis for a more simplified 
approach. 
(79) e.g. See vlright, Chapter 2 
(80) vleston and Brigham, page 676 
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Conclusion 
In the first section of this chapter f'ome of the issues arising 
from having hro distinct methods of incorporating the time value of 
money into the investment decision proct~ss were examined. In the 
immediately follovling chapter it will be argued that the IRR is 
not a valid alternative to the NPV, that it is incorrect in p~inciple 
for choosing betvmen investments, and should be relegated to a minor 
role. 
In the second section, the principal factors 'l'rhich have been 
variously held to necessitate modification of the market rate of 
interest ,.;ere identified. In the succeeding chapters these factors 
will be separately analysed. It vrill be sho'l'm that some of the 
factors such as dividend policy can in fact be validly assuned to 
have no affect. Others, such as the tax deductibility of interest 
payments will be shmm to produce incorrect solutions if reflected 
in the discount rate, as is the conventional practice, rather than 
reflected directly in the cash flows. Others, yet again, such as 
inflation 1'lill be shown to be more conveniently assumed to be 
} F· {ol'"i ' '';~ .! •, •! \ < ' 'ol I'\ n.'' ""' ' 11 '', ~ 
already reflected in the market rate of interest and to require no 
further adjustment. But the one faqtor more than any '\'Thich makes 
some adjustment to the market rate of interest appear to be 
necessary is risk, and the impact of risk on the investment discount 
rate will therefore occupy a major portion of the subsequent analysis. 
It has become axiomatic in finance that projects have different 
risk characteristics and that this fact has a direct bearing on the 
returns required by investors. This belief rests on one of two 
assumptions, that the amount of a project's risk which investors 
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cannot diversify mmy in their personal portfolios is significant 
or that investors care sufficiently about differential risks to 
the extent that they i'TOUld refuse to provice capital to fil).ance 
an investment which had only a moderately higher degree of 
relevant risk than alternative investments 1·li th comparable expected 
returns. 
These assumptions will be closely examined in the succeeding 
chapters. It w-ill not be argued that all risk can in fact be 
diversified away, or that investors are totally risk-indifferent, 
but rather that with improved market facilities for diversification 
there is reason to doubt that the amount of relevant risk which 
cannot be diversified away is significant and that investors' 
aversion to risk is sufficiently pronounced to necessitate the 
kind of refinements to the mdrket rate of interest contemplated 
by theoriticians. Nodification of the pure rate of interest is 
not a step which can be taken 'moderately' or 'partially'. It is 
one which involves forfeiting absolutely the objectivity of an 
observable market rate of interest, and can only be desirable 
if it can be clearly demonstrated that the quality of the 
resulting investment decision is likely to be higher than could 
be achieved if the rate were left-in.its pure form. Before 
advocating departure from the pure market rate, therefore, it 
is essential that the evidence for the existence of a market 
premium for risk is persuasive, that the size of the risk premium 
is material to the efficiency of the selection procedure and that 
the operational disadvantages of having to undertake the 
exceptionally difficuJ.t.task of measuring the premium appropriate 
to a specific project are outweighed by the benefits. 
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Chapter Tvro 
THE INTf~HHAL RATE OF' ill~'J:Umr 
l-iuch ._,f the criticism that has been m~il.e against the Internal 
Rate of Return has taken the form of identifying the situations in 
which that ratio fails to give a correct solution to the optimal 
selection of investment proposal8';, or fails altogether to give a 
single unambiguous soJution. Having identified such situations, 
mosi; text-books nonetheless eoncod.e that, su1Jject to these 
'exceptional' cases, the IRR is a useful measure of investment 
~·/Orth, and although inferior to the NPV method, has the merit of 
being more easily understood by businessmen, who, it is alleged, 
thi11lc in terHlS of 'profitability' rather than of 'contributions 
to \·mal th 1 • The Ifill is represented by its adherents as a valid 
measure of project vrorth, to be treated \'lith caution in ,.Tell-
defined circumstances, and by its critics as a defective measure 
of project >Wrth, but nonetheless a useful guideline in well-
defined circumstances. 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the argillllents which 
are commonly advan~;ed t.o explain the inadequacy of the IRR a::.·e 
-· 
partly misconceived and, to the extent that they fail to attack 
the fundamental concept of an internal rate of return, they are 
misdirected, a...J.d likely to harden the resistance of the business 
community to the discounted cash flov1 appr:oach. That resistance 
will not successfully be broken down as long as theorists propose, 
under the present value umbrella, two conflicting methods of 
investment appraisal, one (NPV) because i+. i::' theoretically in 
accordance 1·li th the assumed objective of \·;eal th maximisation and the 
other ( IRR) because it is in accordance \d th the vmy in v1hich 
businessmen are alleged to think. It is paradoxical that the IRR 
should be offered as the more appealing of the tvro approaches, 
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when in fact, most of the controversial conceptual issues concern 
it rather than the NPV method. 
The t.:i:r(;untsta.nces in Hhich the two l.8::::hniques are likely to 
produce conflict are generally identifiod as Hhen 
(a) the cash flo~1 of one project increases over time and that of 
the other decreases 
' 
'· (b) the projects have different lives 
(c) the projects have different outlays. 
The common explanation for the differences in ranking is 
summarised by \>leston and Brigham, ( 1) one of the most vridel.y used 
text books in finance: 
"The net present value method discounts all proceeds at the firm's 
cost of capital, thus implicitly assuming that these proceec"ls can 
be reinvested at this rate. The internal rate of return method on 
the other hand, implicitly a.ssu.mes that cash flOiv::> <;an be reinvested 
at the IRR. The correct choice of methods for the firm to use thus 
depends upon which rej nvestwent rate is closest to Lhe re. te t!:2at 
the firm i'Iill be able to earn on the cash flo1vs generated by its 
projects". 
It ·l'lill be argued, in this chupter that 
(1) the reinvestment opportunities for intermediate and terminal 
cash flo·ws are irr&levant under conditions of nonraticning~ and 
( 2) the internal-rate~of.~return is invalid no-t because of any 
implicit reinvestment assumption but because ii.. is irrelevant 
to the objective of maximising the firm 1 s i·realth. 
Investment decisions are taken in any of three conditions 
relating to the supply of capital. 
(a) Nonrationing and nonsurplus of capital, where the firm's potential 
supply of capital exceeds the amount needed to finance investment 
opportunities. 
(b) Rationing of capital, where the investment opportunities 
available exceed the supply of capital needed to finance them. 
(1) \'Teston and Brigham, 4th edition, page 151. 
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(c) Capital surplus, v1hcre the firm ha1:1 more cash than is needed 
to finance investment opportuni tie8 a.nd iA precluded from 
paying back the capital at will. 
The significance of the reinvestment opportunities associated with 
a project's intermediate and terminal cash flows, and the relevance 
of the internal-rate-of-return under each of the above conditions 
1dll be considered in turn. 
' 
• 
Under nonra tioning conditions, fil•ms are assumed to undertake 
all projects vrhose prospective returns exceed the cost of raising 
funds, all projects, that :i.sf v1hich are not mutually exclusive v1ith 
alternative opportunities. As a signal of acceptability, the IRR 
ahmys accords \'lith the NPV method, although it •~ill be argued 
subsequently that as a measure of desirability in the accept-reject 
decision, it is misleading. For the time being, we are concerned 
with its function 'II hem choosing among conflicting proposals. 
It has been noted that, for projects vli th broadly similar cash 
flow pa tt01·ns, economic lives and initial outlays t no conflict 
between the tvro methods is likely to pr&sent itself. The fact that 
conflict does arise, ho1·1ever, requires explanation, because on the 
explanation depends one 1 s view v1hether the two methods are truly 
alternative approaches, or whether one of the methods, pe:r.·haps, is 
fundamentally at odds vri th the assumed objectives. 
In Table I h10 conflicting projects, A and B are ranked differently 
by the IRR and the NPV methods. The conventionaJ. solution is to make 
a judgement about which, if any, of the t\10 reinvestment assumptions 
is most realistic and to choose accordingly. 
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Period 
0 
2 
IRR 
NPV at 10% 
-foo 
+144-
20% 
19 ' •. 
f.r0Ji~£LU. ,P.rojec.t Q 
Joo i-
+100 -100 
+ -~o +124 
24% 24% 
16 
The implication is that if it could be kn01m v1ith certainty that 
the £100 arising in year 1 could be reinvested in a thiro., independ.ent, 
project, C, available at the end of year 1, 'I'Ti th a return equal to 
B's internal~rate~of·-return (24%), B vTOuld have a terminal value of 
£154 and therefore, be judged superior to project A '\·Those terminal 
value is £144. 
Before examining this Rrgurnent it is essential to bear in mind 
a distinction between 
(a) Reinvestment opportunities v1hich are physically, logically 
or sequentially dependent upon a project, whatever the soul.:'ce 
of capital used to finance these opportunities. 
(b) Reinvestment opportunities financed by the cash flows arising 
from a project. 
Every investment appraisal must take account of the first 
category of investments, namely those i'Thich are contingent upon or 
excluded by it. To undertake an investment involves committing the 
firm to a certain course of action and the consequence of pursuing 
that course must be evaluated when assessing the project. Novr, 
since, by definition, C does not fall into that category of dependent 
investments the fact that it happens to be fir.anced by the £100 
arising from project B does not represent grounds for associating 
it exclusively vTith project B. Project C can also be undertaken in 
conjunction vrith project A and finance<i by new capital at the cost of 10'fo. 
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The terminal value would then be £158: 
Terminal value of A 
Terminal value of C 
~§. Loan a.ncl interest on C 
' 
'· 
£H-4 
124 
£268 
110 
£158 
Other things being equal, then, project A is alv.ays superior 
to project B, no matter how profitably B's cash flow may be 
rl'd.nvested, provided the reinvestr:1ent projects are independent. The 
destiny of the cash flovrs as such is never relevant. If there are 
dependent projects; they are relevant because they are dependent 
and not because they happen to be financed by particular cash flO'VTSo 
If, instead, project C had been dependent on project A, the assessment 
of A \'l'OUld have to include an evaluation of project C, notvri thstanding 
the absence of cash flows in period 1. 
Unegual live~ 
The comparison of projects with unequal lives is frequently 
specified as a special case requiring particular assumptions about 
the profitability of projects available to succeed the shor·ter of 
the projects. In fact the presence of unequal lives does not create 
a circumstance which calls for treatment different from comparison 
of projects vri th equal lives. The reinvestmnt opportunities for 
the terminal cash flow of the shorter project are no more relevant 
to the selection than are the opportunities for the intervening 
cash flows of either. The only significance of one life being 
shorter than the other is that the terminat::!.oH of the shorter 
project might make it possible to undertake a third project that 
had been excluded by it. But as previously noted, the assessment 
of any project must take account of all other projects contingent 
52 
upon or excluded by it. 
Tab~ 
~ ~yl.._Q ~ctJll .EE9~£Llf. 
0 -~00 ~00 too 
1 121 
2 144 
3 169 
NPV at 10JS 10 19 27 
IRR 21% 2o% 1% 
Thusv the problem of ranldng Projects D, E, and F in Table 2, 
is fundamentally no different from that of ranking Projects A and 
Bin Table 1. Ignoring the question of risk, Project F is preferred 
because it contributes most to the firm's value. There is no need 
to consider the destiny of the £121 in year 1 of Project D, or the 
£144' in year 2 of Project E, because, even if these sums could be 
used to finance additional projects rather than be applied to the 
repayment of the 'original loan', such additional projects might 
equally be financed by new capital raised for that purpose, if 
Project F 'mre undertaken. 
The cessation of Project D might make it possible to undertake 
at the end of year 1, a further Project G, which was precluded by 
the adoption of D, E or F, and, therefore, the benefit of being 
able to undertake Project G a year or two earlier than otherwise 
possible ~rould have to be evaluated in assessing Project D. But it 
is not the receipt of the terminal cash flow that makes Project G 
possible or relevant, but the fact of Project D ceasing to be an 
obstacle. To emphasise the point even further, if Project E 
terminated (physically) in period 1, but the terminal cash flow ~ras 
not receivable until period 2, Project G could be undertaken, and 
this would negative the relative advantage of Project D in relation 
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to E, in which case the terminal cash flows would be seen to be 
irrelevant. 
Therefore, in the absence of mutually exclu.sive or dependent 
projects, the order of preference is FED irrespective of how 
profitabl;y: the terminal flovrs of D and E can be reinvested. 
If the reinvestment opportunities for intermediate and terminal 
cash flo\·Ts are irrelevant to the choice behreen tvw or more competing 
projects the question remains \vhy it is that a project can have a 
'higher return' than another but have a lo>'ler NPV. 
'l'he explanation is that one project may have a higher rate of 
profit per unit of capital invested than another but, if it has 
fewer units of capital invested in it, it may make a smaller 
contribution to the \'laalth of the firm. The objective is to 
maximise the firm's wealth rather than the rate of profitability 
per unit of capital invested since the latter goal could be achieved 
by rejecting all but the most highly profitable projects. If two 
projects, then, have different amounts of capital invested they 
cannot validly be differentiated by their respective rates of 
return per unit of capital any mor-e than a choice bet..,reen hro 
products can validly be made on the basis of the rate of profit 
per unit sold without reference to the number of units involved. 
Unequal Outill§_ 
This fact is universally recognised when projects with different 
initial outlays are compared. Even its most ardent supporters admit 
that the IRR is invalid for the purposes of discriminating betvTeen 
projects Hhose outlays differ, because different outlays imply 
projects of different sizes and the contribution a project makes is 
a function of both rate of return and size. It is self-evident that 
a project costing £1 'ITi th an IRR of 1 OCf;0 is not thereby more desirable 
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than a project co sUng £100 \d th an :um of 2o% if the cost of 
capital is ·1 o;~G. But that is because the difforonces in scale of 
the tv10 p:.·ojects are immeo.iately apparen.t by virtue of the different 
outlays. 
However, the size of a project is not determined by its initial 
outlay alone. For projec·bs vdth different outlays the difference in 
size is established at the outset and increased or decreased by the 
subsequent pattern of cash flm'l's. For projects vrith identical 
outlays, the difference in size is determined by the pattern of 
subsequent cash flovrs only but is no less significant for that fact. 
Proj~ct A and B in Table I appear to be projects of equal length 
because their terminal flovT happen to coincide. But Project A 1 s 
outlay has 'earned' its 200} over hro years, and project B, fo:r the 
most part, :L ts return of 24% only over one year. Like'l'lisP., the 
projects appear• to have the same capital outlays, but the emphasis 
on the initial year is misleading since the significant fact i8 
that B has a smaller average capital invested over the two years. 
The practice of categorising projects into those of unequal 
lives or initial outlays is invalid because it is based on the 
misconception that it is othervrise possible to identify projects 
as having the same size. In fact no hro projects have the same size 
unless they have identical cash flows, and it foll0\1S that a rate of 
return per unit of capital invested can never in principle be used 
as a criterion for choosing bet·ween projects. 
To deal \'l'i th this problem of different initial outlays Merrett 
( 2) 
and Sykes ' recommended the incremental yield approach to be used, 
which 11 simply consists of subtracting the net cash flows of the 
(2) Herrett and Sykes, 1973, page 127. 
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cheaper alternative from those of the dearer, to ~sta~lish tho 
incremental cash flows which result from accepting the alternative 
involving the higher initial capital outlays." In effect, this 
exerclse seeks to convert a ranking prO-iJlem into an accept-or-
reject decision. Merrett limits this technique to comparison of 
projects .1·1i th different initial outlays but Bierman and Smidt 
suggest the technique could_ be applied to comparison of any hw 
projects vrhether of equal outlays or .unequal lives. For example, 
by subtracting the flows of Project B in Table I from those of 
Project A an 'incremental yield' can be calculated, namely 14% 
on the additional capital invested over period 2 of Project A. 
Uo1wver, they do not make clear hO\·T the decision-maker should assess 
the significance at the present time of an 'investment with an IRR 
of 14%' which does not commence until a future date. 
Moreover, only trial and error can determine which project 
should be deducted from the other, and vrhen there are a nu;nber of 
projects to choose from, the procedure could be unnecessarily 
complicated. In addition, the net flov;rs would frequently be of a 
pattern that would give multiple yields. Since the NPV method 
provides an im..'llediate solution, this complicated refinement is 
unnecessary. Finally, the technique assumes that it is desirable 
to use the IRR for an accept-or-reject decision, and this assumption 
will be questioned in a later section. 
The conclusion that the NPV is the only correct criterion 
under nonrationing conditions is, of course consistent with the 
findings of a number of writers. But the reasons \'fhich have been 
proposed are different from those usually givent being totally 
independent of the reinvestment rate assumed to be appropriate 
for the intermediate cash flovlS. As a consequence, a source of 
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conf<wion associated vrith the conventional approach is eliminated. 
For example, Dudley, (:5) 1~llo argues that neither the IRit nor the NPV 
techniques mal~e any impl:Lc:i.t assumption a1)out the reinvestment 
opJlO:ctunities fo1· intermediate cash floHs but that the assumption 
i:3 itilplicit in the .decisJ:.gn_i~ one or other of the hw techniques 
and ..l};'2.:L1Q"ln3JfQ. any estimate of the poss:i..ble return on reinvestment 
't 
of interl!ledia:Le cash flmm, concludes 11 if financial capital is freely 
available e.t an;,r point in time, the reinvestment rate should be the 
rnar,:;.Lnal coat of these o.lter·native funds, i.e. the firm•s cost of 
capJtal. In such a case, the present value criterion is to be 
preferred. 11 Nm·;, if, as has· been already demonst1•a ted, the 
reinvestment C>.fllJortuni ties for the cash flows are irrelovant, it is 
mideading to base the support for tbe NPV criterion on the assumption 
that the cash flo~·ts are reinvested at the marginal cost of capital. 
1rnu.s, if a. practitioner believed that a particular intermediate cash 
flm; from a project vmuld in fact be reinvested at 2o%, even although 
the cost of capital is 1 OJf~ he could be excused for being confused 
about 11hether the 1 (fj6 or the 2f17b vms the relevant rate. On the other 
hand 1 if be perceived the esflential defectiveness of the IRR techniq_ue 
as having nothing to do 1vi th the reinvestment of the intermediate 
cash flows, then no such confusion need arise. 
It is, more than anything, the need to provide a guide for 
firms operating under capital rationing conditions vrhich has been 
used to lend credence to the rate of return criterion. When cash 
is scarce, the rate of return per unit of capital invested might 
appear to be a significant factor in the selection procedure. In 
addition, the opportunities for reinvestment of a project's intermediate 
(3) Dudley, paGe 914. 
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cash flows become relevant when other sources of capital are 
restricted. Nonetheless it \vill be argued thd.t the IRR remains 
fundamentally incorrect in principle, an1 only the NPV approach 
is valido 
It is not a matter of importance to the discussion whether 
capital rationing is a common con~ition experienced by companies. 
'· 
As individual savers, '.'le are all subjec·~ to capitul rationing~ and 
take it for granted, but it is far from clear that a similar 
condition is experienced by fil'ms in their transformation of 
savings into productive resources. Apart from the apparent 
irrationality of failing to raise capital, however costly, ·when 
the rate of return from its use is expected to be greater than the 
cost, it is doubtful, from everyday observations, vrhether the average 
company has a superfluity of profitable projects which outueigh its 
capacity to finance them. However, for the purposes of discussion, 
the fact that such a condition can exist will be assumed, because all 
that concerns us is 1'lhether the IRR can make a valid contribution to 
the selection of projects vrhen firms are so constrained. 
\'/hen operating under financial constraints, the basic objective 
is no different from that vrhich is t:J.ppropriate for nonrationing 
conditions, namely to select the combination of projects which, in 
aggregate, effect the greatest contribution to the ·wealth of the 
firm. The selection, however, is more complex with rationing 
because, :i.n addition to having to take account of physical interdependen-
cies amongst projects, a problem which exists whether rationing is 
present or not, cash interdependency is introduced. Projects, 
otherwise independent, become interrelated when the feasibility of 
the one depends on the cash flo1vs generated by the other, and the 
process of choice can become exceed~ngly complicated. (4) 
(4) For development of this subject, see vTeingartner. 
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However, the fundamental objection to a rate of return measure to 
discriminate between projects of different sizes (different, that 
is, even '1Ti th identical initial outlays) :ccmains valid. The need 
to make some allo1vance for the reinvestment opportunities available 
for intermediate cash flows calls for a modification of the 
straightforward NPV approach, but in no sense does it validate the 
\ 
IHH. The modification to NPV can· be in two forms, either· by changing 
the discount rate from the cost of c~pital to the opportanity 
reinvestment ratG, or by calculoting the,terminal value of each 
alternative programme of investment after taking into account the 
cash flows generated by projects financed by each inflow of caDh, 
and then, if desired, discounting the terminal value at the cost 
of capital. 
rrhe first approach has serious limitations: 
(a) it is only valid if the relevant rate is constant througho~t 
the life of the project. The reason is that the method operates 
by penalising cash flo'tTS for the lost opportunity of not being 
generated in an earlier period. If the opportunity rate chc;_nged 
from year to year the effect would be to penalise most severely 
those cash flo·ws \·Thich v1ould create the greater opportunities 
for the firm. 
(b) it presupposes that none of the cash flovrs is used to pay 
interest or dividends on the capital raised to finance the 
project ~~til the project is terminated. 
Whichever method is used, the conclusion is that, under 
rationing, the simple NPV approach is invalid, i.e. when the 
project's own cash flows are discounted at the cost of capital. 
Let this simple NPV be denoted by NPV (k ). NPV(k ), even under 
0 0 
rationing~ indicates the contribution a project makes to the wealth 
of the firm in respect of its .2J:!.£ cash flows. But the significance 
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of capital rationing is that the contribution which a project 
makes in isolation from the projects financed by its cash flows 
ceases to be the relevant criterion of choice. If it were valid 
to assume 1:t constant reinvestment x·ate then the NPV derived by 
discounting the cash flovrs at the reinvestment rate = NPV(k ) 
r 
would indicate the relative (not the absolute) desirability of 
alternative investment programme~. 
(5) Dudley and others have observed that if a firm is presented 
under rationing 1d th two or more project$ having identical outlays, 
and if the 1·ank.ing given by the simple NPV(k ) conflicts with the 
0 
ranking given by the IRR, then, provided the reinvestment rate is 
less than the Fi8her rate ( 6) (defined as the rate \'Thich brings the 
present valu.e of the tvro income streams into equality), the NPV(k ) 
0 
will rank correctly~ and if the reinvestment rate is greatEn: than 
the Fisher rate, the 1RR uill rank correctly. This has, surprisingly, 
been presented as evidence of the indeterminacy of the relative 
superiority of the NPV and the IRR approaches. It has, hoHever, 
been sho-vm above that, under rationing, the single NPV(k ) is 
0 
itself invalid in principle, and therefore the so-celled Fisher 
·rate is no more than an aritl~etic devica to indicate the point at 
which the invalidity of NPV(k
0
) actually manifests itself in terms 
of the ranking of the projects. If tl~ rate of reinvestments is 
less than the Fisher rate, the ranking given by NPV(k ) is correct 
0 
in fact though incorrect in principle. If the rate is greater than 
the Fisher rate, the ranking is incorrect in principle and incorrect 
in fact. But above the :E'isher rate, the IRR, which remains incorrect 
(5) Dudley, page 914 
(6) See Alchian, 1955. 
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incorrect in principle throughout, becomes correct in fact because 
above that rate the consequences of the invalidity are insufficient 
to cause the ranking to differ from the correct order. Even vrhen 
they do achieve correct ranldngs, the II\R and NPV(k ) are misleading, 
0 
because, being calculated without reference to the relevant reinvest-
ment rate., they imply that the relative clesirabili ty of alternative 
projects is independent of that r~te. 
The fact is that, when rationing exists, the relevant discount 
rate is the reinvestment rate and NPV(k ) 'produces the c0rrect ranking 
r 
(given the right conditions) vlhether the reinvestment rate is above 
or below the Fisher rate. If the conditions vrhich allov1 the use of 
NPV(k ) are absent, then NPV(k~) and IRR will not even rank correctly 
r v 
using the Fisher rate device, and their claim for consideration could 
not even be presented. Only the second of the NPV modifiQations will 
then yield correct rankings. It is not a valid critic ism of the NPV 
approach that the ranking given by 1TPV(k ) is not universally correct 
0 
in cil·cumstances uhere the relevant NPV criterion is not N.PV(k ) but 
0 
NPV(k ) or the terminal value approach. Still less is it a validation 
l' 
of the IRR techn:i.que if, in very limited circumstances, it is capable 
of indicating the correct order of preference, that is ( 1) when ther·e 
are no other sources ot· funds (2) ~hen the projects' initial outlays 
are equal (3) the servicing of capital is passive (Lir) the reinvestment 
rate is constant throughout the lives of t'he projects, and (5) the 
Fisher rate is known and understood. Even in these restricted 
circumstances, it has been shovm that the IRR remains invalid in 
principle, and gives the correct ranking merely because its degree 
of irrelevanc0 i.s insufficient to affect the rqnking. Payback can 
effect correct rankings for projects having a protracted series of 
equal cash floiW but remains nonetheless incorrect in principle. 
There is one possible set of circumstances in which the reinvestment 
61 
opportunities could have some bearing on the validity of the net 
present value and internal rate of return, not only in ranking 
project:::, but even in the accept~or-reject. iecision. There is an 
implicit assumption in both methods that the capital raised can be 
repaid as the cash flovrs are received, f9.iling which, that the cash 
flows can' be reinvested to earn a return at lea~;t equal to the cost 
\ 
of capital. (fie payment vrould include direct repayment, purchasing 
the company's loan stock on the marke't, paying out inc:r·eased dividends, 
and if applicable, purchasing the companyts 01m shares. Reinvestment 
opportunities viOuld include the purchase of shares or loan stock in 
other companies in the same risk class.) This assumption does not 
imply the relevance of reinvestment opportunities in a general sense, 
but merely requires the recognition of costs associated vrith holding 
surplus cash. 
Although it is reasonable to suppose that the circumstance8 
outlined are rarely if ever met, if they do exist the application 
of either the IRR or the NPV method in its pure form could lead to 
suboptimal decisions and even the acceptance of unprofitable investments .. 
The correct solution is to advance all cash flovrs ~eceivable in 
a period of capital su~plus at a compound rate of interest equal to 
the maximum available rate of interest on investments (Government 
stock, etc.) to the first period in which·capital surplus conditions 
do not apply ( v1hich may be before or even aftfJr the project has 
ceased) and to discount the resulting cash flows at the cost of 
capital to their present value. The effect is thus to incorporate 
the cost of carrying cash directly in the NPV computation, with the 
result that the basi.c validity of the NPi! approach remains intact. 
Apart from when capital is rationed, the other consideration 
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which gives a ratio of prof:i.tabili ty a more intuitive appeal than 
any measure of tho absolute contribution 1'1hicb the project makes, 
is in evaluating the project 1 s riskiness. The impact of :risk on 
the evaluation process vrill be taken up in the succeeding chapters, 
but, for the present, it is sufficient ·~o say that if the IRR is 
inapproprlate for discrimina tine; bet-1-reen. projects under conditions 
'· of certainty it cannot be validated by the introduction of 
uncertainty. A highe1' rate than normal may be required to compensate 
for a given level of risk, but the choice,between projects can still 
not be made on the basis of their respective rates of return. This 
must again be made on the basis of the net present values after 
adjusting for risk through the discount rate or after applying 
certainty-equivalent coefficients to the prospective cash flows. 
A~~t or Reject Decisions 
l''or accept-or-reject decisions, the IRR and the NPV ah;ays give 
the same solution, but since the IRR is invalid for all project 
comparisons, to justify its retention for the nonranking problem it 
must be shown to possess some advantage over the NPV. Bierman and 
Smidt vrho prefer the present value method as being "simpler, saftr, 
easier and more direct" ( ?) concede, hovJever, that the yield method 
may be useful "to d.ramatise the relative desirability of an investmentu 
and that the "relative desirability of the i.nvestment may be better 
judged if we know that the yield is 6o% or if we kn0'\'7 the yield is 
1o%." (8) 
For an investment project to be desirable, it must make a 
worthwhile contribution to the value of the firm. The contribution 
a project makes is a function of the average amount of capital 
(7) Bierman and Smidt, 4th edition, page 57. 
(8) Ibid., 2nd edition, page 49. In the 4th edition they do not even 
concede this much. 
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invested and the lifespan of the project. A project involving 
an outlay of £10 in period. 0 and an inflow of £16 in period 1 has 
an IRR of 60%, but is clearly undesirable in the sense of making 
any significant contribution to the firm. Therefore the IRR does 
not indicate the clesirabili ty of a project in an absolute sense. 
Presumably vrha t is meant by being a measure of desirability in a 
' relative sense, :.s that any projec"t is more desirable for having a 
higher rate of return than a lov1er one 1-rhatever its size. It has 
been shovm that eize should not be determ~ned by the initial outlay 
but by the average capital invested, taking account of the amount 
and pattern of cash flows. Since the IRR is determined by the 
pattern of cash flo\·lS ~ a project cannot have a different IRR unless 
it has a different size, and it follows that the above statement is 
equivalent to saying 'o. project is more desirable for having a high 
rate of return with one size than it is v1ith a low rate of return 
with a different size.' But this latter statement is true only if 
'different' means smaller. If 'different' means some flows are 
smaller and others greater it may or may not be true. In other 
words, as has already been demonstrated in the rankine; problem, the 
IRR is incapablE< of discriminating bet·ween hw patterns of cash flows. 
It is, therefore, as incorrect to say that a project is more 
desirable for having an IRR of 1o% rather than 9% as it is to say 
that it is more desirable than another project \'lith o/;b. Assume, 
for example, Project B in Table I were presented to a businessman, 
not in competition 'ITith A, but as an independent project requiring 
an accept-or-reject decision only. And assuming that it were possible 
for the cash flo1-rs to be regulated without increasing the risk, in 
such a way that the cash flows in year 1 could be delayed until 
year 2 and that the effect would be to produce £144 in that year 
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(as in Project A), then the businessman might be misled into taking 
the \'/Tong course of action by assuming that the project Has more 
desirable for having an IRR of 24% rather than 20%. Another vmy of 
expressing the same idea is that if A and B were independent projects, 
with identical risks, requiring accept-or-reJect decisions and the 
businessman imposed a cut-off of 21% for projects of that class, to 
represent his minirm..un level of ddsirabili ty, he vlOuld accept B and 
reject A despite the fact that A is superior. 
'I'he only circumstances in which a h:tgh rate of return can 
unequivocally be said to be preferable to a lower rate of return is 
v;hen the cost of capital falls behreen the tvro, which simply means 
that a project which is acceptable is categorically ~referable to a 
project which is unacceptable. IJ.'hus if a project has an IRR of 24-% 
it can validly be stated that such an IRR is superior to 2q;-6 provided 
the cost of capital falls between 2o% and 24%. If, in fact 1 the 
cost of capital is less than 20%, how·ever, this observation ceases 
to be relevant, because both IRRs are acceptable and '.j.. • l.v J.S quite 
invalid to conclude that a relationship which exists under certain 
hypothetical conditions continues to exist in the absence of those 
conditions. 
It has previously been observed that under perfect conditions 
no project would have an IRR greater than tpe cost of capital, that 
is,greater than the return required by the suppliers of capital, 
because in perfect equilibrium the suppliers of capital v10uld 1 require 1 
the return that was obtainable. The existence of a project with an 
IRR which is greater than the cost of capital therefore indicates a 
state of disequilibrium (imperfect competi tj_on, or artificially loi·T 
interest rates, as discussed more fully in the next chapter) and 
the rate of return can be perceived as being a measure of the degree 
6.5 
of disequilibrium. A high IRR unequivocally indicates a higher 
state of disequilibrium than does a lovrer IRR, but this is far 
from implying that a higher state of disequi..Hbrium is necessarily 
more desirable than a lo1<Ier state. All that vre can say is that 
\·Thilst a state of disequilibrium must exist to produce a benefit 
to the inVestor (a +ve NPV), the extent of the benefit is not 
directly a function of the degree~of disequilibrium. 
It follovrs then that, although the IRR gives a corr·ect signal 
' that a project can be undertaken without loss, it is not a numbe:r 
in a scale against \'lhich the businessman can represent the level 
of his 1 satisfaction 1 o It does not indicate how desi:cable a project 
is, far less whether that project is preferable to any other. 
Therefore, if its continued use is to be advocated in the accept-or-
reject situation, it can only be on the basis that businessmen 
constantly bear in mind that even 'I'Ti th the same risk a project :i_s 
not necessarily better for having a higher rather than a lo>.;er rate-
of-return. But in practice this can only be misleading in contrast 
to the NPV method, vrhere the businessman knOI'IS that for the same 
risk, £10,000 is unambiguously more desirable than £5,000. 
The maximum accentable cost of canital 
In the introductory chapter some very cumbersome efforts to make 
the IRR a meaningful statistic when non-simp'le investments are under 
review were examined. These efforts result from perceiving the IRR 
as a profitability ratio and the need to resolve the confusion which 
arises when some investments 'l'rhich are clearly desirable have no rate 
of return, 1·rhen others have hro or more rates of return, and others 
require the external cost of capital to be incorporated before the 
internal rate can be computed. It has been shmm that even \'Then 
these salvage efforts are carried out, the end result is a rate of 
~return per unit of capital invested, a measure which remains basically 
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irrelevant for selecting investments 1vhich have varying and 
unspecified amou.nts of capital invested in them. On the other hand, 
if the IRR is perceived not as a profitability statistic but as a 
cost of capital statistic, two advantages emerge, an immediate 
description of the restricted function 1·1hich the ratio has, and a 
better insight into the significance of the ratio for non-simple 
investments. It is suggested therefore that if the ratio 'l'rere 
interpreted as the breakeven cost of capital, a considerable amount 
of unnecessary conceptualie:ing could be spared. For the simple 
' 
investment~ the ratiov therefore, represents the maximum cost of 
capital 'l'rhioh could be paid 1·rithout incurring a loss. For a quasi-
borrm'Ting situatian, on the other hand, such as: 
Time 0 1 
Flm.,r + £100 -£110 
the ratio represents the minimu~ cost of capital which makes that 
particular source of finance preferable to alternative sources. 
~'his interpretation i3 alco more consistent with the logic of 
discounting. The effect of discounting is to impose a penalty on 
cash flm.,rs occurring in the future, and since the extent of the 
penalty is a function of the size of the discount rate, then the 
IRR method, \·rhich by definition discounts future flm·Ts at the IRR, 
would imply, if perceived as an index of profitability, that the 
more valuable a series of cash flovTs, the greater vlOuld be the 
penalty attached to these flows. That is, a cash flow of £1,000 
generated in period t with an IRR of 25% 'I'Tould be deemed to have 
a lower present value than a £1,000 generated in period t of a 
project vTith an IRR of 15%. The discount rats applied to future 
flows should not penalise them because they are profitable, but 
because the capital used to generate them has a cost, vThether an 
actual cost, an opportunity cost or a notional cost. In any given 
E? 
period the actual cost or opportunity cost cannot be both 15~0 and 
25%. 'I'hercfore the IRR is a notional cost, namely the maximum cost 
a project is capable of supporting. 
It is no-v; possible to avpr'oach the problems of multiple roots 
and imaginary roots >'lith some degree of understanding. 
'· 
The most celebrated example of the problem is the Lorie and 
Savage pu_mp project ( 9) v1h:i.ch involves th~ outlay of £1,600 
in Year 0 to extract the oil more quickly and advance the receipt 
of £10,000 from Year 2 to Year 1. The problem is represented in 
Table 3, ''~"here the application of the IHR methoJ yields tvm ans1·mrs, 
25% and 400]0. 
Solomon's assessment of the problem is as follows: 
11 Nei ther of these rates is a measure of investment vrorth, neither has 
relevance to the profitability of the project uncler consideration, and 
neither, therefore, is correct. The fault lies in the incorrect 
application of the "usual proscription" for finding the rate of return. 
The correct solution for the investment IWrth of the project is 
simple. But it requires an explicit answer to a rele11ant question: 
111o'lhat is it -vrorth to the investor to receive £10,000 one year earlier 
than he vlould have othervlise received it?" This is actually all that 
the installation of the larger pump aehieves. If the investor expects 
to be able to put the £10,000 to vlOrk at a yield of x per cent per 
annum, then getting the money a year earlier is v1o rth £1 OOx. If x is 
23 per cent, for example, getting £10,000 a year earlier is worth 
£2,300. In other vrords, if he spent £1 , 600 on the larger pump now 
(at that t ), he i·rould end up at time t having £2,300 more than he 
othervlise would have had. This can be stated as an equivalent "rate 
of return," which in this case would be about 20 per cent (£1,600 at 
20 per cent per annum vmuld amount to £2,304 at the end of two years). 
Using this approach, a unique and meaningful rate of retur~ c~n 
ah'lays be found for any set of cash inflovrs and outfl01'1"S. \ 10) 
The implication of Solomon's solution is that the pump project 
should be accepted if the cost of capital is less than his "unique 
(9) Lorie and Savage, pp. 235-38. 
(10) Solomon, page 79 of Hanagement of Corporate Capital, 
Macmillan, 1964. 
.68 
and meaningful rate of return". In fact the correct solution is 
that the project should be· rejected. :'3olomon 1 s line of argumen·t 
implies that even in non-rationing condi t.Lons a source of finance 
is acceptable siruply because the funds can be invested at a rate 
higher than the cost of capital. But the presence of a profitable 
investment opportunity is a signal only that finance should b~ 
\ 
raised and is not a justification for any particular source of 
fundso That justification comes from comparison i'lith alternative 
sources of finance. 
Solomon 1 s unique return of 20% is p:cesumably compared ui th 
the firm's cost of capital, sa-:;' 10%, and judeed acceptable. But 
if the investor hc;.s an opportunity to invest £10,000 in year 1 at 
23% he should borro>·T the £10,000 at HY;6 and thereby finance the 
project from normal sources, to produce a terminal value in Year 2 
of: 
Terminal value 
Less borrowed 
funds and interest 
This compares with Solomon's Solution 
Terminal value 
Less borrovTed 
funds and interest for ti·TO years 
£12,300 
1 t,OOO 
£ 1,300 
£ 2,300 
1 '936 
. £ 364 
The problem, then, consists of determining whether it is v10rth-
while undertaking a particular project to provide a source of funds. 
The evaluation should be on the basis of a comparison 1-ri th other 
sources of funds and not on the profitability of investment 
opportunities, although the existence of such opportunities must be 
ascertained before the decision to raise funds can be made. 
The two rates of return represent, then, a range of interest 
69 
NPV 
500 
0 
-500 
-1000 
£10 000 
NPV =: -£1 ,600 + (!~' -
' 
'· 
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rates vrl thin 1-.rhich it v10uld be to the advantage of the company to 
ra:i.~Je the i~10,000 by means of buying a pump rather than by calling 
on its normal sources of finance. 
\'lhy, it may be asked, is it cheaper to buy the pump ·\'Then al ternatj_ \re 
sources are above 25% and more expensive ·when they exceed 40o%? The 
answer is that the use of the £10~000 cash in year 1 has two costs: 
'· 
1 • A fixed charge of £1 , 600 :i.n year 0 
2. The interest charge of borrowing the £1,600. 
For inte:rest rates under 25% it is better for the company to 
raise the £10,000 through the normal channels and pay the year's 
interest on tlw.t sum rather than pay the fixed charge of £1,600 
ancl the interest on the £1 ,600. 
For interest rates between 25% and 400%, it is 1-mrthwhile paying 
the £1,600 and the related costs because the interest on the larger 
stun of £10,000 would be an even greater burden. 
For rates greater than 40o% the interest burden on the £1,600 
becomes so great that it v1ill, for all higher rates, be less expensive 
to raise the £10,000 directly rather than undertake the outlay of 
£1,600 and related interest costs in the previous period. 
The solution to the multiple-root situation in conditions of 
non-rationing is to discount the flows at the cost of capital; the 
resulting net present value vrill represent the contribution to the 
firm's value of seJ.ecting an unconventional method of raising finance. 
Curiously, therefore, far from being meaningless, multiple roots 
have more relevance to the investor in t!te context in which they arise, 
than has a unique rate of return in the normal investment appraisal. 
When confronted with a financing opportunity (which is essentially 
what the cash flovr pattern represents in the multiple root situation) 
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the investor is concerned 'd th a comparison of costs 'd th alternative 
financing sources. 
The multiple roots indicate clearly to him the range of costs 
"I'Ti thin v1hich the best alternative source muet fall to make this 
project preferable. He can 9 furthermoret by studying the curve 
\<Thich lies above the horizontal ax1.sr observe that if the best 
alternative "I'TaS at 7Cf}~, 8()50 or 350%t the pump would be worth 
purchasing, but that although the pump ~~ould be IDQr!l acceptable 
~ 
if al terna ti ve costs "l'ler·e 80% rather than 7or0 it 1muld be lees 
attractive if the alternative rose to 3507~. In other "l'rords, the 
diagram represents a sensi t:L vi ty analysis f vrhich is perhaps a 
useful su_pplement to the single NPV figure proposed as the solutione 
If discounted at 100% the NPV indicates the contribution the project 
makes but it does not indicate vlhether the contribution \orould be 
more or less if the cost of capital were 101%. 
Certain cash flovr patterns consistent vii th 1 respectable 
( 11 ) investment options' ' have ueen identified as having no real 
internal rate (i.e. \vhere the present value equation has only 
imaginary roots). As v1i th multiple roots, this phenomenon has been 
used to support the view that the IHR is ambiguous. Examples of 
investment pattern having no real rates of return are contained in 
Table 4. 
(11) Hirshleifer, page 468 of Book of Reading, Archer and 
D'Ambrosio, Hacmillan, 1967. 
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Period H J 
0 -1 +1 
1 +3 -3 
2 -2-L 
-2 +2t 
IRR None None 
NPV Ah<·~ys - ve .Ahmys + ve 
Those viho perceive the Internal Rate of Return as an index of 
profitability undcrstEJ.ndably take the vievl that if no internal rate 
can be found an investrnent such as .T, which is clearly capable of 
being profitable~ such an index cannot be relied on Vii th any 
confidence• But, once again, it is in these circumstances in which 
the Internal Rate of Return has been dismissed as ambiguous or 
meaningless that the benefit of perceiving it as a 1111o.ximmu cost 
of capital 1 is most apparent. The absence of a discount rate vrhich 
equates the present value of the inflows of a project 1•Ii th the present 
value of the outfloviS signifies that there is no constant cost of 
capital vThich vwuld make that project acceptable, or, depending on 
the pattern of cash flovrs, unacceptable. Thus, Table 5 illustrates 
that there is no cost of capital that v10uld make the 'financing-
project' H an a.cceptable source of capital, or invest1uent J an 
unacceptable investment. 
It would always be more advantageous to borrow £3 in period 1 
at any cost of capital than to undertake project H and borrow £1 in 
period 0 at the same cost of capital, and incur an outlay of £2t in 
period 2. Conversely, undertaking project J is ahTays a cheaper 
method of generating £1 in period 0 and £2t in period 2, than 
borrowing these amounts directly at whatever cost. 
Therefore, the fact of having no internal rate of return is not 
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in itself meaningless or ambiguous. It indicates for example, 
that project J is desirable at any cost of capital. But that is 
an 1 accept·~or-reject 1 decision. The defect of the measure is, 
once again, that it fails to discrj.minate betv1een project J and 
any other mutually exclusive project. To rnake that selection it 
is nccessa~y to ascertain which project makes the greater 
contrihution to the firm. 'rhis cad: be achieved only by the Net 
Present Value method. 
+ 
+j_ 2 
- 1 
J 
In Table 6 , a series of projects are presented which differ 
from one another in duration, in cash flo1v pattern, and in the 
amouni of the initial outlay. The order of preference-is given 
by their respective net present values rather than by their 
respective rates of return. \1e have established that the 
explanation is simply that each project has a different scale from 
the others and hovrever profitable a project may be in relation to 
its size, it may not make as significant a contribution to the 
value of the firm. as an alternative project of a greater size, 
even although the latter is less profitable. It is the monetary 
contribution which a project makes which is the primary 
consideration in the ranldng of al ternat:i.ves, and a valid 
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Net Cash Flo1'JS 
Year H N p Q R 
0 i2P000 j.,ooo f.~ooo ·t,ooo t ,ooo 
+ 10 +2, 100 +2,500 +2,200 
2 
3 +3,109 + 329 +1,728 
4 + 483 
---~ --
NPV L345 t156 /272 /:.330 ,297 
IRR 16J6 17% 25% 23% 20% 
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selection can never be achieved, other than by chance, on the basis 
of a ratio of profitability. Table 7 demonstrates how the scale of 
a project might be measured. The resulting figure of £5,981 represents 
the equivalent amount of capital employed for one year in project l'l, 
taking into account the effect of the cash flO'I·rs on the capital 
outstanding in each year. Table 8 contains the 'scale' of number of 
units of ca.pi tal employed as calcuJ,ated by the same method for each 
ax (;W ottu. fM,w 
of the five projects. Project R cannot have a higher NPV than 
t- ~ ~SD"'-
project N and a lower N"?V than project I1 @.eea:u.se of its lovrer initial 
cmtlayo It is more 'profitable' than both 11 and N but M has more 
units of capital profitably employed and succeeds in producing a 
greater increase in the firm's wealth. N has more capital initially 
invested in it but has a smaller total investment of capital \·1hen 
seen in perspective over the three years. To specify its cash flow 
pattern as the explanation for its superiority to N, and its longer 
life for its greater acceptability than P, and its lower initial 
outlay for its inferiority to H is simply to recognise the symptoms 
and not the cause. 
Ascertaining the scale of a project does not in itself have any 
practical value. The merit of the NPV method is that it measures 
the contributions vlhich a project makes \d thout the necessity of 
computing the number of capital units involved. But if v1e are to 
accept the observation that practitioners are reluctant to accept 
the NPV without some method of relating it to the size of the project, 
then it may be useful to be able to provide some index of relative 
profitability to supplement the absolute monetary measure, even 
although it has to be borne in mind that the supplementary ratio 
has no authority beyond that provided by the primary measure. But 
such an index should satisfy certain criteria before its use as a 
supplementary ratio is warranted; it should be simple to understand; 
it should be consistent vlith the assumptions underlying the NPV method; 
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Table 7 · 
----
Calculation of nwnber of units of capital employed 
Project IVJ: Project N 
PV PV 
Year x.~act\?r lt'actor 
1 Invested Capital £2;000 1.00 £2,000 £2,000 1900 £2,000 
2 Interest at 1 o;:& 200 200 
~-~- ~--
2,200 2,200 
Cash flovr 10 2,100 
-
Invested Capital 2,190 .909 1 , 991 100 .909 91 
3 Interest at 10% 219 10 
2,409 .826 1 '990 110 .826 91 
---
Units of Capital Employed £5,981 £2·, ~82 
-
M 
Units of Capital Employed 5981 
NPV 345 
IRR 16% 
PI 1.172 
ERI 5.&% 
Ranking. 
~-· 
NPV 1 
IRR 
PI 2 
ERI 
\ 
78 
N 
2182 
156 
17% 
1.078 
7.2% 
5 
4 
5 
4 
p 
2000 
272 
25% 
1 .136 
13.6% 
4 
1 
4 
2 
Q 
2000 
330 
23% 
1.165 
16. 57S 
2 
2 
3 
1 
R 
3000 
297 
2or; 
1 .297 
9.9% 
3 
3 
1 
3 
and since the object is to supplement the NPV and not to provide an 
alternativef tho index should relate the NJ'V directly to some measure 
of the size or scale of the project. 
The tvro existing profi tabili.ty ratios are, of course, the IRR 
and the PI (the present value of the future returns divided by the 
investment outlay). The IRR, ho>·rever, fails to meet any of the above 
\ 
criteria. It has the ummrranted reputation of being readily 
comprehensib1e to businessmen, but it is doubtful if the significance 
of a rate of return internal to a project is fu!.ly understood. It 
may be interpreted as the rate of growth of each unit of capital 
initially invested but without any apparent means of specifying the 
number of units invested for a single year only, or t-vro years etc. 
Alternatively, it may be perceived as the annual rate of return for 
each unit of capital invested in the total Hfe of the project, again 
without any obvious means of quantifying the nlliTLber of units of 
capital employed. In order to measure the number of units employed 
according to the method descrj.bed in Table 7, the rate used to 
discount the annual outstanding capital could no longer be equal to 
the cost of capital since that >wuld imply that the resulting number 
of units of capital had succeeded in achieving the internal rate. 
But to discount at the IRR itself would imply that tho amount of 
capital invested in any particular year 1-ras partly a function of 
the cash flows received after that year since these in part determine 
the IRR, and this would be clearly confu8ing, if not absurd. In 
addition, how does one conceptualise an IFR of 17~~ against a cut-off 
rate of 15% and evaluate the project's desirability in relation to an 
alternative project -vrith an IRR of 19% and a cut-off rate of 16? 
In other 'l'rords, the IRR suffers from a fundamental inconsistency 
with the NPV method namely that it takes no account of the cost of 
capital. V'hat is alleged to be a source of strength, the fact that 
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the IRR"is independent of the cost of capital) is in fact a basic 
weakness, since uoth the NPV and the sizn of the project are a 
function of the cost of capitalo Finally, the possibility of 
multiple returns etc. provides an unnecessarily burdensome framework 
for both specialist and non·-specialist seeking to acquire an insight 
into the economic rationale of the investment process., 
\ 
11'he Profitability Index (or Benefit-Cost Ha tio) does have the 
merit of avoiding many of the technical problems associated with the 
IRE and of seeking to place the NPV in a meaningful context. But it 
suffers from the serious defect of equating the size of a project 
with its initial 011tlay, ignor:i.ng the time scale or the amount of 
capital outstanding throughout the life of the project. It is 
apparent from table 8 for example tlmt the PI misleading suggests 
that project R is substantially more 'profitable' than any of the 
other projects, as a result of the disproportionate emphasis on 
the initial ou tJ.ay. 
A new ratio is therefore proposed which for \\'ant of a better term 
is called the Excess Return Index. It is illuatrated in Table 8. The 
denominator is equal to the total capital employed in the project 
as calculated by the method doscribod in Table 7, and the numerator 
is the net present value. The ratio is consistent "'I'Tith the underlying 
logic of the primary selection procedure and incorporates the NPV 
directly. One cannot arrive at or comprehend the ratio without first 
being made aware of the absolute contribution "'l'rhich the project makes 
to the wealth of the firm. In addition, it directs the attention of 
the user to the size of the project, thus highlighting the fundamental 
reason 1·rhy profitability ratios cannot be used in isolation to 
discriminate between alternative proposals. It is relatively easy 
to conceptualise, the capital employed being the equivalent a~ount of 
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capital . .invested for one year at the required return~ and the NPV 
being the immediate increa$e in the firm's value as a result of 
employing that capital. In Table 8 the l'anking produced by the ERI 
is compared to that of the IRR and the PI. Not one of the methods 
ran.ks consistently in agreement I'Ii th the NPV method, but, as 
previously observed, that is an inevitable concomitant of the scalar 
differences betvreen the projects. \The NPV remains the only valid 
criterion. But of the tlu'ee indices of relative performance, the 
ERI alone pu_ts the NPV .i.H u or1·ect per spec ti ve and pl'OVide8 the user 
with a valid measure of the project's effectiveness in relation to 
its size. 
CONCLUm.Qli 
The alleged preference for a ratio rather than an absolute 
monetary measure to describe an investment may be an understandable 
desire to extend the familiar technique employed in the securities 
market. The IRR is the accepted yardstick for measuring the relative 
merits of govermnent or corporai;e bonds, and its application to 
productive investments is clearly an inviting possibility. But I'Tha t 
distinguishes financial securities from productive investments is 
that there are effectively no constraint::~ on the amount of capital 
which can be invested in the former. The choice is not normally 
bet\'reen investing £10,000 in I.C.I. or £12,000 in General Motors 
stock but between the investment of an unspecified number of units 
in either, with the result that the rate of return per unit of capital 
is a legitimate criterion for making the choice. The approach, however, 
cannot be extended to the selection of real investments, which require 
a specific amount of capital for a predetermi~ed period of time. 
Productive projects come in 'parcels' and the selection of one parcel 
from another of a different size can only validly be effected by a 
comparison of the amounts by I'Thich each project increases the value 
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of the firm, and not the percentage return 'l·rhich each parcel yields 
per unit of capital invested. \'/hen applied to real investments the 
IRR is capable of giving an apparently correct solution.. It is also 
capable of giving incorrect solutions. \•ihat the text-books fail to 
point out is that· there is no method of knovli.ng >·rhen it will give a 
correct so:Lution other than by determining the NPV. vli thout the NPV 
the only si tuat:i.on in vrhich tvro in~estments can confidently be said 
to be ranked correctly by the IRR is v1hen they are identical in every 
respect! As for an accept-or-reject decision there is no occasion 
when a high IRR can in itself be said to be better than a lower one, 
because that vrould be to say that a given set of cash flovw in better 
for being as it is, rather than different, and the IRR can only be 
confidently relied upon to discriminate betvreen two patte:r·ns of 
cash flows -vrhen the patterns are not different. 
lt has been proposed that, if it is perceived as the highest 
cost of capital that could be paid for the funds used to finance 
a project, the limitations of the IRR might be more readily r·ecognised, 
and the controveroies about its significance when there is no unique 
solution to the present value equation finally set to rest. In 
addition, the business community might be better disposed to accepting 
the validity of the present value concept without fear of being 
mystified by the confusion that has surrounded it. 
Sffi<1NARY 
The essential problem. in capital budgeting is to select the 
combination of projects which exploits to the maximum the imperfect-
ions of the market. If competition amongst firms v1ere perfect and the 
securities market totally efficient, com;anies would not be able to 
achieve returns in excess of that required by the suppliers of capital. 
Prospective projects would have zero NPVs, or, equivalently, IRRs 
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equal to the required return, and the selection of projects vwu1J. 
be relatively straightforward. It is the existence of imperfect 
markets vrh:Lch alloviS projects to be under Laken v1i th expected 
returns :Ln excess of the required return, ·v1hich, in turn, gives 
rise to the difficulties in the selection procedure. The source 
of the problem in ehoosing real investments is their indivisibility, 
which precludes the selection proc~dures appropriate to the 
securities market and i·rhich necessi i.:ates that the expected excess 
returns be expresse<l in absolute monetary terme in order to make 
the optimvm selection possible. ~rhc IRR vws found to be invalid. in 
principle even under the limited circumstances in vrhich it happens 
to produee correct rankings. If users find it desirable to relate 
the project's NPV to the scale of the pro<ject, this might be achieved 
by using, as a supplementary measure, the Excess Return Index described 
in this chapter i'lhich, unlike the IRR and PI ratios, reflects the 
essential difference between choosing a financial security and a 
productive investment. 
NOTE. In discussion, it is sometimes convenient to speak of a 
project having a high or lovl rate of returno This is not a 
contradiction of the principle that the yield approach is invalid 
for choosing investments. To say that a project has a high yield 
is a convenient v1ay of emphasising that there are excess returns 
available to be exploited. It remains true, nonetheless, that to 
measure the significance of the excess returns only the NPV approach 
is valid. Therefore, if in the subsequent chapters a project is 
described as having a high rate of return, this is simply to avoid 
the more cumbersome but more technically correct expression 'a high 
positive net present value.' 
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Chapter Three 
'l'H\ii NET l;ImSSNT VALUE PJJI,J.<; 
The trad::_tiona1 assm1.ption that rational investors are averse 
to risk has led. to tl1e vridely acce1)ted proposition that the minimu.m 
return acceptable to investors in risky assets must be greater than 
the defaull;-~f,·ep rate. This in turn has led to the decision rule 
that firms Bhould~ 
(a) di8COLmt: the exrx;cteci values of the annual cash flOi'IS at a risk·~ 
adjusted rate, or 
(b) clif3COv.nt the certainty-equivalent cash floHs at the risk-free 
rate, anci shoulci accept only projects v~hich have a positive net 
present value. Of course, precisely because projects are risky, 
then accepting thof:le >-Ihich are expected to yield ;:;;ere than the 
required return is no guarar.+;ee that such returns vr:i.JJ. be achieved. 
Some vrill earn considerably less than the minimum acceptable 
return and others will earn more than their expected return 
(their IRR), but by the :!..m1 of large rnunbers, if there is no 
systematic bia;=:; on the part of corporate decisio;;.~r::aksrs 1 
estimates, the averc.ge achieved returns fro:n the aggrege.te of 
projects undert8ke:n in the market as a whole .shoald exceed the 
average minirm.'m acceptable return of investors financing those 
projects. 
Equity investors, it seems therefore, have t'ITO incentives to 
entice them into a portfolio of equities in preference to a default-
fre& security: A) the fact that management seeks a return on their 
capital i'lilicl: parports to compensate them for their aversion to 
risk, and B) the fact that the company will not undertake subseq1.1.ent 
expansion unless the returns from the nevr projects are expected to 
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exceed the return required by the ncv1 suppliers of capital, \·Ti th 
the result that the existing shareholclers should benefit by a 
corresponding increase in their wealth. 
Since the incentive offered by A alone is, by definition, 
sufficient to attract investors, the additional returns arising 
from tbe sul>sequent wealth-increments proc1uced by B must be a 
sup})lemen tary bonus. That is, B cannot be explained away as the 
reward for risk if projects are discounted at the rate which is 
the reward for risk. 
In present value terms this excess return for a particular 
project is represented by its net present value, and w·hen the 
firm undertakes a new project, the value of the firm should arise, 
ceteris paribus; by an amount equal to the net present value. 
This accretion in value accrues entirely to the firm's shareholders 
and its existence demands that there be a disparity betv;een the 
return required by the shareholders and the prospective return 
from the project. A positive net present value signifies one of 
three events: . ::' 
(1) A transfer of wealth to one company from others as a result of 
the former securing some competitive advantag8 
{2) A creation of new wealth as a result of some technological 
advance, increased productive efficiency, or the discove:ryof 
new resources. 
( 3) Disequilibrium behreen the return required by the suppliers of 
capital and the opportunity return from productive investments. 
If all +ve NPVs were attributable to the first of these events, 
that is if one company's +ve NPV implied by necessity a proportional 
reduction in the value of other competing firms, this would suggest 
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that the pursuit by individual companies of the classical \·Walth-
maximising goal could not secure any benefit to the holder of the 
markE·t portfolio, since mis \'TOUJ.d not be increased in aggregate 
but merelJ changed ui th respect to its distribution beh1een the 
components of tbe portfolio. In a portfolio context tf.en a 
positive net present value vlOuld be of no significance to 
sharehol<lers, and it Hould be a matter of indifference that a 
firm selected a project with a low NPV in preference to one with 
a high NPV. 
Indeed, if there vrere perfect competition bet·ween firms, no 
such NPVs vlOuld arise because the competitive advantage of the 
one company vrould be instantly eliminated by the competitive 
process. In these circumstances all projects l'lDUld have zero 
NPVs and it vrould not be possibl~ to add to the weal i;h of 
shareholders either at the individual company level or at the 
aggregate portfolio level. 
To have any real economic significance to the portfolio 
holder the +ve NPV rule and vreal th~maximising goal must imply 
the possibility of adding real v1ealth to the aggregate portfolio 
as well as to the individual company, vrhether by the discovery of 
additional resources or the development of some more effective 
production technique. Since the present study is operating 
within the wealth-maximising framework of conventional theory, 
the possibility that new '·Iealth can be created for shareholders 
will be assumed hereafter. 
The third source of positive net present value calls for 
special· explanation. The ·wealth arising is not new wealth or a 
transfer of wealth from one company to another but a differential 
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ll(:;cJtil r::1'·::: £::1 by tb::: fnilu:co of the market rate of intere~ot to 
)~c::Jl :p:r·o01Jc"\;iy'-' :i.J.wcu·!;':E::ntr;. 'J':he corJt of ec1uity equals the 
·i ·1"' .. ," ·1 <>Var1 i· , n·,·em~J· urn for r· ·J· ~+ ( 1) 
..J.. l_l:_..~-.t_J - J' LJ,. l"·\.. •~ .1-J .. )..O 
then the co:st o:f eqld.ty '.-J:!.Jl li.ke.vl:l.::;e be belo\·J its equilibrium 
l'cvcL It :L·ol.l.c•d:J the<.t a p:r0.joet yi1::lding a Teturn equal to 
the eg_uili b;··:Lum :rate of :interE,~e>t 11ill produce a +ve NPV if i t~1 
J·cl:UJ.'J".s a:c•:· d:i.~·;<:;onntul at a :rnte bolm·r the equilibrium rate. 
It it; nr:(;CI:lEw.ry to consider' hovl it is possihle for the rate 
of intere~::-i: i::) be belo1·; :tts equil:i.b.r-ium level. Before doing so, 
ho1·1ever, :i.t :sbould be noted that the possibility of achieving 
profits in exce:c;s of the requi:ecments of tbe suppliers of rick 
capital can be only part:Lally att:c-i1J1tted to inventivenesfl; 
tcchnologiciil aclvances, mane,eerial flair, etc. If the ms.rket 1 s 
competitive fOl'Ces ope:cate relativt;ly efficiently. one 1'/0uld 
e:x:Jx:;ot the opportuni b.e;.:J to achieve surplus returns of this na ti..1.re 
to be restricted in numller, at least to the extent of making it 
impracticable for the prospect of achieving surplus returns to 
be the primary criterJon for acceptance of investment projects. 
Yet the positive net p:i.'csent value· rule ( -v;berc tho Nl'l/ is computed. 
by discounting the expected. cash flows at the 'risky' rate) states 
precisely that,namely that the achievement of returns surplus to 
the required 1 risky' rate should be a prerequis~ te for r.evr 
investment::.;. Finance text-books tend to state th0 rule as accept 
projects if 
t :::: 0 
( 1 ) Van Horne , page 1 i 0 • 
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~ 0 /l' 
• ~. ···', ., ·. ' -, , .• 'I ( 2 ) J,.• ···-· ·',· . _,1 •("··.···-· ~ but in IJ.t'•JC 1._ \..•. >· l),) 1,1.) vi.1•~'· c• L_, :.c ·~ L8 nO j,IJ()(;?!)GiVG tO 8.CCE:'[)t 
wca:Lth cd.' Uw C;J::Lc-ot:i.ng r:l!8J'elwldernp 11\lir:h i.:.: the assumed objective. 
mc:nts :LmpJ:i t'U'> a :factor otl·.r:::c 'Llw.:n ;-;bnormal p:r·o:('J ts. It imp1it.:8 the 
t.ht.: f :i.:nn 1 fl e;ost of capi to.l) to be less than 
tbc warginal pioduct:Lvi ct cap:i.ta.J, D. fo:r-ce 9 in effect, Nhich 
p1·ochwes a div,•:rgcnce bG i:•>:een the 1 1non<:::y ra "t;o 1 prevailing j_n the 
lo<:m market a;:,d t.:be:: 1 llE!.tLU'<!.l rr:\·:;e 1 (:;) attainc1ble from marginal 
pro clue ti ve invc :; i.;n,en ts. Lccnnl:i.ng to the class teal theory of 
interest, thG l't:tte of :inteTest is c3ependent on the supply of savings 
and the dernand for loanal,le l'J.nds 1 and the J.ong~.:cun equilibrium rate 
of interest in the loE"n ma:r-1\.(-:t :i.;,; one in ~~hich the money rate coincides 
1·d.th tho nat·ural re.te or, equivalently, 1·rith the marginal productivity 
of capital. But this eqn:i.lilJriwn state is essentially a long-run 
concept and does not preclude shor t...:r:un discrepancies beh1een the 
money and nahn·Ell rates. Incleedp this possibility is recognised by 
the classical scbool. (-"t) I<' or exam1)1e, if for any reason the quantity 
of money is increased, causing the bond demand curve to be shifted to 
the right and the supply curve to the left, the:re l'iill be a decline 
in the money rate of interest which will produce a discrepancy between 
the market and natural rates of interest. This decline, it is argued, 
\'Till be a transitory one, because the discrepancy 11 automatically 
generates equilibrating forces 11 ( 5) v1hich bring the money and 
(2) Van Eorno; pe.ge 74, and \·leston and Brigham, page 267. 
(3) These terDs were originated by Wicksell. 
(4) Patinkin, page 369. 
(5) Patinkin, page 368. 
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na tP ,.,."] lAte s to cq_uali ty. The inflationary effectc~ of em inc;rease 
in t~~'"-' ,,~,!'ley ~;up~lJ eventually bring about a revex·sal in the do1mv;ard 
mover,icn\; L'f the intcref;t l'ate and a reh,~·n to tlKl equilibrium level. 
But "L<c:a.u.se the equilibrating force is not ml inst<mta.neous process J 
then durj_ng the period of adjustment, borrowers will be able to raise 
:finn.J.•CG nt lOi>c> thr::.n the equ.:L:U. br:Lum price. I:cving Fisher, \'lhose 
tllcoj:•y (Jf j.ntcr0::d: ::;c,_ppo:cted the notion of an intere:::t rate 1-1hj_ch 
adju2L~ complctoJ.y to anticipated rates of inflation, conceded in the 
fnce o:f cvid.oJwe to the contrnry, that 'vrhen r)rices are rising, the 
ra.JGe of interest tends to be liigh but not so high as it ahould be to 
l(6), n' 
comr)(ciWB.te for the r·ise ~ and, agaJ.n, that 'men nre unable or 
um·ril1:i.:o.g to adjust at a.ll accurately and pl'Omptly the money interest 
rate.s to changed priee level::;. The erratic behaviour of real interest 
is e>.'i.clontly a trick played un the money market by the 1 money illusion 1 
v1hen •.;ontraets are mad.e in unstable money. 1 ( 7 ) If the money rate 
exceed::; the natural rate in periods of deflation, there is no 
corresponding adverse effect on productive borrowers (borrowers for 
conmPnption pu1·posos 1>Till, of course, suffer) other than the temporary 
disaPl)'.::arancc of opportunities to exploit the imperfections of the 
bond market. The net present value rule should signal to corporate 
borro\Jcrs a rejection of all marginal projects (whici 'irill yield a 
negative net present value at the money rate of interest) until the 
interest rate falls below its natural level. 
There are, doubtless, other forces in addition to increases 
in the cruanti ty of money v.rhich operate to produce a divergence 
beh~een the market and the equilibrium rate of interest, and in 
(6) Fishe:e, page 368. 
(7) Ibid., page 415. 
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currency to me~~t tile ·;;ccd~:; of 1)n:cJ.·o·;~ers at a l'easonable rate 9 or 
( 9) by fiscal policy. Also, management appear to some extent to 
be conditione~ to exu~t influonce in the market to produce a 
discrepancy in tllc t\,'O ·ca:l;o:J ur~d ·(;o create a climate of opinion in 
t to be intrinsically desirable. 
( '10';·, 
In a stud.y by Jl}erret. t Di'ld Sykc:3 in 1966, a co::npa:r L~'>on Has made 
behwen the ex posi.: re:c;i..l.l ts of uuclatcd GoYe:cmnent Stock (2·} Consols) 
and thosG of a 1dcleJ.y 1)i:~Ged po:L·tfolio of U.K. securi tie.s. For the 
period 1 949-1966 the .L'l:' bnn on the Consols on a year to year basis 
avere.ged -0.65b J.n rea} teTms compe1·ed to +7.4% for eq1.J.Lties. This 
vrould suggost a pers~.Dtc::;;.-!.; fe.ilur·e on the part of fixed-interest 
investors to predict the trend of inflation, or a persistent 
inability to raise in tf:·re s t ro. tr-" c; to a level which c or:Jpensa ted them 
for inflation. 
Whatever the cause might ber if the interest rate is below its 
'natural' level, then, assuming the interest rate directly governs 
the cost of equity capital ( I'Ihether or not there is a risk-premium 
added), the latter vr:iJ.l also be proportionately less than its 
1 natural 1 level. As a consequence, a firm 1 s >·leigh ted-average cost 
of capital vr:i.ll be less than tl1e return ~m its marginal projects, 
and the marginal projects will, v~1en discounted at the cost of 
capital, have a net present value I'Jhich is positive nohri thstanding 
(8) 
( 9) 
( 10) 
For example, in the U.K., Ue period 1932-1951 1·1as marked by a 
'cheap money' policy, inaugurated by the conversion of War Loan 
from a 5% to 3~; basis in 1932, and later intensified by Dalton's 
ultra-cheap money drive in 1 946. '£hroughou t the period the Bank 
Rate uas unch[ciJ{Scd at ~&. 
Hirshleifer, page 137. 
See Solouons fof' example 1 pcwes 61-62. 
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their marginality. 
There arc, therefore, a combination of forces which operate to 
c8tablish positive net present values or surplus returns for tho 
equity investw·. Hhen he pu.rcllases a portfolio of ec1ui ties he can 
expect to achitfvet on average, a return equal to his required minimum 
plus the right to participate in the future series of wealth increments 
arisb1g from project~l undertaken and financ0cl by cap:L tal raised after 
his acquisitioD of the portfolio. Hence the rationale of the 
classical shareholde~-wealth-maximising objective. 
Four ex ante returns can be identified for a company vd.thin a 
given risk class, assuming for the present that all companies 
vli thin the class are fina:r\ced by equity only and there are no taxes: 
k == the minimum return acceptable to investors in the firm's 
e 
equity capital 
k == the average return expected to be earned by investors from r 
holding the firm's equity capital 
k ::::: the average retu:rr: expected by investors from the fir·m' s 
a 
projects 
k. = the defaul t-fr·ee rate 
~ 
In perfect market conditions k = k = k , and under conditions of 
e r a 
certainty, or risk-indifference,= k .• But, if projects are to be 
~ 
capable of yielding +ve NPVs, it is necessary that k be greater 
a 
thank and k .• And since over the life of the firm k should on 
e ~ r 
average equal k, then k should also be greater thank and k .• 
a r e ~ 
The implications of the generally accepted assumption that the 
expected return and the minimum required return on equity are 
substantially synonomous are presumably that investors 
(a) require the return vrhich they expect to obtain, or 
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(b) bid up the price of securi tie:c> expected to yield. more than is 
reqrdred until tl1d:r· value is :nwh e.s to yield only the return 
villir:h :i.nvestors :cequi:r·e. 
It hac3 been shown, hmrever, that if a num1)er of acceptable 
projects of similar risks have IRFW of varying magnitudes, the 
reqni:ced return, k , mnst be less than the expected averat;e return, 
e 
k t because k is a marr,ina.l rate whilst k is the averatse of 
a e · a 
expected rates above the margin. Therefore, investors cannot 
eliminate the disparity between k and k simply by raising k 
e r e 
to the 1eveJ. of k 9 because, since k is the investment cut-off r e 
rate used by management, all projects vri th IRRs less than k ("" k ) 
a r 
would be rejected, resulting in a new k which was again greater 
a 
than the nevr k , a process \'Thich would continue until k = the IHR 
e e 
of the single most profitable project in the class, and a major 
recession takes placeo 
The relationship between the ex-ante and the ex-post returns on 
equity securities is illustrated in Figure 1. P.M.= the total 
J J 
set of projects in risk class j available in the market. For 
simpl:i_ci ty, to begin Hith, the problem of leverage is ignored, and 
each firm engaged in the production of projects in risk class j is 
assumed to be all-equity financed such that the required minimum 
return, and the long-run ex-post return on the firm's equities 
equal respectively the required minimum return, the expected actual 
return and the long-run ex-post return on the firm's productive 
investments. lf p.kj ~the set of acceptable projects in risk 
J e 
class j, then kj = the minimum acceptable rate for projects of the 
e 
class. If some projects in class j have IRRs kj as is implied 
e 
by the shape of the curve P.M., then the average ex-ante IRR of 
"J J 
J33 
RATg 
OE' 
RETURN 
•• 
NUJ.'IBEH O.B' INVESTBENT OPPORTUNI'l'IES 
IN RISK CLASS j 
FIGURE 1 
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tl1c total ::wt of acccplaule productive invostmGnts, k;, \vill be 
and, if as is likely, E\cJS1WLint; no systematic 
t>i&r:; in tlic; cash flo\'r estimates at the corporate level, 
·j j 
=-c Jr''. 1·->rw-re ]r - the average ex-pc·.~:t rate of return on 
·'p' . ~ ' '"p 
proclucLL-v~· hc·vc~d;HKmts of class j, then kj vdll p 
than kj. The ex-post rates of return (of which 
e 
also be greater 
lcj is the average) p 
arc denoto2 by the dots. The expected ca~h flows from the shares of 
,c,J}. f:i.j'JC~s 1n 'the clar;s 'l'ri:ll be discount<:.d in the market at kj. 
e 
Tf l:;j -l kJ an analysis of ox-post retu:c11S will not indicate 
-- ~ \.p 1 · -B. r 
anything cxc(;pt; to give an 
nsmJJ.nccl to be equal to k;j? 
a 
incorrect estimg.te of kj. If kj is 
a p 
then an analysis of kj will yield a p 
value for kj but indj.cate nothing o£ kj 
a e 
unle&s the relationship 
bcb.recn kj and kj is known. If it 1·;rere true that investors 
e a 
related their' required returns directly to the perfC>rmancc of 
shares in tho past, then kj would be raised to the level of kj 
0 p 
vrith the re~:mlt that kj l'roul<.l be located at a higher point on 
a 
the curve P .N. a process which 1wuld continue until the values 
J J 
of kj kj ~~d kp coincided at the highest point on the curve, e' a c"g_ '"j 
implying ( i) a. continually cieclining aggregate supply of 
investible ftinds as the prospective rate of return increased 
or (2) the disappearance of the imperfect compoti tiC>n vThich made 
it possible for the curve P J1. to be other than horizontal. 
J J 
It follmm, then, that the minimum acceptable rate for a 
given risk class will, on average, be less than return expected 
to be achieved.. If a similar analysis is carried out for all risk 
classes in the market, then it could be shovm that the weighted 
average ex~post return of all classes would. be less than the 
weighted nverage ex·Aante required return for all classes. 
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Let us assume for tho moment that the cost of capital is constant, 
that the mnrlrr:d; :Lr~ not vola tile, and that all earnings are pCJ.id out in 
dividunds. Apa~t from inc:ccases in the amount of capital invested from 
time to time a:ri:'>ine from mc;vT savin~:;s 1 th0 value of the market portfoliu 
1"i'ill rise pe:r:~_oclicnl1y a:'l ~c: result of the :Lno:re&ses in wealth represented 
by the NPVs assoc:La-i;ed 1dth lHcl·r tecbn.ology etc o If l·ie look back to try 
to find out tlte :ccd;urn requ.L·cd by :Lnve;cd;ors, this could be achieved by 
relating the ave:cD{;'Ej earni11,c;r~ to the average market value of the 
portfolio. For this pur1JODG tho L1crea.se in marl:et value of the portfolio 
resulting from the gener·ation of neH >·wal th could be treated as an invest-
ment of new capital rather than as a windfall return to the preceding 
portfolioholclers. In effecty an investor's requj.recl return would never 
be earned in the form of a capital gain but only in dividends. All 
capital gains vrould be surplus r·eturns. 
In practice, hOI'iever, the cost of capital is not constant, 
companies do not pay out all earnings in dividends and share v;:J.lues are 
in fact volatile. Therefore the distinction between the returns vrhich 
are required by investors and the returns 1·rhich are surplus to their 
requirements is blu:cred and cannot be discerned from a retrospective 
analysis. An investor's actual returns are in the form of div1dends 
and capital gains, and there is no 'I'Tay of being able to identify the 
capital gains brought about by the reinvestment of earnings and the 
capital gains created by surplus wealth (NPVs). 
It foll0'1TS from this that the h'adi tional practice of measuring 
past equity returns to learn what equity holders required as their 
minimum acceptable return vrill lead to biased estimates because it 
ignores the fact that in a dynamic economy the realised returns from 
equities vlill include periodic v1eal th increments. 
If the capitalist system had evolved differently it might have 
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been that when any wealth increment arose it would have been divided 
prOlJr:n·tiono.teJy bet•,'een equity debt and la1xmr, Hi th the result that 
debthclders would obtain periodic windfall increases in their wealth 
surpJu::; to thei:e rec1uired return. In pract:i.ce, ho·wever, the share-
holder vrealth~·maximising rule implies that the excess goes entirely 
to the :ce2idual 01mers 9 the shR:ceholders. :B;conomists have for long 
regarded this e1~titlcment to all excess returns as the reiwrd for 
loisk~t;akillg, but it is clear that this cannot be correct if the NPV 
by t!ef:i.ni tion io the accretion to ·Health after discounting at a l'ate 
vrhich includes ;che risk-adjusted return required by shareholders. 
Therefore it follovrs that if tbe required return for equity is the 
same as thut fer debt, the averc;.ge realised returns for equities are 
likely to be greater than the required and realised returns from debt. 
ill:§l:£ ... J2ric_~.sL_ty$_JJPV s 
It has been suggested by a colleague that the disparity bet·ween 
the ex post yield from equities and the ex ante minimum required 
return i'10Uld be eJ.imina ted in the market if the price of securities 
vrere bid up to take account of all future surpluses. In this section, 
ho>·Tever, it \'fill be argued that 
(1) even if this bidding-up process took place it would not alter 
the fact that over the life of the company the suppliers of the 
equity capital would on average earn more than their required 
minimum, 
(2) if the bidding-up process took place as a once-and-for-all 
financial event the effect vrould be to make the classical wealth-
maximising goal an illusory objective, since all future wealth 
would be impounded in the current price of shares. 
A distinction has to be made between specific surplus returns 
which are foreseeable consequences of a firm's current and planned 
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opc:!::d;j_on;J and tl:r,: non:c;pec .. uJ.c m.lrplns J.'(~turns ·whir;h, in an expanding 
eco''""lJ ~ <'Te en::),](~ ted. to oxisc in the fn cu:ce, but vlh:i.ch cannot yet 
to c1 i.:<r;ount S}X'cj_[j_r; surplu::;es 9 but the cxtsnt to v1hi.ch future non·-
:::;pe;,·: ;.fj r; ~mrpJ.uc;c:.: BXG included in tho price of o. sccur:L ty is a 
mattcJ.' to he rc;·.clv·.:d 1x:tvrr:cn one gerwrati.on of e(1ui ty investors and 
Uw nc;;·1:~ If the: };:d.ee of tl!<:: market r;o:ctfolio of equit:Les vrere bid 
up so that all futuTc nonspecific surpluses were discounted in the 
l.G tr-ne that 9 for subsccc1ur:mt TJU:cchasers, k Hould be 
- e 
equ:3.l to l;: • 
. r 
Du t the1'e \!Ould. have to be a point of time in 1·rhich 
i;lJis nnt:i.cipation of futurE:' surplus returns ancl the consequent 
increase jn share prices became effective. If the period during 
·which k ) k is to be rnin:i.Hlised then the bidding.~up process '·rould 
:c e 
take place at tho in.ception of the company so that the equity capital 
subscJ·ibed to tlle nevi company imrnecliate1y acquired an enhanced market 
value, reflecting the share of surplus returns vrhich the cornpauy 
m:i.£)?.t. earn in the future. For subsequent purchasers c:f the dw.res 
k vwuld eq_ual k , but for the original sulJscribers, k would exceed 
e r r 
k by a sign:Lficant and immediately realisable amount. 'fhus if, at 
e 
the time of the i~;sue of the shares of the average firm in class j 
all future expansion programmes by the firm are foreseen by the 
market, together Hith all associated future NPVs, and if the expected 
rate of return from the firm's is kj, then the market value of the 
a . 
kJ . . 
shares 1dll be bid up by thE~ factor _g_ such that kJ will equal the 
kJ e 
e 
ex-ante and the ex-post return for subsequent purchasers of the shares. 
But the return on the cauital invested in the firm by the original 
subscribers to tl1G equity, I, \·Till be, on average, 
X == 
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kj, plus the immediate windfall of 
a 
I X 
'L'hc!·ufore the p:t•oposi tion remains fundamentally true that over the 
J U'e of tho avn·ae~·e company k ''> k • \'!hat is less obvious is 1'1hether 
r 1 e 
thc.1.i: inequ.glit:y }Jersists tb:r·oughout the life of the company, or 
vrllc thcr it. e:x:i::; tc for one generation of investors only. If all 
fu tt):re NPVs 1·rere impounded in exi::;ting share p:r:·ices this presumabl;>r 
\Wu.ld mean th::I t every company in the market ~ms c:cedi ted id th its 
:potential shm."e of future growth given that the specific companies 
1·1hich in time Hill generate the NPVs cannot be identified. The 
objective o:f vrealth-maximisation in the portfolio context vrould 
cease to have its accepted meaning. The object of b~siness enterprise 
vrould be simply to fulfil the expectations of the first generation 
of eq1.d.ty investors. As each ncn; project became specific, the rise 
in value of the relevant company ivould be matched by a corresponding 
dccTcase j_n the value of all other companies so that the total value 
of ·che portfolio remained. unchanged. In addition, with each ne'I'T 
company that is formed there would, it seems, be an immediate 
accretion in value representing its potential share cf future grovrth 
matched again by a proportional decrease in the value of existing 
companies. It ~rould follOVi that because all the benefits from the 
operation of the NPV rule accrued to the first generation of equity 
investors, there i·rould be a definite bias in favour of forming new 
companies to finance expansion in order to avail of the immediate 
enhancement in value. Ho>vever, if part of the attraction of 
investing in a portfolio of equities is to participate in the future 
grovJth of the economy, it is unlikely that the second and subsequent 
generations of investors would be p~epared to pay a price which 
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diHcounted all future growth. As we will see from the empirical 
evidence :i.n the next chapter? there is good reac-;on to believe that 
the pa:ctici·ration in grci\'rth is an ongoinc: p:cocess rather than a 
once·"and~for-aJ.l phenomenon. 
11'1..9~ 1.0LI1i rn~:UJl.._fl.c l.\C:Il:Ls0~1e L<:Y~--'1[~ rqt UJ:'Jl 
Let us assume that the dcfault·=free rate is 1 O%, and that equity 
investors are pJ~·qnn·ed to accept it as their minimuLI return. It has 
been shovm that if all firms nc;ek to achieve I 07~, Ol' more, from their 
e.ssetsv the probability is that~ on averace, they ·\'Till earn more than 
1 Oji. If experionco shmfecl that the average return from all assets is~ 
so.y ~ 12Jb, then it has been ar·gued that, al thovgil each firm Hith 
projects yieldine more than 1 OJb 1vi1l be valued so that the yield on 
the firm 1 s securities equals ·1 Ojb, the po:rt:folio of market securities 
i·till not be valued to discount all future excess returns vrhi.ch might 
be earned because this vrould lead to the creation by arbitrageurs of 
ne1-1 companies to undertake each subsequent expansion. But if the 
expected average return from the market portfolio of securities is 
127s, should not a firm use this rate as the miniBUID. acc8otable return 
from its new investments, since that rate of return could be achieved 
by investing in the market portfolio? l'lhy should the firm accept a 
project yielding 11% on the grounds that its yield exceeds 1 if;b, the 
cost of capital, if 12% can be attained from the market? And if it 
should not accent the project, does not the market return effectively 
become the relevant criterion of acceptance? When presented with 
the apparently simple choice bebmen 11~6 and 12%, then, of course 
it is difficult to be persuaded that anything lower than the 12% 
could be ecceotable. But, in fact, the choice is not a straight-
forvlard one of 11% or 12'jlo, because the tv10 rates do not mean precisely 
the same thing. By accepting the-project offering 11%, the value of 
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the firm should rir~e by ·tbe amount of the +ve NPV wh:ich thr: })rojoct 
generates: vrhere the cash ·floHs are disc:o1.mted at 1 oi;• 'l'his rise~ 
if not imruedia te ~ should occur once the 8C<mornio signif. icance of tho 
project is communicated to the market. 'l'hus~ 1·lhilst the 117; is th::: 
average return over the life of the a.ssett the elem.ent of the retun1 
vrhich is excess to tho roquired minimum is translated into an im..mediate 
increase :Ln vrealth for the oxistinE; shareholders. Tt.c 127~ from the market 
portfolio, hm·:ever, ir; an average expected return, but no more than 
that. It comprises the 1 o% required minimum return >·rhich is expected 
to be atbinod from existing and p:rellictable projects, plus th? 'C;~ 
excess return VJhich is the average, expressed in percentage terms, 
of the benefits produced by the series of NPVs expected to arise in 
the future, 1·1hen new projects are undertaken and become identified 
with specific companies. But there is no immediate increment in 
wealth created by an investment in the market portfolio. The 12% 
arises because various companies, as yet unidentified by the market, 
are expected, in the future, to undertake projects yielding 10%, 115~ 
12%, 13% etc. and vrhich have an average yield of 1 qS. Projects 
offering 11~b are as much an integral part of the expected average of 
12% as projects offering i 3'!6 or more. By rejecting the project 
yielding 11~0, the firm is rejecting the opportunity to increase the 
firm's wealth in the immediate future. Thus, if a project costing 
£1,000 were expected to produce a perpetuity of £110, the present 
value of the project would be £1 , 100, increasing the firm 1 s '.-mrth 
by £100. The shareholders could, if they vrished, sell their shares 
and invest in the market portfolio to achieve an expected return of 
12,%, that is, a perpetuity of £132, compared to the £120 which they 
would have obtained had the original capital of £1,000 been invested 
directly in the market portfolio. 
A company ·which has hitherto succeeded in achieviHg the average 
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market return of 1271; may 1wlJ f)eek to continue to achieve or improve 
upon thnt :c8,te, bvt nonetheless \·wuld be wisguic1ed in waking that 
target tho 1ninirnum standard of a.cc.optance, and so rejecting pr•ojects 
l·rhich baiJp m not to ytelcl 12~;{ o:c rnore. '.Che use of return--on--capital 
c:riteri8 t•.s a g~J.icle to investment decisions is knovm to favmu· the 
rejnct1on of rna_rginalJ.y p:cofi table investments because of their 
aclver;3c effect on the average rcd;e of return. ( 11 ) Indeed, to use 
the p•:>rnentage :eetnrn of previous projects as the minimum acceptable 
x·e{~urn for future pro.jccts could be disastrous for a company 1·rhich 
v:as fortunatG enough to find an initial project which happened to yield 
2516. The minimum standard, thereforet is the cost of capital irrespective 
of how successful the company has been in the past or expects to be in 
the future in earning more thaD tbe minimum. It may be counterintuitive 
to accept that shareholiiers may expect 1276 vrhen they require 1 00/o, or 
that fj.rms can have a minimum cut-off rate for ne1'1 projects of 1 0"/o, 
but have an expected average return of 127b. But l'l'hen one bears in 
mind the impo1·t of the NPV rule, and the fact that it amounts, in 
effect, to a mandate issued by the suppliers of capital to the firm's 
management, advising them that 'our minimum required return is 10%, 
therefore, do not accept any projects unless you expect to earn 
more than that rate,' it becomes less difficult to accept that a 
disparity betvreen the required minimum return and the expected ave1·age 
return for both real investments and equity securities is other than 
a logical and virtually inevitable consequence. 
(11) See Solomons, for example, pp. 61-62. 
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The ::~i-Gnii'ier.mce of the positive net preso~·t value conce-pt 
ha.s been exaw:Lned anrl 1t 1-ms contended that if companies pursue 
the NPV ru:Le there must inevitably be a uispa:;:·ity betueen the 
minimum acceptable return (the cost of capital) for new 
investments and the average realised return from equities. This 
leads to the important conclusion that the conventiorw.l practice 
of measuri:n[; historical returns from equities both at the individual 
and the market level to eGtimate the minimum return required by 
equity investors is ill-founded. It cannot therefore be ascmmed 
because equities have earned on average a. higher return than that 
earned on bonds that equity investors had a minimu.rn acceptance 
return higher than that of bonds. 
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Chapter Four 
THE COST· OF EQUITY CAPITAL 
In the las·t chapter v-re came to the important conclusion that 
the cost of equity cannot be discerned from past equity returns, not 
simply because the past is an unsatisfactory guide to the present 
but because past realised returns are ave~agc returns and the cost 
of equity is a minimum return. If l'l'e cannot use the past as a 
guide it becomes a very difficult, if not impossible task to decide 
vlhat the cost of equity actually is. \le kno1'1 that, in general 
terms, it is held to be equal to the rate of interest on debt 
plus or minus a premium or discount for risk. It is only in 
recent years that the possibiJ.ity of a risky project meriting 
a diacount rate less than the rislc-free rate has been recognised, 
by virtue of the fact that in the context of the capital asset 
pricing model, if a project's returns, hOi.;rever risky in themselves, 
are negatively correlated with the returns of the narket portfolio, 
the project has the effect of reducing the riskiness of the portfolio, 
a feature which should, it is argued, be reflected in the discount 
rate. As a result, the cost of equity is generally defined as 
the market rate of interest plus or minus sene adjustment for risk, 
although the magnitude and direction of the adjustment is a matter 
of difficult jude,1nent, and in practice, it appears, a matter of 
arbitrary rule or guesswork. 
In this chapter it is contended that rather than accept as 
axiomatic the need for corporate managers to undertake the task of 
estimating the cost of equity, it must first be demonstrated that 
there are material benefits to be derived frommaking any adjustment 
at all to the market rate of interest. It has already been pointed 
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out that since the market rate of interest itself changes 1·mekly if 
not daily, then the theoretically correct cost of equity can be 
assumed to c.hange at least as frequentl:l given that the magnitude 
of the adjustment to the rate of interest is itself susceptible to 
changes in investors' psychology and perception of risk. Hencer 
hovmver di.fficul t a task it might be to compute the cost of equity, 
the inherent logic of the concept 1·1ould requi:ce that the computation 
be carried out frequently if the discount rate derived is to be of 
relevance )lio cur:>.'ent economic conditions. 
There are three reasons for proposing that practitioners should 
disregard the risk premium concept 1then selecting investment projects, 
and need make no adjustment to the objectively determined and readily 
observable market rate of interest: 
(1) Equity securities are not materially risky in a portfolio context 
(2) Government bonds are not in fact free of risk but are subject 
to money and purchasing povrer risk 
(3) Equity investors appear not to be as averse to volatility as 
theoreticians assume, and may have a 1 risk-tolerance 1 level vTi th:i.n 
which a measure of volatility is acceptable \"li thout a high~r. 
expected return. 
The I1Tarket Portfot!-.2. 
If we compare a highly volatile pro,ject "l'ri th a goverr.Jnent bond, 
fevr would gainsay that the former is significantly riskier than the 
latter and that some measurable difference in expected return rrould 
be required by mo9t investors. But, although the risk premium 
hypothesis vms first advanced at a time 1-rhen this kind of perspective 
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'IKW considered to be the appropriate one, in mo(lern capitnl budgetiug 
theo:r·y the individ.ual risk of the projec·t is no longer regn:cded as 
relevant. Por the difference in requi:r:ed returns to be material 
it must be sho111n that the volatility of an efficiently comd;ructed 
portfolio of risky assets~ including the project t1.nder revicm isr 
material. Btlt Hhat is that portfolio? Capital market theorists 
refer frequently to the 'market portfolio' and for the purpose of 
their statistical studies this usually means the N.Y.S.E. or the 
U.Ko market. But it. is no~>r recognised ·~h::t t shal"eholde:rs 1 capacity 
to diversify, if necessary through the medium of investment trusts 
etc., extends 1.Jeyond a single nation's securj.ties market, and indeed 
beyond financial securities into other media. ( 1 ) In practice there 
is little difficulty in divising and operating a portfolio 1·1hich 
transcends international boundaries and includes several investment 
media as proposed by Cohn and Pringle( 2 ) and others. If a portfolio 
of risky assets is capable of including U.S., U.K., Canadian, 
Australian, German and Japanese stocks, together 1d th investments 
in land, even the investor's private home, it is the vole.tility of 
such a portfolio i'Thich is relevant. The problems of specifying the 
components of an international, multi-media portfolio and then of 
measuring its riskiness are, of course, substantial. For example, it 
i'Till be argued in chapter 7 that the relevant 'market 1 poTtfolio for 
measuring undiversifiab1e risk should include corporate bonds in the 
proportion in vrhich they are issued by the respective companies. But, 
in order to justify the proposition that the minimwn return require(l 
from this portfolio should be clearly distinguished from the default··· 
free interest rate, it vrould need to be a :ceasonable assumption that 
(1) C. Robichek, Cohn and Pringle, 1972 
(2) Cohn and Pringle, 1973 
107 
the nondiversifiable risk of the portfolio vtas significantly greater 
than the purchasing pm1er and money risks of the default-free 
security. 
Inflation a11d the relative risldne::-;s of _Q_onds versus eqy.i ties 
A Government bond cannot be classified as risk-free if inflation 
is taken into accmmt. Conventional measures of variability, 
however, are computed in relation to. cash flows which are unadjusted 
for changes in the purchasing pouer of money and, therefore, ignore 
a significant source of risk. If it can be assumed that a portfolio 
of 'risky' assets is to some extent protected from the consequences 
of inflation and that the real rate of return on fixed-interest 
securities is variable vrith the rate of inflation, then, unless the 
expected cash flows of each are expressed in a common monetary unit, 
the stability of 'risk-free' securities and the variability of 
'risky' assets will both be overstated. 
Assume, for simplicity, that all variability risk can be 
diversified away, and that only inflation risk remains. Assume also, 
for the purposes of illustration, that the market portfolio of equity 
securities is perfectly correlated ;-ri th the price index. Given n 
net-of-inflation required rate of-return of 4%, a nominal 'risk-free' 
rate of 10fb, and that the expected change in money values is 0.5 
probability of 47£ and 0.5 probability of $, then the expected 
monetary returns from the equity portfolio vrould be a 0.5 probability 
of 8% and a 0.5 probability of 12,%(3) and from the 'risk-free' asset 
a 1 oO probability of 1 0}~. But the expected real net-of-inflation 
returns for equities i<TOuld be 1.0 probability of 47'~ and for the 
(3) Nore precisely these' rates should be (47; + 4% x 1.04) = 
8.165S, and (s;s + 4~~ x 1 .o8) = 12.3C;b. 
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risk-free security a 0.5 probability of 25& and a 0.5 probability 
6 ! of ~o. Conventional measures of volatility w·ould classify the 
equity portfolio as risky and the governmen-t: bond as riskless. 
i'Then measured in a stabilised unit of purchmling povrer it is the 
equity portfolio which is riskless and the government bond v1hich 
is risky. The implication therefore, is not only that the framei'rork 
in 'I'Thich the risk premium hypothesis has developed, that is the 
standard Capital Asset Pricing Nadel, is in need of respecification( 4) 
to take account of purchasing pouer risk, but that by ignoring 
inflation the market price of risk has been overstated in the 
traditional model. The subject of inflation will be taken up 
again in chapter 10. 
Investors' attitude tor~ 
'vle have argued that unless it can be shmm that the variability 
risk of an international portfolio is materially greater than the 
purchasing power risk of a Government bond, the required return 
from the market portfolio can be reasonably assumed not to be 
distinguishable from the yield of the latter. This i'IOUlcl :i.mply 
that the average risky project with a variability similar to that 
of the market should be discounted at a rate equal to the Government 
bond yield. But it 1vould be arguable within the framei'rork of the 
Capital Asset Pricing 11odel that nonaverage projects 'iTi th variabili. ty 
characteristics significantly different from those of the market 
should be discounted at a higher or lmver rate. This houever 
presupposes that investors' aversion to risk extends indiscriminately 
to all levels of volatility and that investors are not prepared to 
accept any degree of volatility without a higher expected return. 
i'le 'I'Till novr examine the conventional risk-aversion hypothesis which 
it is contended is based on a fairly 
(4) see J. Lintner 1975, page 278 
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simplistic view· about investors • attitudes to variability. An 
investor k:novm his portfolio 1·rill vary :Ln value ove1' its lifetime, 
as \'Till the value of the default-free stock. It may, in fact, 
never rise above the price he paid for :Ltr but unless his time-
horizon is very short or unless he has no control over the date 
of disposal, he >'fill not regard every posdble depression "I'Ti th 
proportionately equal distaste. His attitude to a projected 
series of volatile movements in market values is likely to be 
related to his time-horizon and investment latitude, varying from 
volatility-aversion ivhen subject to short time-horizons and 
inflexible disinvestment opportunities, to volatility-partiality 
"\'Then operating with longer time-horizons and flexible disinvestment 
opporttm:L ties. Investors who have no tactical latitude are 
unlikely to be attracted to the equity raarket even Hi th a risk 
premium and will presumably seek fixed-interest securities "\'rhich 
match their maturity preferences. Those uho are attracted to 
the equity market presumably expect to be able to exercise some 
control over the timing of their exit from the market. But the 
conventional approach to measuring the riskiness of a portfolio of 
equities is to give every market movement equal vreighting, implying 
that the probability of the portfolio falling in value to a 
particular level at a particular time is equal to the probability 
of the investor having to sell rds portfolio at that level and time, 
and does not allow for the latitude vrhich most investors undoubtedly 
expect to have in oeing able to ride many of the bad patches and of 
being able, to some extent, to select the point of his departure 
from the market. Indeed, if one portfolio is predictably more 
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vola·tile than another, it may be for that reason as attractive 
to the aggressive investor vrho is free to choose ivhen to sell, 
as it vtould be 1ma ttracti ve to the investor uho lacks that 
freedom. 
In addition, the widely held assumption that investors require 
a higher expected return for a higher level of risk nay be reasonable 
for significant levels of risk, but unrealistic in relation to the 
volatility of a '\>Tell-diversified portfolio of assets. It is some-
times implied that because investors insure their car at a costly 
premium, despite the fact that the car may have a lesser value and 
less risk than their security portfolios, is evidence of an aversion 
to risk. But this preoupposes that investors do not distinguish 
behreen the kind of situation which typifies an insurable event, 
that is, an event i'lhich is capable of involving a once-and-for-
all, substantial and irrecoverable loss, and the variability-over-time 
pattern i•Thich characterises the cyclical movement of the '\·TOr ld 1 s 
securities markets. Hirshleifer notes( 5) that the existence of 
gambling at unfavourable odds re~uires an explanation in the face of 
the risk-aversion assumption underlying the theory of choice amongst 
risky assets. He observes that gambling on a scale likely to 
impoverish is rarely encountered in the middle or upper classes, 
and that, except for the poor, it is more "like a consumption good 
than an investment good - an activity engaged in for pleasure rather 
than with the intention of changing on& 1 s vrealth status."(6) Pleasure-
oriented gamblin~ exists all along the income scale and is a 
(5) J •. Hirshleifer page 230 
(6) Ibid, page 230 
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potential source of enjoyment v1hich t-Jill be normally "characterised 
by repetitive miniscule bets practically guaranteed not to drastically 
change Health status. 11 He concludes that because such an activity 
can be distinguished from an investment or i·real th-oriented decision, 
the latter can be represented by a concave utility fuxlCtion, implying 
an aversion. to all levels of risk.(?) If, hov;ever, Hirshleifer's 
observation that gambling is more like a consumption good than an 
investment good is conceded, it does not follovr that the two goods 
cannot coexist in the one activity. The VTealth-oriented impulse 
may cause an investor to constr·uct his equity portfolio so as to 
minimise the possibility of a drastic reduction in his vrealth, 1'lhilst 
the pleasure-oriented impulse may cause him to be tolerant of, if 
not positively sympathetic to, a measure of volatility over time. 
The individual investor may not compartmentalise his pleasure and 
vreal th-oriented activities as implied by Hirshleifer in the sense 
of being vrilling to assume some risk at l.Ulfavourable odds in one 
context ancl of being umrilling to accept any risk 'I'Ti thout favourable 
odds in an other. Indeed, for many, the securities market may be 
the most satisfactory if not tho only outlet for the pleasure-
oriented impulse, by providing a superficially more rational and 
socially acceptable context than the tables of Las Vegas. The 
success of government lotteries testifies to the willingness of 
investors to accept an investment VTith a very high probability of 
a negative net present value for the sake of obtaining a very lovT 
probability of a high net present value, vli th an expected average 
return, if anything, marginally less than the market rate of interest. 
( 7) Ibi'd. page 231 
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Paradoxically, therefore, the complexity of the decision-making 
process of choosing betvreen risky investments may have been magnified 
by an oversimplified specification of investors' preferences and 
behaviour patterns. A greater recognition of the complexity of 
investors' motivations and preferences might, it is argued, justify 
a more neutral status for the variability of retlrrns and lead to a 
simpler decision rule, one in \oJhich the expected return alone coul<i 
be perceived as the primary criterion. 
It is certainly not a firm foundation for the conventional 
risk-premium hypothesis to assume, in the face of a 'I·Iidespread 
acceptance of risk in one context for an actuarial return which is 
not only less than the risk-free rate but vrhich is actually 
negative, that invest.ors in securities are umrilling to tolerate 
a moderate degree of volatility from their portfolios for a return 
vrhich on average is not expected to be less than the default-free 
rate. 
~he intuitive basis for the risk P!~~um concept 
There is v~doubtedly a strong intuitive appeal for the risk-
premium concept and the desirabil~ty of modifying the required 
return to suit the risk characteristics of the individual project. 
There is also presumably a lridespread belief that hmrever difficult 
it might be to put the theory into practice, management's judgment 
and experience can be depended upon to make a reasonably satisfactory 
attempt. Indeed, at no time since the risk-premium approach 
was first conceived could it be said that its implementation ;ms not 
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heavily dependent upon managerial judgment. Hm•TE:Ver the scenario 
in '\'Thich that judgment 1-ms traditionally expected to operate has 
been significantly changed by the developments 1vhich we have 
observed to have taken place in capital budgeting theory. '\'lhen one 
proceeded from the assumptions first that there existed a truly 
risk-free rate which could be observed ili. the market and secondly 
that it was the total risk of a project as it appeared to the 
manager in isolation from projects outside his company vrhich vras the 
relevant risk, it might be a reasonable expectation that management 
could operate the risk-premiun1 approach relatively effectively. 
The manager could be confident, for example, that if the project 
'\'Tas materially riskier than the risk-free secu:i.'i ty he should make 
an up1·mrd adjustment to the risk-free rate. In addition, if one 
project was clearly riskier than another, the upvrard adjustment for 
the former should be greater than that of the latter. His main 
concern 1wuld be to determine the magnitude of the adjustment. 
The validity of this relatively straightforward intuitive framevrork 
has however been sienificantly undermined by the developments 
discussed in this chapter, namely in portfolio and capital market 
theory and the recognition that government bonds are subject to 
purchasing po1·1er risk. To begin with, a much more penetrating 
perspective is needed to estimate the size of the adjustment to 
the market rate in a portfolio context. But, more important, the 
correct direction of the adjustment, up .. mrds or do1·rmmrds, is nmf 
uncertain. Rather than use as the base rate some notional risk-
free rate '\fhich cannot be observed in the market, it is clearly 
preferable to proceed from the government bond rate which is 
objectively determined and readily observable. 
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1~e have argued that because of inflation and because of shareholders' 
capacity for diversification, the required return from the lnarket 
portfolio must be closer to the governmr.mt bond yield than has been 
traditionally assumed, and that if they are broadly the same, it 
would imply that average run-of-·the-miJ.l projects should be 
discounted at the government bond yield, leaving only non-run-of-the-
mill projects to be discounted at an adjusted rate to satisfy the 
risk premium framew·ork. But such adjustment is as likely to be 
dowmrards from the bond yield as it is to be upi-rards. It follows 
that the intuitive basis for measuring the price of risk has 
effectively been destroyed, and that ivhilst the absolute significance 
of project risk has materially declined, the scope for error in 
operating the risk premium refinement has increased significantly. 
In the next chapter He vTill consider the evidence to support 
the claim that the derivation and application of differential 
discount rates by managers are not an essential prerequisite of 
effective present value analysis and that the benefits of simplicity 
are too great to be traded for a refinement of doubtful practical 
utility. 
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SlJfilHARY 
In this chapter 1·re questioned tho validity of the risk premium 
h:{pothesis in a portfolio context Hi th spec:Lfie reference to the 
cost of equity. It Has argued that since only the proportion of 
a project's risk Hhich cannot be diversified mmy is relevant, it 
is far from apparent ·that the relevant risk of an internationally 
diversified portfolio comprising corporate bonds and equities and 
other risky afJsets is significantly greater, and is perceived by 
investors to be significantly greater in real terms than the 
money and purchasing power risk of a default-free security. 
In addition, it u:1s contended that the conventional risk-
aversion hypothesis is postulated on a naive and simplistic 
description of investors' attitude to volatility, 1·Thich staJces 
that investors are unvd.lling to accept any level of volatility 
'\'rithout a measurably higher expected return. The concept of a 
risk-tolerance level vras introduced which is compatible ;'lith 
investors' observed insurance andspeculation behavioural patterns, 
and vThich proposes that 'lvi thin certain limits of volatility investors 
may not make fine distinctions betvreen different risk-return 
combinations. 
It vras also noted in the previous chapter that investors have 
an incent).ve to select the market portfolio in preference to a 
default-free bond without any risk premium, given the nature of the 
+ve Net Present Value rule uhich directs mane.gement to select only 
projects Hhich are expected to yield more than the minir:1um needed 
to satisfy equity investors. 
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F':Lnally, it 1·J'3.S .noted that the in tuit:i.ve basis for the tracli t:i.onal 
risk~·p:CCL'ti.um apJ.J:conch in 1·1h:i.ch it could b0 assumed that all risky 
projects :~hould ho.ve a miniH<cU:t return hit;her than the yield on 
bonds an(l chat rno:r·e T:Lsky l'rojects shouJd have a higher minimum 
re-turn than less ri.sky pro;jeets has been undermined by the implications 
of nwdel'n capital I.Kn·ket theory and the recognition of purchasing p01·rer 
risk. It follm,rs that implementatj_on of the approach places 
considerably more clomancls on manac;ers and has a mu.ch higher 
susCGlYtibLl.ity to E:XTor than is generally assumed. 
In t.lw following chapter \le 1dll examine the e;-:1pirj_cal evidence 
relating to the ri1:-;k premi1JJ:1 concept and })resent data 1·rhich raises 
sufficient doubt about the mate:ciali ty ancl even the existence of a 
market })remiura f'o:c risk to ju.stify the expediency that management 
should Ui3e only the pure tine value of raoney to evaluate risky 
projects. 
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CHAPTER FIV1~ 
'l'Hl~ COST OF i~Q.UI'rY CAPl 'L'AL II 
T.he empil-ical evid.enc& 
'l'he required returns on equity secm·i ti0s cannot be directly 
observed in the market. One approach has been to study the ex 
post return::J from shares to find out what previous requi:::·ed 
returns have been, on the assumption that realised returns are 
good. estimates of ex ante eX})ectations, but this ap"])roaeh has 
been observed to suffer from the fundamental defect that it 
pres1.unes the kind of market conditions in vrhich the +ve NPV rule 
would .hav0 no practical validity. The realised rettu·ns from 
a share include dividends and capital gains, and since there is 
no available method cf distinguishing between the proportion of 
the returns uhich are needed to meet shareholders' minimum 
requirements and the excess returns 1-1hich arise at each phase of 
expansion 1 a retrospective analysis vrill at best indicate investors' 
expected average rehJ..rns and not their :required r1inirrn:un return. A 
'~ I ) 
number of statistical studies, in parti.cular those of Ellis' 1 
Blume and Friend( 2 ) and Norgaard(3) have revealed tho.t the 
diffci·ence behreen the realised returns on equities in the Hew 
York Stock Exchange and the yield on corporate bonds 1vas much 
greater than could be accounted for by the risk differential. 
This difference bet1veen the certainty-equivalent bond yield and 
the certainty-equivalent equity yield mirrors the disparity bet1-reen 
( 1 ) 
g~ 
c. Ellis, chapter 3 
Blume and l•'riend, 1973 
Norgaard, 1 97 tr 
119 
the minimum acceptable yield for Gquities and the realised yield. 
Horcover, according to Norgaard 1 s study, the umrarranted diffo:cence 
beti,rcen bond and equity yields (an average of 5.55b comvound yield) 
remained r-ela ·t.:ively stable throughout the period 1926-1969, 
suggesting that the higher returns accruing to equities by virtue 
of the HPV rule aro not entirely discounted in the price at the 
company 1 s formation lnJ.t are spread over the company 1 s life as the 
events rrhich give rise to the +ve nr~vs occur and become knmm to 
In each of the above studies, the authors concluded 
U1a t there 1-ms a posi tJ.ve advantac;e for investors to choose a 
portfolio of equities rather than a portfolio of bonds. One 
explo.nation suggested. was "segmentation of markets betHeen stocks 
and bonds" ( 4.) bttt this vrould imply that the equity required 
return i·ras independent of the bond yield, a concJ.usior.. which Hould 
undermine the foundation of the 'risk-free :rate pltts risk premium' 
hypothesis. The present study finds the +ve NPV effect a uore 
defensible explanation; implying as it does that the minir:mm equity 
return is directly related to the bond yield. The significant 
implication of both explanations, hNmver., is that the risk p:re~ium, 
if any, appropriate to equities cannot be defined as the difference 
betvreen the risk-free rate and the average return earned by equities. 
Before examining the available evidence relating to risk 
premiums, it is necessary first to develop further the concept of 
a risk-tolerance level introduced in the previous chapter in order 
to understand ho;.r the nonexistence of a risk premium is quite 
compatible 1·1ith the existence of risk. 
(4) Blume and Friend, 1973, page 31 
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The context in uhich risk p:cemiwns are det'3rmined according to 
the conventional capital asset pricing model is depicted graphically 
in Figure 1. The shaded area represents the opportunity set 
containinG all possible combinations of risky assets. Only port-
folios lying on the curve PHQ are efficient in the sense of 
dominating all otht~r portfolios in the opportunity set. Hmrever, 
if investors coJ1 lend or borro-vr at i, them everyone will hold the 
same portfolio of risky assets, N, the lJOint of tangency 'lv.i.. th the 
Btra:Lght line dravm from i, and -vril1 supplement their holding in 
portfolio IV!, by borro1'ling or lending at i to achieve a combination 
'I'Thich lic~s somewhere along the capi {:al market line. Therefore, 
the investor whose indifference cu:rves lie to the left of H will 
hold. both the risk--free secu:ri ty and portfolio H, I·Thile the more 
aggressive investor w·hose indifference cu:rves lie to tha right 
of M will place all his capital in portfolio M, having borrowed 
at i {;o augment his holding. The significant fact is that 
both investors •·rill hold the same portfolio of risky assets, i.e. 
-< 
the market portfolio containing all risky assets in exactly the 
proportion they are supplied in the market in equilib:ciwn. 
The shape of tho cu:rve PHQ results from the assumption that the 
market is composed of risk averse investors •·rho positively trade off 
risk for return, and the slope of the CNL is a function of the 
market's price for risk. In perfect market conditions, 1vhere returns 
in excess of the required minimum >vould not be available, and where a 
zero rather than a +ve NPV rule 1·rould operate, the angle of the Cf·IL 
slope vrould depend solely on the distance of ~1 from i, and investors' 
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FIGURE 1 
The opportunity set in risk-return space 
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a-ttitude to l'ish:. If the distance behreen N and i is insignificant, 
that is if ruos t risk can be diversified EJ.'..ray, then vtha tever the 
attitucle of investors to risk, the CI-11 VIOUld be apl)X'Oximately 
horizontal~ If the dis tan co betw-een i and D'! is not insignificant, 
the slOJ1e of the line will depend on investors' attitude to 
vola HH ty. 
In the previous chapter, it vms argued that because fixed-
interest securiUes are especially vulnerable to purchasing povrer 
risk, <md because of the enhanced opportunities to eli versify on a 
i·Jorld-vlicle basis t inves-tors are unlikely to perceive the systematic 
risk of the market portfolio as being signific~:mtly g-reater than that 
of a government bond. It vras also argued that even if investors 
'1-Tere able to distinguish betvreen the risks of the portfolio and the 
bond, the incremental risk is not necessarily at a level to which they 
are averse. In conventional utility analysis, investors are generally 
assumed to fall into one of three main categories 1-Ti th respect to risk. 
Thus Fig~ro 2 represents the utility functions for a risk-averse, risk-
'~ I -" 
t 1 d . k ~V<~ . t t. 1 neu ra , an r~s -see~ ~nves or respec-~ve y. For the least degree 
of variance, the risk averse investors is assumed to demand a higher 
return to compensate him. The risk-lover, on the other hand, is 
prepared to suffer a fall in his expected return in order to have the 
opportunity to be exposed to variance. The risk-neutral investor is 
concerned '-ri th expected return only, and is indifferent to the 
variabi1ity of the returns. 
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It has already been argued that because it is an observable fact 
that many investors insure against risk on the one hand, and take 
part in lotteries on the other, the categorisation of investors 
as either exclusively risk-averse or risk-seeking is unrealistic 
and that most investors display a tolerance if not a possible 
liking fen~ risk up to a certain level, and thereafter become 
increasingly averse to it. The level of risk tolerance will vary 
vri th each individual according to h:Ls ini Jcia1 -vwaJ. th and 
tempermncnt 1 ranging from nil tolerance f'or tho very timid to a 
high J.f~vol of tolerance for specu.la tors. The majority could be 
expected to fall somevJhere in behreen. ~:hus Figure 3 depicts the 
range of inclifference curves 1·rhich investors 1d th ambivalent 
attitudes to volatiH ty might have f 11i th Figure 4 representing 
the average market curve. 'I'he fla t-bottomecl shape of the market 
utility curve does not nega·te the general substance of the 
conventional risk hypothesis. It simply denotes that whilst people 
generally insure against the possibility of major losses, they are 
prepared to undertake and sometimes even seek some variance v1i thout 
any specific compensation other than the chaJJ.enge and satisfaction 
of participating in the dynamic of the market. 
The necessity for having a risk premium for even the riskiest 
of assets depends on vrhether the level of variance at uhich the 
market as a vrhole ceases to be neutral is greater than the variance 
of the portfolio of risky assets. Graphically, it depends on 
whether the point vrhere the marl:::et' s utility curve begins to rise 
in Fit,'llre 4- is the left or right of H. Therefore, tvro conditions-
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must be met to ~justify a risk premium: 
(a) the distance boh-reen H and i must be sienificant, and 
(rJ) the ho:.:-izcntal section of the market u·U.li ty curve must 
not extend beyoncl the point N. 
If neither of these conditions is met, the CJ.lL 11ill be horizontal 
as in Pigure 5. 
It is not necessary that each individual investor has the 
same dogree of risk tolerance. Those l'l'ho have a loH tolerance 
level but nonetheless wish to purchase a portfolio of risky assets 
may choose a portfolio componed of lOi'l'-risk, defensive securities 
1·rhose com1)ined variance is less than H 1 s, and at a level i'Jhich 
is tole1·atle to them. Nol'e aggressive investors '~>rill be satisfied 
with a portfolio composed of more volatile securities, even if 
their portfolio is not expected to earn on average more than the 
defensive one. This, of course, contradicts the separation theorem 
of the conventional capital asset model \'thich states that all 
investors in risky assets i'Till hold the same portfolio. If there 
are different levels of risk tolerance amongst investo::r8; t.hen one 
-~ 
group may perceive one portfolio as inefficient which another group 
finds efficient, in the sense that __ the latter group may derive a 
positive satisfaction from holding a volatile portfolio even 
although its volatility could be further red1 . 1.0ed without a 
corresponding reduction in the average expected return. Indeed 
research has sho1m that most households (5) do not hold >·Tell diversified 
portfolios, implying that investors have heterogeneous expectations 
or have a risk-tolerance level i'Jhich the traditional frar.1evrork fails 
to make allowance for. 
(5) See Blume and Friend, 1975 
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To summar1se s thOl'efo:co, it Jw.s been c·,:cgu.(~(L that in order to 
challenge the utili t,y cf :Lnc.:o:r')_)Or:\ting ·d.sk :pr:·smiums into the 
capital hLcr1gcting frameHork, it ::i.s not n8c:c;~;c~UL'J' to [;hot;r that 
nondiversif:Lable risk: does not 0::x:L~t, nor "lh.cti. investors are 
indifferent to risk. All that is required is to throw doubt on 
the assmnJlt:i.on that tho level of nondiversif:i.c,l;Je risk vrh:i.ch does 
exist is regarded by investors a:; being of 2. [oit:(nificant level. 
~£h~L~ce:t ovjj.~ 
Although it has 1Jr..-;en shmm that the Gupcrior performance of 
equities is not acceptable eviue:oce that the trinimv.m retv~n requ:i.red 
by equity investors exceeds the bond rate, it r-eEJ<dns necessary 
to consider the evidence indicating a risk~-rd.IJ.rn pat-Lei'll as 
bet\-1een one equity security and another. 
A number of empirical studies have indico.ted a relationship 
between the level of a security'u systematic risk, or Beta factor, 
and its realised excess return. This has been assumed. to imply 
that investors are averse to volatility and that they seek a higher 
return for those secur·i ties ';Thich contri,bute TJOJ:e to the portfolio 1 s 
volatility. 
Tl'lO points , ho1vever should be no ted, 
( 1) It has been sho1m that the realised returns on equity securities 
reflect at best the expected returns froEl the firms' productive 
assets, and not the minimum return required on the firms' 
securities. It may be that the :risk~:r,eturn r·ela tionshi p of 
firms' productive assets ha.s conformed partially to the traditional 
capital asset pricing model, causing, in turn, the p;:.>.ttern of the 
ex post risk-return relationship of the firm's securities to 
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assume a similar patter{• 9 and so g:i v:Lng a fal:Jc impression 
of tho ex ante required rclationsbip. ':i]nu::;, the risk·-rebxrn 
tradeoff for one industry as agaiD~J·(; ::mother Hill be influencecl 1• 
in part, by u1unagement 1 s lJOrception of risk, and if management 
generally are more averse to risk th::.:n investm:s are, or if 
they ascribe a higher degree of avel'sion to investors than is 
'\'rarrantedt then the level of cmnpcti::;iorl in more risky industries 
11ill tend to be less severe than in less risky ones. To the 
extent that some diversification is charecteristic of most 
J.oacling companio s in th(~ mn:cke t, the co::..-pe ti tion might vary 
inversely -vd.th Jche deg:J~88 of syeteua tic :risk. The retm--ns 
from. productive assets eoulcl then be cx:p.ected to confo:cm, 
partially at least, to the traditional asset pricing model, and 
this could explain the o 1:;.seryed pa tte:rn of re {;1 U'ns on financial 
assets. If shareholders 1 required_ :retm·n 1mre less than the 
cut-off rate used by corporate manacers, then the shares of 
those 'risky' firms vrould be bid-up as the super-norrna1 profits 
uere communicated to the mar-ket. But the overall performance 
of the shares vrould, in a retrospective analysis, be superior 
to that of shares in less risky indust:ries, and this might 
be ta£en to imply a higher required retu:cn by investors. Yet, 
without any method of analysing the :cesults so as to identify 
the proportion of the returns vrhicll \iere excess to shareholders 1 
requirements, it ~>roulcl not be possible to assuiJe the existence 
of a risk prer!.lium let alone measure :i. t. 
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( 2) \1hc ther or not :Lnves·tors have the same l0vel of risk-aversion 
as manac;e:cr.;, one \·rould GXJ)ect the degree of aversion of both 
com.r,tu.ni ties to decline as the capc.d ty for both to diversify 
:Lntrn·na tionally has increased ovel' the year a. Hence, any 
risk-·reh:rn pattern derived from olJservations over long 
pel"iods 1d.ll tend to 1o.ck relevance for current conditions. 
The evjclence of recent periods 'vill be more :::-elevant than 
long-term averages, subject to the reservation that during 
short periods less reliability can be placed upon the 
evidence of realised returns to estj_mate ex ante expectations. 
The findings of a recent study conductec3. by Black Jensen and 
Scholes(G) are of particular importance in this context insofar 
as they provide a very significant challenge to the relevance of 
the risk-premium refinement under modern market conditions. The 
results of the study are sumrnarised in tables 1 and 2. 
(6) Black, JenBen and Scholes, 1972 
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SUlnmary of Statistics for Time Series Tests, Entire Period (January, 1931 - December, 1965) 
(Sample Size for Each Regression = 420) 
Portfolio Nw~ber 
I terr.* . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
.A 
0'• 1.5614- 1 •JS36 it2483 1~1625 1.0572 0 .. 9229 Oe8531 0.7534 0.6291 . 0.4992 '~ I 
-?. 0.0213 0.0177 0.0171 0.0163 0.0145 0.0137 0.0126 0.0115· 0.0109 0.0091 
'("', 
/> p = Estimatas systematic risk of the portfolio 
-
* R = Average monthly excess returns 
'.C..U3B "! 
fv\1 
1 .oooo 
0.0142 
0 
/:(\ 
..... 
SUMJYL{I.RY OF CCEFFTCIENTS :E'OR TIB SU13PERIODS 
PORTFOLIO NUMBER 
S;;.b-
Item Period j. i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ~11 
/'.... 1 1 0 5416 i.3993 1.2620 1 .1813 1.0750 0.9197 0.8569 0.7510 0.6222 0.4843 1.0000 
B 2 1.7157 1 -:;--:or I 3..)£_.~() 1.1938 1 .0861 Oo969'7 0.9254 0.8114 0.7675 0.6647 0.5626 1.0000 
3 'l .5427 1.3593 1(,!822 1~1216 1.0474 0.9851 Ov9180 0.7714 0.6547 0~4868 '1.0000 
~- 1-4423 1~2764 L1818 1.0655 0.9957 o. 9248"· 0.8601 0.7800 0.6614 0.6226 :.oooo 
0.0166 
...--
i 0.04-12 0.0326 0.0317 0.0272 0.0230 0.0197 0.0127 0.0115 Oo0099 0.0220 l<" 
R 2 0.0233 0.,0183 0.0!65 0.0168 0.0136 0.0147 0.0134 0.0122 0.0126 0.0098 0.0149 
3 0.)0126. Ou01i2 0.0120 0.0126 0.01"17 0.0109 0.0115 0.0110 0.0103 0.0075. 0.0112 
4- 0.0082 0~0082 0.0081 0.0087 0.0096 0.0095 0.0088 0.0101 0.0092 0.0092 0.0088 
-~---···--·---·--------~.---~-~-.--.-~----~---
f Subperiod 1 ~ January 1931 - September 1939; 2 = October 1939 - June 1948; 3 = July 1948 -March 1957; 
4 = A?ri~ 1957 -December 1965~ 
TABLE 2 
The statistics cover the 35 years from 1931 to 1965, and consist 
of L1o11thJ.y l·etu:cns for each of ten portfolios e;omposecl of securities 
A 
·eroupec1 c.c:;onL\.ng to their estimated. rislc category (j3), where 
portfolio 1 contains the h.ighost-risk s9curities and portfolio 10 
the lowest-risk securities. The overall :r·esul ts smnmarised ap11ear 
to acc<n·d vr~.th the conventional theory that the excess returns should 
increase with the portfolio's beta factor. 1io1.;ever, further analysis 
by l1JS revealed that high-risk securities almost consistently earned 
les:1 t=md lovr·-r:Lsk Llecu:d ties consi stentJ.y more than predicted by 
the traditional form of the asset pricing model. 
But of even greater relevance to the present issue are the 
results sUJnmarised in 1l'able 2, vThich vrere prepared by BJS to test 
the stationarity of the empil•ical relationso The 35 year interval 
vms divided into fou..r equal su-operiods of 105 months each, and the 
results indicated that, although the risk coefficients vrere 
fairly stationary, the pattern of low earnings R for high-beta 
assets and high enrnings for low-beta assets became progressively 
more marked in recent years 1 until in the latest of the four ~ 
subperiods (1957-65), the risk or beta factor had no apparent 
influence vThatsoever. Thus note _how in Table 2 the very significant 
conventional risk-return relationship 1.;hich existed in the 1930s (line 
1 of band R) contrasts vri th the equally significant stability of 
retuTns irrespective of risk in the 1960s (line 4 of band R) The 
fact that the average risk~return relationship throughout the \·Thole 
per:i.od 1931-1965, as in Table 1, conformed approximately to the 
conventional risk-premium theory is irrelevant, because the conditions 
of the market and the perceptions of investors have necessarily 
changed since the thirties and the recent period is the most relevant 
one to cu:rrent conditions. The fact that the relationship existing 
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in the last decade is in line Hith the trend of the Hhole poriocl 
also implies that the former :Ls not unrepresentative or anomalous. 
It rnighT; ·be asked if this data has baen available since 1972 
why their significance -vms not earlier 1:ecor;d.sed. It mus-t 
hm·mve:e bo remumbered that the returns of the equj_ties, albeit 
ind.istinguishaLle amongst themselves in respect of risk, are on 
average significantly greater than the l'eturns obtained from 
government bonds, and to any interpreter 1·rho has not considered 
the signi:ficanc:e of ·!;he +ve Nl'V effeet outiinod in Chapter 3 and. 
the necessary disparity between equity realised and ex ante returns, 
this 110uld appea.r to corrobor.9.te the basic risk premium theory. 
He would simply search for some other explanation to account for 
the findings of Table 2. 
Thus in ~heir m·m analysis BJ'S did not comment on the significance 
of the reported trencl.s from the aspect of investors' attitudes to 
volatility. But in pri.vate correspondence uith Professor Ilfichael 
Jensen, the vTri ter asked whether he \'TOUld agree that the results of 
his study ·vrex·e co!1Sistent 'Hith the hypothesis that invesiors 1 avc1·Dion 
to relevant risk had, over the period, shoi"m a stee.dy decline and 
that latterly investors appeared to be indifferent to th8 existing 
level of undiversified risk and to accept the expected return as the 
sole criterion of value. He replied that the results \'IOre in fac·t; 
consistent with this hypothesis, although he preferred to seek some 
other explanation, in vieVT, for example, of the continuing 1 demand 
for insurance'. 
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It should hovrever be enphasised again that the observation that 
shareholders appear to be willing to accept the existing level of 
nondiversifiable risk does not carry ·vi th it an assu.mption, as 
Pro:fessc.r Jensen seems to imply, that shareholders have become 
indifferent to risk. It is quite consistent vii th the proposition 
that investors are averse to significant risk and are observed to 
insure themselves against significant risk 1 to assun1e that once 
the significant risks are insured against (in the context of 
investments by the IJJ'OC8SFJ of diversification) they are '\·rilling to 
accept the residue of • 1 rJ.S.Ko 
Therefore, 'lvhile it is not clear to '1-Jhat extent the results 
relatin~ to earlieJ: periods reflect only investors 1 risk :preferences 
or are influenced, in addition, by management's risk aversion, the 
overall rssults of the BJS study, nonetheless, strongly suggest 
that investors bave uot, in fact, displayed the degree of intolerance 
to variance predicted by a capital asset prj.cing model based on 
conventional theories of risk aversion, and more important, that 
the trend in recent decades has suggested that nondiversifiable 
variance is vTi thin the risk-tolerance ·J.evel of investors, and has 
ceased to play any significant role in the valuation process. 
The market evidence to support the risk premium theory in 
capital budgeting is therefore very vreak indeed, and it is 
unrealistic to expect even financially sophisticated managers to 
implement it effectively if its very validity is so clearly open 
to doubt. 
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In order to gain additional insiehts into investors' attitudes 
to risk and to test ·Nhether they appear to be consistent I'Ti th the 
above inter[?retBtion of the BJS findings, it 1·ras clecided to undertake 
the more direct and apparently untried method of questioning a sample 
of investors and inviting them to describe their attitudes. 
The aim of the survey vras to g:i.ve investors the opportunity to 
express their attitudes to three aspects of risk: 
( 1) \>lhether, taking into account the effects of inflation~ investors 
perceive the variance of the market portfolio as being significantly 
in excess of the variance of a default-free bond; in graphical 
terms~ 1-Thether they perceive the distance betvreen M and i to be 
significant. 
(2) \'lhether investors display any tolerance of risk, and if so, 
'Vrhether the level of variance which investors associate vTi th 
the market portfolio is within their tolerance level; graphically, 
l'Thether the extreme point of the horizontal section of their 
indifference curve is to the right or left of H. 
-:. 
If markets are perfect, it is necessary that both these conditions 
be satisfied, namely, that the risk which cannot be diversified mray 
is both significant and beyond the market's tolerance level, to 
necessitate a risk premium in the ex ante required return. But it 
has been argued, in the previous chapter, that under imperfect markets, 
in l'Thich there are surplus returns available to equity investors, a 
third condition is necessary, that is, that the prospect of participating 
in those surplus returns is inadequate compensation for investors to 
be attracted to the equity market. Therefore, the third aspect "'fri th 
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vlh:i.ch the su.rvey is concerned is, 
(3) vlhether, given equity holders 1 residual right to profits in 
excess of the minimum acceptable retu:cn, investors uould be 
attracted to a 1-rell-cli versified portfolio of risky assets where 
each component of the portfolio is selected on the basis of 
ex1)ected return only, vri thout regard to variance; in effect, 
vrhether they uould accept the default-free rate as the 
minimum cut-off rate for corporate capital budgeting decisions. 
Clearly, a number of problems presented themselves, not least 
the problem of defining risk. It vias not possible to explain to 
interviewees the implication of the capital asset pricing model, 
or to distinguish expiicitly bet1·wen systematic and non-systematic 
riske Ther·efore, the questions were framed in such a way that the 
investors vrere compelled to formulate their replies from the stand-
point of a holder of a very 'l'relJ_~diversified portfolio, even more 
diversified than most might ever consider desirable. A fei·T were, 
in fact, puzzled by the practicability of investing so vridely •·rith a 
relntively small amount of fm1ds, but accepted that it could be 
effected through the agency of an investment trust. Although the 
international portfolio specified in the questionnaire 1-ras intended 
to suggest maximtilll diversification, the U.K. portfolio '\'ras included 
as an alternative to give an option for those who might conceivably 
take the view that the inclusion of foreign securities 'I'Tould add to 
rather than diminish the total risk of the portfolio. This fear 
i'ms borne out by the replies of a feu interviewees, but for the main 
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part most respondents commented on how well diversified the inter-
national portfolio Hase 
Because of the unavoidable complexity of the questions, and 
therefore the probability of a lovT and unreliable response to a 
po~tal questionnaire, it Has decided to conduct perso:n.al interviews 
in order to be able to deal uith any difficulties raised by the 
respondents, v1:Lth the result that tho size of the sample -vms 
l:Lmi ted to 50, l:l.nd the method of selection largely a matter of 
convenience, namely, colleagues and acquaintances of colleagues. 
The sample con.sisted of ten l"epresentatives of each of five 
occupational groups living in Glasgow, accou...'1.tants, businessmen 
and industrialists, academics (business studies), investment 
analysts or advisers, and other professionals. Each interviewee 
vras asked as a screening device, if he had ever invested or taken 
an interest in the stock market, and vThether his tech.11.ical knovTlodge 
vras sufficient to understand terms such as "the yield on undated 
loan stock" etc., unless, of course, from his occupation such 
expertise could be a:=;sumed. r.I'he clefaul t-fl·ee security clwsen for 
the purpose \'las the familiar 3~ War Loan, that is, an undated 
security, on the grounds that 'l'tha tever time horizon equity investors 
in undated loan stock might have, neither investment medium is 
dominated by the prospects of an early maturity. An investor 
may not perceive his period of investment extending beyond a 5 or 
10 year horizon, but since the terminal value of his portfolio vTill 
be affected ,-by the discount rates appropriate to the cash fl01'1S of 
succeeding periods, he must take account of the long-term average 
of future-short-term rates of return, and the best estimate of the 
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average o:f.' futm:e sbort·-term ratos of interest is provided by the 
yield on undated stock. 
Each subject >vas asked du:cing thEJ intervie1·r to complete the 
quest.ionnc::.ire in the 1·rriter' s presence. A copy of the questionnaire 
is included in the ap}Jenchx. The respondents w·ere invited to raise 
any difficulties they might have in unfl.erstanding the questions. 
It 11as emphasised to each Hhen he approached question 4 that he 
vms being asked to rank the portfolios in order of their riskiness 
and not their desirability. His attention vras dravm to the fact 
that lifo. 1 signified the most risky etc. In question 8 it vras 
made clea:r that a project's expected yield '\'las no more than the 
mean of a range of possible yields. In question 9, the purpose 
of stating portfolio A so laboriously rather than in the form of 
a simple bank deposit 1ms to minimise the effect of' any possible 
prejudice against fixed-interest securities. It 1ms also explained 
to each in tervievree that to have a 2, 5, or 1 0 yea!' time horizon 
vms in no 1my a guarantee that there might not arise circUJnstances 
which would require a forced sale. -1 It-Has merely an expectation 
that the fUJ1ds vrould not be required for other purposes during 
the period. 
Results 
It was clear from the intervievT that the respondents fo1.L'lld it 
difficult to think of the risk of an investment in isolation from 
its desirability. It '1\'as also obvious that the tentative definition 
of risk given in the introduction to the questionnaire conflicted 
w·i th many of the respondents' concept of risk. One respondent, 
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for example, remarked that "in your sense of risk, undated stock is 
not particularly -c·isky because the investor is virtually assured of 
losing money. 11 li'urthermoJ:e, at the ti::.'le of the interview (Hay 1974), 
the economic situ:::,tion could not be descri1)ed as normal. The rate of 
inflation vras expected to exceed 1 57; in 1 97 4, i'lar Loan vras yielding 
nearly 14~5:;, and the F .T. Ordinary Share Index vras at its lm·rest 
point for seven years. There Has general disillusionnent expressed 
about eqvities for their failure in recent years to keep pace vlith 
inflation, but it is probably fair to say that the depressed 
conditions produced an even greater disillusionment 1-rith and prejudice 
against fixed interest stock. nonetheless the results of the study, 
as indicated in Table 1 appear to corroborate the BJS study and 
hypotheses presented in the last chapter, nanely, 
( 1) That undated dofau1t-free lo.an stock is perceived by investors 
as having a substantially equivalent level of riskiness as an 
efficiently diversified portfolio of risky assets. 
The general dissatisfaction 1-ri th the definition of risk has 
already been noted, and it w·as clear that most respondents vrere 
replying to the questions according to their o>m perception of risk. 
Hov1ever the fact that as many as 46 out of 50 took the vie'I·T that the 
loan stock was actually riskier (in 1·rhatever sense) in the medium 
or long term must cast doubt about any generaliDed assumption that 
a default-free security is less risky. Inflation, of course, vms 
frequentlycited as the main consideration inarriving at their decision. 
(2) That the risk-aversion hypothesis is not a valid assumption 
for all levels of risk 
As many a? 48 out of the 50 investors questior..ed Here w·illing to invest 
at least some of their surplus funds in a volatile portfolio vri thout 
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any CXl!octation of a hi~her average roJcurn than a non-·volatile 
SOCUTityo To 1rhr, t extent this readiness to accept somo volatility 
without compensation ~1plied risk-tolerance on the part of the 
investors~ Ol' a l)o1iof in their ability to time their exit from the 
market under favov~·o. bJ.e conditions vras not clear. Neither reason, 
of cou:r-sc: ~ may conform to the theoretical concept of rational 
Lwestm.· t)ehavio:xr. But it is hmr investors actually behave uhich 
matters and not how they ought to behave, and it would seem that few 
investors would wclcrnne the disappearance of all variability. 
(::>) 1J1hat the yield on default·-free stock is a reasonable proxy for 
the minimum acceptable reh1.rn on the market portfolio of 
risky assets. 
All members of the samplr:, indicated that they would be pre1)ared, 
for the meclium and long term, to ~nvest at least some of their surplus 
funds, and 48 out of the 50 said all of their surr)lus funds, in a 
portfolio of equities, if manage111ent adopted the yield on undated 
t l th . . t. . t . ( 7 ) s oc ( as ·. e nnn:.LmUI;l o.ccep _.anco crl er2on. 
(7) '.Phe :-ees:pons~~ use.~ in tabl: ( 1) ~o test thes?. three _,hypotheses 
vrere (1J len (92/o) (2) 3b (96)o) and (3) 2n (10<Y;J). In 
each case a test of the null hypothesis that the probability 
of response in the population is belo;.r 50.; is rejected at the 
5>:~ level, using the Normal auproxir:1ation to the Binomial 
distribution. For cases (1) and (2)t approximate confidence 
intervals for the probabilities of response can be calculated 
using the Poisson approximation to the Binomial distribution. 
The intervals are: 
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Humber 
(Total 50) 
Pel'Ccntac;e 
of response 
( 1) IrrcdecJJwble dcfault~.frco loan 
stock is: 
(2) 
(3) 
a) modcrnte1y or sig11:Lficantly 
safer tnun a well-diversified 
portfolio of risky assets 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
b) 
in the short term 
in the medi'Lw term 
in the loug term 
only marginally seder than a 
·Hell-,d:i.vcrsifiecl lXlrtfolio of 
risky assets 
in the short term 
in the medium term 
in the long term 
i) 
ii) 
ii:i.) 
c) r:i.Bkicr thari a 1·mll diversified 
i) 
ii) 
ii:i.) 
. ·portfolio of risky assets 
in the short term 
in the medium term 
in the long term 
Investors preferring to invest 
some or all surplus funds in a 
portfolio of equities of 
All 
surplus 
funds 
companies which use the default-
free yield as the mininUI:J. cut-
·" 
off point for selecting risky 
projects rather than to invest 
in the default-free stock 
itself' 
. i) for the short term 42 
.~~~ for the medium term 48 ~~~ for the long term 49 
Investors preferring to invest 
some or all surplus fm1ds in a 
volatile portfolio of risky 
assets rather than in a non-
volatile security which 
yields 1 (J}~ 1d t.h certainty 
a) even if the long~term expected 
y:i.eld on the volatile portfolio 
-;/ 
was only 91<) 33 
b) if the long-term expected 
yield on the volatile 
portfolio equailed 10~ 37 
c) if the long-term expected 
yield on the vol3tile portfolio 
was 117~ 37 
TABLE 3 
- 14.1 
7 
1 
1 
4 
3 
2 
39 
46 
47 
At least All 
some S'..U'plus surplus 
funds funds 
47 84% 
50 96~0 
50 9~b 
47 66% 
48 74% 
49 74~0 
At least 
so:-ne 
surplus 
funds 
94~~ 
100% 
10CT~ 
94~~ 
96% 
98~ 
It is a defect of the survey that the groups intervievred -vrere 
arbitrarily defined and therefore do not conform to any recognisable 
representative Rample of the investing popule:cion. On the other 
hand, it is not clear that those 1rrho determine risk premiums can be 
assumed to be representative of the general body of investors. The 
original intention had been to ascertain whether any clear differences 
of attitude could be identified betlreen the different occupational 
groups, but because of the unexpectedly high degree of consensus 
among the respondents, it i'Tas clearly not fruitful to analyse the 
results into sub-groups. Nonetheless, it is significant that of 
those vJho could be described as professionals in the finance field, 
the accoun.tants and brokers and analysts, all hrenty 11ere not only 
tolerant of some risk, but Here actually prepared to pay a premium 
to assume a degree of ·risk, as indica ted by their \'Tillingness to 
invest in a vola tile portfolio \'Those expected average return uas CJ% in 
preference to obtaining a certain 1 a;s. Furthermore, all tVTenty stated 
that the default-free yield vras an acceptable yardstick for companies 
seeking a minimum cut-off rate. 
It was of interest to find quite a fevr of the respondents 
lighting upon the concept of nondiversifiable risk. For example, 
>vhen they replied, as all of them in fact did, that they 1'lould be 
willing to accept the default-free rate as the minimum cut-off rate 
for new projects undertaken by the constituent companies of the 
portfolio, it >·ras emphasised to them that the rate vrould be used 
even for projects vrhich in themselves were very risky. The 
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typical reply ~-ras that it vrould hardly raatter hm·T risky a particular 
project Nas .Lf the portfolio vms as vridely diversified as the one 
envisaged. 
There also appeared to be an implicit recognition of the effect 
of the +ve HPV rule. \•/hen asked uhy they \'lould choose to invest 
in the portfolio rather than the loan stock, if the yield of the 
latter was the yardstick for the former, they invariably replied 
that they 1-muld be attracted ·by the prospect of earning a higher 
return on average than the default-free rate if the latter were used 
as the minimum criterion. 
In conclusion, then, the survey revealed that investors' 
attitudes appear to conforn to the hypothesis presented in chapter 
4, and to the interpretation offered of the BJS fin(Lings, namely 
that under moclern capital market conditions, there is insufficient 
evidence to establish the necessity or even the desirability for 
managers seeking to apply the present value technique to depart 
from the market rate of interest. 
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The evidence examined in this chapter nnd the 1)receding one 
indicated that: 
(1) }<;quities have consistently earned more than bonds by an amount 
greater than can be accounted for by the risk differential. (8 ) 
f!'his SU[Jports the contention of chapter 4 that as a result of the 
operation of the +ve HPV rule, ex post equity yields cannot be 
used to estimate ex ante required minimum rates of return. 
(2) The internationalisation of equity portfolios reduces relevant 
risk significantly belo1·r that associated id. th domestic markets. ( 9) 
(3) \!lith the increased efficiency and internationalisation of capital 
markets investors appear to have become progl'essi vely less 
concerned about the differences in variabilj.ty of securities and 
in recent decades they have appeared to base their selection on 
expected return only.( 10) 
The survey carried out to test investors' attitudes to risk 
revealed that 
(a) \•Then inflation is taken into account, investors do not pe:cceive 
-( 
an efficiently diversified portfolio of risky assets to be any 
riskier than a fixed-interest default-free security. 
(b) Investors have a greater tolerance of volatility once the major 
risks have been diversified al'ray than the conventional theory 
of risk aversion implies. 
(c) Investors 1vould find it acceptable if companies used the market-
determined Govermaent bond yield as the cut-off rate for new 
investments v1hatever the variability characteristics of the 
individual project. 
(8) Horgaard 
(9) Cohn and Pringle 
(10) Black, Jensen and Scholes, 1972 
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Thus the fact that equities bavo ea:cnecl lft(,J.'e than debt ~3eeuri ties 
does not necessarily :Lmply -!;he exi:3tence of a :Premium for risk and can 
be explair.ed by the effect of the +ve IT?\' :cuJ.e as discussed in chapter 3. 
1'o support tho :cisk-prem:i.ln:1 theory it \lould neect to be demonstrated 
that the reqniTE~d r·eturns amongst risky assets vary according to theh· 
relevant risk. Again because of the +ve Nl'V rule effect He cannot 
observe the minj_mum retu1·n rellU.il:ccl O'l eqt.<i tios b·~1t only the average 
achieved returns. If achieved returm1 have v,s.rJ.ed according to the 
:riskiness of the industries involvea, this may have been due as much 
to management's aversion to risk as to investors'. But the fact that 
:i.n recent decades achieved returns have been ok;erved not to vary at 
all vii th risk :provides very compelline evidence that variance has 
ceased to play any significant role in the vahntion process. 
It is not suggested, of course, that the f:Viclel1Ce demonstrates 
conclusively that the differential risk of the 1mrld ma:rket portfolio 
is not a material consideration to investors, but in vieH of the 
very considerable operational difficulties of implementing the risk-
premium hypothesis, it is argued th2t it4 ifl mel'ely sufficient to 
raise serious doubts about the materiality of nondiversifiable risk 
to be justified in questioning the utility of introducing the 
risk premium refinement into the capital budgeting framework. It 
~rould appear that a high proportion of the relatively small number 
of companies who even attempt to adjust the dincoun:t rate for risk 
do no more than apply an arbitrary set of rules vrhich produce 
rates that are not even responsive to changes in the market rate of 
interest. ( 11 ) It is concluded therefore that because of the doubts 
raised by the evidence relating to risk premiums, and because of both 
the significant problems of implementation and the :possible consequences 
(11) See, for example, Abdelsammad, pp 105- 106 and Klalillaer, 
page 391 
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of defective or arbitrary solutions it is ):6s.sonable to assume that the 
quality of investment decisions in the market as a v1hole would not be 
adversely affected and might 1·rell be sit;nificantly improved if the 
pure market rate of interest 1·rere adopted as the relevant discount 
rate. There are, of course other consj.derations l·rhich have been 
alleged to necessitate depaTture from the pure market rate of 
interest, and these ·will be examined in the succeeding chapters. 
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Chapter Six 
'l'HE COS'l' OF DEBT 
In order to ,justify the proposition that the relevant discount 
rate for c;;cui JcaJ. projects can be taken for p-ractical purposes to be 
that given by the government bond yield, it is necessary to explain 
the fact tmt corporate bond yields not only vary according to 
their respective maturities but apparently accordine to their degree 
of riskiness. 
A significant proportion of the literature in recent years has 
been devoted to the I'roblem of measuring the cost of equity capital 
in a capital-asset pricing model context, and this has earned the 
reputation of being the principal stumbling block in the derivation 
of an operational measure of the weighted average cost of caui te_lv 
On the other hand, the typically ·brief text-book treatment of the 
procedure for computing the cost of debt gives the impression of 
the absence of any significant controversial issueR. Thus, the 
cost of debt is usually defined as the discount rate which equates 
4 
the present value of the interest plus principal payments with the 
net proceeds of the debt issue, that is, the solution for k in the 
follovring equation: 
D = I + I + I + B ••• & ( 1) 
(l+k)' (i+k")t.. ( l+k)l\ ( l+k)"' 
where D = net proceeds of bond issue, or market price of bond 
I = annual interest payments 
B = maturity value of the bond 
n 
-
number of years to maturity. 
For the purposes of project analysis, where the cash flows are 
148 
expressed on an after-tax basis, the relevant cost of debt is 
usually defined as kJ3(1- t). Therefore, in the simplest case, 
I<Ihere the bond is issued at par and matures at par, the after-tax 
cost of deot is equal to the coupon rate less the rate of corporation 
tax. 
In this chapter it vrill be demonstrated that this vridely 
accepted definition is an oversimplification, and that although the 
scope for error in computing the cost of debt is restricted, the 
problems of measuring it are potentially as complex as those associated 
'l'ith calculating the cost of equity. It will be argued that, in 
order to derive the overall cost of capital, the relevant co~t of 
a particular debt security is not the promised yield to maturity, 
but the expected time-adjusted average cost of the series of 
successive securities of which the particular debt security is one 
component. In effect, the cost of debt is shovm to be independent 
of the coupon rate of interest and, on the assumption that lenders 
are capable of diversifying efficiently, it is argued that the cost 
of a bond of any maturity should approximate the yield of a default-
"' free security. Thus one of the most convincing arguments for the 
validity of the risk premium concept, albeit in the none1uity market, 
namely the hierarchy of interest rates for bonds which vary only in 
their degree of risk, is in fact, illusory. 
THE COST OF DEBT AND THE LENGTH OF TI11E TO NATUHITY 
It is an observable fact that rates of interest differ for 
equivalent-grade securities according to differences in the length 
of time to maturity. The relationship bf3t>-Teen yield and maturity 
will be influenced by a number of factors, but, in particular, by 
the market's expectations of the future course of interest rates. 
A bra year bond- may have a yield of 5% at the same time that an 
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equivalent~grade, seven-year bond may yield 1o%. The tv10 year 
bond cannot 9 hm1ever, be said to be cheaper per se than the seven-
year one. J:>resumably the market 1 s expectations are that after tvro 
years, interest rates vTLLl rise so that, on average, over the seven 
year perio1~s a, purchaser of a series of short term bonds vTill earn 
approximately 10%. There may, of course, be other factors vThich 
operate to put the average of the short term rates above or belm'l 
the 10%, for instance, investors' liquidity preferences or 
segmentation betvreen the short and mecliulfl markets. But, nonetheless, 
it remains true that the relationship of the tv10 yields cannot be 
assumed, pr:Lma facie, to reflect fundamental differences in cost, 
· otherwise, a simple decision rule of issuing only lo\'1er yield 
securities, irrespective of maturity, 'l'rould commend itself to firms. 
For convenience, the subsequent analysis proceeds within the 
framework of the traditional 1~odigliani and Hiller assumptions of 
efficient markets and no taxes etc. \'There the overall cost of 
capital can be shovm to be unaffected by the degree of leverage. 
However, this framevrork is not essential to the argument, e.nd the 
" principles involved are equally valid w·i thin a more conventional 
framework. 
Assume there are hw firms, M and N, of an identical risk class, 
'I'Thich are expected to earn a perpetuity of cash earnings, X, such 
that each firm has a market value, V. In addition, both firms have 
identical capital structures except that the maturity of M1 s debt 
is short-term and that of N, long-term, and the interest rate, r 
n 
on N's debt exceeds that on M's debt, 
V = S + D = S + D 
m m n n 
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r . 
m 
Therefore 
vrhere S =-= the market value of the equity, and D - the market value 
of the debt, and S "'" S , and D = D • 
m n m n 
In the absence of corporate taxes, the Heighted average cost of 
capital for each firm is 
w = X 
s 
u 
\<Jhere S = the market· value of the equity of an unlevered firm of 
u 
the same class. Therefore 
s B x km (-s +; ) ·D.l ( -;;---;:; ) \'1 == + kj3 ::::: s Ill s >J ., 
m m m m u 
s 
n ( B X 
and w :::= kn (s+~) + l~ rn ) == n s s n n n n 
u 
vlhere k
8 
and~ arc the relevant costs of the respective equity and debt 
capitals. 
then, 
= 
s 
km ( m ) 
s S +D 
m m 
and therefore 
D 
km , m ) 
B {s +D 
m m 
and ~ = ~ 
== 
= 
n 
k 
s 
kn 
B 
s 
(.S" +~-) 
n n 
D :.-' 
(~ +D ) 
n n 
but since r < r , then it foll01·1s that r cannot, per se, be the 
m n 
relevant cost of debt in determining the firm's cost of capital. 
If~ 4 ~' then either 
(a) w < w , or m n 
(b) km /" kn 
s ' s 
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The first of these alternatives is rejected because it conflicts 
~>ri th the Nodigliani and I\1iller theorem that the cost of capital is 
inclevendent of the form of finand.ng and. because the resulting 
disparity in firm values would be eliminated by their now celebrated 
arbitrage process. The second alternative implies that the cost of 
equity articulates perfectly vri th the cost of debt, or equivalently 
that the implicit cost of debt (including·explicit and implicit costs) 
is independent of the debt's yield to maturity. If therefore, in 
practice, the cost of equity is computed on the basis of the firm's 
debt-equity market value ratio, l·d.thout reference to the maturity 
structure of the firm's debt capital, then, to compensate, the cost 
of debt should be computed indepenclently of its length of time to 
maturity. · That is, ~ does not equal r but, rather, equals the 
weighted-average of the expected return from the bond and the expected 
return from the security or securities which subsequontly replace it. 
Therefore 
(1) If the firm intends to replace its dated debt security by another 
debt security or by a series of debt securities, so as to maintain 
its existing capital structure, then the relevant cost of the 
:< 
dated security is not its own cost but the expected average cost 
of the entire series of debt instruments. Unless the management 
considers itself competent to predict the future course of interest 
rates, then the best estimate of that expected average is given 
by the yield of equivalent-grade long-term bonds. 
(2) If the firm expects to replace its existing dated debt by equity 
capital, then in the context of the conventional assumption that 
the cost of equity is distinguishable from the cost of debt, the 
manager is faced with the difficult task of computing the average 
cost of the debt-equity series. It has to be borne in mind that 
if the current market yield-maturity relationship for debt 
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securities indicates an expectation of a future increase or 
decrc::aso in interest rates, then it is reasonable to assume 
a corresponding increase or decrease in the cost of equity 
capital, if the latter is perceived as being equal to the 
rate of ilnerest plus a premium for risk. 
(3) If the firm intends not to replace the dated debt Hith any 
security, then the relevant cost vlill be the average of the 
cost of the existing debt and of the vreighted average cost 
of cap:L tal expected to p:cevail after the clebt has been repaid. 
This conclusion is based on the observation that if the 
conventional method of calculating a firm's cost of capital produces 
solutions lvhi.ch vary according to the maturity struct'J.ra of the 
component securities, then the cost of capital as a decision tool 
must be redefined, so that it can be expressed in maturity terms 
'vhich are consistent vTi th the needs of the decision. Either cash 
flovrs should be discounted at the rate specifically appropriate to 
the year in vThich they are receivablA, in which case the cost of 
capital should be perceived as a short-term rate to be computed for 
each year of the period under review, or cash f lo·ws shoulc3. be 
discounted at a single time-adjusted average rate, in which case the 
cost of capital should be expressed as a long-term average rate. 
Since the cost of equity is generally defined in terms of an indefinite 
stream of income, and since most theoreticians favour the convenience 
of using a single rate for discounting pro~pective cash floHs, then 
the latter approach is preferred. But whether one or the other is 
adopted, the yield to maturity is clearly not the relevant cost for 
inclusion in the weighted average calculation. 
rrHE PRO.l-1ISED VERSUS THE EXPEC'l'ED RATE OF INTEREST 
The second aspect of the cost of debt capital to be examined 
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concerns the d:LGtinction sometimes made in the finance literature 
between the promised rate of return and tho expected rate of return~ 1 ) 
'l'he promised l'Clte is the rate ·which solves oquation (1), 'I'Thilst the 
expected rate is the rate which debt-hol1ers ectually expect to 
rece:i.v<::. If the debt is riskless, then these two rateB are synonomous. 
If the debt is risky, then the promised rate is the maximum rate 
l·rithin the range of possible returns receivable by the bondholder, 
and 9 therefore~ must be higher than tl.1e expected rate Bince the latter 
allov1s for the possibility of default. Some controversy exists about 
1·rhich of the hm rates is the :celevant one for inclusion in the firm's 
cost of capital computation. (2) Haley and Schall, for example, argue 
that it is the expected return 1vhich is the relevant one, whilst, in 
a recent p~per, ()) Brennan argued that, uith bankruptcy costs and 
corporate taxes, it is the promised not the expected cost which is 
relevant, andr in fact, most textbooks consider only the promised 
rate. The issue is 'l'lhether investment projects should be accepted if 
their expected rate of return exceeds the rate needed to provide the 
suppliers of carji tal rTi th the rate which they expect on average to 
earn, or whether it should at least equal.,. the rate which the firm 
commits itself to pay to the suppliers of capital. 
The problem is more easily put· in perspective if w·e initially 
make the convenient, albeit unlikely, assumption that a company could 
be financed entirely by debt, again in the context of the Modigliani 
and Hiller assumption that the capital structure is irrelevant to 
the firm's overall cost of capital. The issues raised, however, once 
again, do not depend upon acceptance of the MN framework, but are 
nonetheless more readily placed in perspective vri thin that context. 
(1l For example, see Boness. 
(2 See Haley and Schall, page 160. 
(3 Brennan, page 27. 
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'J:he distinguishing features of deut capital as distinct from 
equity are that, 
(a) the returns are more predictable, and 
(u) there in a higher degree of sta1)iUty in the pattern of returns. 
The predietability is achieved by establishing a contractual 
rate of :i.nteref3t per annum, so that the debtholder can ascertain 
the wost likely pattern of cash f1o-vts. The variability of that 
pattern is rrd.niwised by attaching to debt a prior claim upon the 
fh·1n 1 s income~ pJ us a right to look to the firm's assets should 
the firm fail to meet the contractual rate of interest. The higher 
the; proportion of debt in a firm 1 s capital structure, the more 
doef:l a deqt security lose its predicta.bili ty and protection from 
risk, and the more does it assume the characteristics of equity. 
For a pure debt company, the returns are neither more predicta:ble 
nor more secure than those of a. pure equity company, and, therefore, 
the c0ncept of a pure debt company is highly unrealistic. On the 
other hand, it is a useful artefact for the purposes of focusing upon 
the similarities and differences betvreen the cost of debt and the 
cost of equitye 
PeJ·fect Na1:kets 
By perfect rmrkets, it is assumecl. that there are no bankruptcy 
costs, and that competition is so effective, both amongst firms for 
capital projects, and behreen the debt and equity sections of the 
securities market, that the firm's overall cost of capital is 
substantially equal to the expected rate of return from acceptable 
projects. That is, no firm can find projects Hhose IRR) k, or 
equivalently, vthich have a positive NPV >vhen the cash flovTs are 
discounted at k, where k is the cost of capital appropriate to the 
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risk clans. All acceptable projects have NPVs = 0. The cost of 
capital for a lJUl·e debt firm should equal the cost of capital of a 
pure equity firm of the same class, but unless the firm's asset 
returns are free of risk, the promised r~te for the debt company 
would be higher than tho return expected by the bondholders, and, 
therefore, by the same token, higher than the return expected by 
investors in the pure.equity company. The minimum equilibriun 
rate for the promised rate of interest is the highest return 
includecl in the market 1 s probability distribution of possible 
returns fror.J. the firm's projects. If it vTere any less than the 
highest possible reJcu.rn from the projects then the expected return 
for the debt 1·10uld be less than the mean expected retu1·n from the 
projects. 'rhus, in order to have an expectation of achieving a 
required return of~ say, 15%, the promised rate for the pure debt 
company might have to be 50%, or even 50o%, if there vrere the 
remotest possibility of the projects' actual returns deviating to 
that extent from the expected return of 15%. Indeed, to be assured 
that every possible return were included, the nominal rate for a 
pure debt company might be set as high as OQ%, >·Then of course the 
:' 
debt is indistinguishable from equity. But whatever the appropriate 
promised rate might be, the relevant rate to g~ide investment 
decisions would be the expected rate. In perfect markets, lenders 
'I'TOUld not exercise their right to declare a firm bankrupt for failure 
to meet the nominal rate of interest as long as there existed the 
expectation of achieving, on average, the required return. If they 
sued for failure to earn the nominal rate, no :firm would be able to 
survive for any length of time, because, by definition, it vrould 
not be pos8ible to find any projects which offered an ex ante 
average return higher than the return required by the suppliers of 
capital. The promised rate, therefore, is clearly no more than a 
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mechanism to give bondholders the opportunity of achieving on 
average the return rec1uired by them. It is a device for capturing 
possible devi.<ttions from the mean return, D.nd cannot, therefore, 1Je 
used as a screening criterion for selecting projects. The effective 
decislon criterion is the expected cost of debt, and the acceptability 
of projects clepend.s on this rate only. It cannot be observed in the 
markeJc, and muRt be assumed to be, like equity, equal to the default-
free rate plus, if necessary, a premium for risk. The size of the 
premium, if any, depend.s on the degree of the firm's nondiversifiable 
risk 7 vrhilst the differential betvreen the default-free rate and the 
promised rate depends on the total variability of the company. 
Van Horne ( 4 ) defines the risk premium on corporate bonds as "the 
differential bet1·1een the promised yield and the actual yield on a 
comparable risk-free security." It is clear, hO\feVer, that this is 
not the case, and that the risk premium is the differential between 
the expected rate on the risky bond and the risk-free yield. If it 
vrere possible for· bondholders to diversify all risk m-ray, then bonds 
should have no risk premium, and the expected rate vrould equal the 
default-free rate. But th.:; promised rate >·rould nonetheless exceed 
the expected rate, because the promised rate is a function of the 
total variability of the company's returns, vrhilst the expected 
rate is a function of nondiversifiable risk only. 
Indeed, for the pure debt company, the promised rate has to do 
'·rith the upper tail of the probability distribution of the firm's 
project returns rather than the dispersion about the mean. Thus 
the promised rate for a pure debt company, A, may be higher than 
that of another pure debt company, B, even although A has a lovrer 
total risk than B. Table 1, for exru~ple, gives the distribution 
(4) Van Horne, page·104. 
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of po;:;sible j_)ltcnwl l'ateD of x·etvrn for the productive assets held 
by companies A at~ B. B is the riskier of the two, but A's assets 
have P non_r.;d;>J(;]cu;~ a small possibility of achieving 1 ~/o as against 
B 1 f3 rnaxirmun of 1 El';,S. 'J:he. e:;:pected :rate for each is assumed to be 1 Cf}0. 
If no risk prc;1d:um is required because of the opportunities for 
di versifica tj_ on r then the 107; \'Till also equal the risk-free rate. 
But. the . , pronn DCCL rate tor .fi..' s debt is 195ib and fOl' J3' s only 1 [];'/ ·/Co At 
each of these levels the respective bondholderA can expect to receive 
an average of 1 O~br as :r·ecp.<iT'ed. 'fhc prorr.ised rate has, therefore, 
no economic significance other than to provide an umbrella under 
vrl1ich the retu:cn expected. by bondholders can be realiseds given the 
particular configuration of the pro1:·ubility di::;tribt<.tion of returns 
from the firm 1 s projects. 
'fABLE 1 
A B 
nm Proba1)ility IRR Probability 
1% .o·J 2% .20 
10% .98 1o% .60 
:' 
1 gojb .01 18}6 .20 
\'Then firms operate under partial leverage in perfect markets, 
the promisecl rate of debt i'Till vary prOl)Ortionately 1·1i th the degree 
of leverage and vri th the variability of the firm 1 s assets. The 
promised rate vrill continue to be higher than the expected rate in 
order to give bondholders the right to receive deviations in returns 
above the expected rate up to the promised rate, to counterbalance 
possible deviations belovr the expected return. Paradoxically, if 
the realised returns from the firm's assets exactly equal their 
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expeclc'l r-eturn::, 1 tlle real:i.sec\ return on th3 firm 1 s debt will exeoed 
the llordhr:<i,~e1·c; 1 r:;>;p<;cted r<-lte 9 and tlJe realised. retu:cn on the finn 1 s 
equity will be less than thu return expected by the slilireholders. 
Thercfo:ce ~ :Ln o:c:Jor that a portfolio of levered equities should 
achieve the ex-ante expected return, it is necessary that the spread 
of the reali::;ed r2 t;urns be Gubstantially as broad as the spread of 
the ex-m;te prob::;biiLty distr:ibution of returns from the firm 1 s 
assets. Just as the necessity for a diff0rential between the promised 
rate of (~ebt and tllo e-xpected :r-ate is causecl by the variability of 
the pl'c;;pectivE; :r·otcJ.:cns frOJa the firm's productive assets~ so the 
possibility of achieving the returns expected from a portfolio of 
levered shares depends on the actual occurrence of those deviations. 
Fixed income securities actually benefit from and equity securities 
Guffer fro:u a h:Lghcc degree of stability ex po.st than 1·ras expected 
ex ante. Thus~ e.n equity investor vrho holds shares in tvro levered 
companies, each i'li th a significant degree of spread in its ex-ante 
probability distribution of returns~ will, in fact, fail to achieve 
his required return if each company earns its expected return, even 
if the returns of the companies were perf~ctly negatively correlated. 
He will fare better if one firm does bery badly and the other very 
vrell, provided, of course, tbe average return is no less than the 
expected return. 
To illustrate this counter-intuitive effect of achieving the 
ex-an to expected r·eturn from the firm 1 s assets, assume that P and Q 
are two companies whose returns are perfectly negatively correlated, 
and have probability distributions as follo·Hs, for one year hence: 
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p Q 
Event P:cobabili ty Ca.<Jh Probability Cash 
]'J.Oi'T FlOI·T 
\<J 1 .2 ,t5)0 .2 £1,670 
H., G6 1 '1 00 c6 1 '1 00 
L 
"\'j 'Z .2 1, 670 .2 530 
.J 
Each company has equity of £500 and debt of £500, the latter 
having a ])romised rate of 11%. The required return for both the 
oqui ty a.nd debt are m:m.Jmed to be 1 (Jjb. The expected returns for 
a portfolio of debt and for a portfolio of equity are, therefore, 
as presented in Table 2. 
TABLD 2 
Event p 
.Q Portfolio Probabili t;y Equity Debt 
PQ 
'\ Equity 0 1 , 115 1 , 115 .2 223 
Debt 530 555 1.085 .2 217 
vr ,1 Equity 545 545 1 ,090 .6 654 
L 
Debt 555 555 1 '11 0 .6 666 
.:-1 
u 
3 
Egui ty 1 '115 0 1 , 115 .2 223 
Debt 555 530 1 ,085 .2 217 
1 '1 00 1 '100 
It is clear that if each firm earns the expected return of 
£·t, 100 (event v1J the equity portfolio vrill earn less than the required 
.:. 
return, and the debt portfolio. more, namely a return equal to the 
promised rate. Conversely, if P or Q does badly I·Ti th the other doing 
1vell, the :r.•eturn on the equity portfolio will exceed both the return 
from the debt portfolio and the minimum return required by the 
equityholders. 
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In iW}H;;_·fcc:t markc:;-ts? the firm 1 s cost of CB.pital and the expected 
return froHJ t:bc firm's projects are not identical, and indeed it is 
a condition of acceptance 9 under the positive NPV rule, that the 
latter execccl.s the former. The promised rate of interest is, once 
again, the rate which the market estimates to be necessary to give 
l)ondholders an expectation of obtaining their :r·equired return, but 
unlike the pe-;;·fect market situation, the promi.sed rate for a pure 
debt company IWUld be lsss than thG maximum 1-1ossible return included 
in the probD.bility di,str.ibution of returns for the firm's projects, 
othend.se the clebtholders could expect to achieve a return equal to 
that expected from the firm 1 s projects, I'Thich, by definition, under 
the operatjon of the NPV rule, vrould be greater than the return 
required b~l them., 
If a pu:re debt company accepts a project \·rhich is expected to 
earn more than the 1 cost of capital', i.e. more than the debtholders' 
required return, then the question may be asked, to whom does the 
resulting NFV or excess return belong? If the project's IRR is 
greater than 1'13 but less than r, then because debtholders are entitled 
to receive any returns up to the level of the nominal rate, r, it 
might seem that the excess returns vrould accrue to the debtholders. 
Indeed, it has already been noted that if every firm achieved the 
return expected from its productive assets, the debtholders 'lvould 
earn a return equal to r, and would, therefore, secure to themselves 
the full benefit of the excess returns. Ho1·revor, looking at the vrhole 
market portfolio of levered firms, it is extremely improbable that 
each component firm 11ill earn precisely the return expected from its 
productive assets, but rather that the pattern of realised returns 
vrill conform sommrhat to the ex-ante spread of returns which vras 
contemplated uhen the market level for r vras determined. Each pure 
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debt company has the possibility of earning a return higher than r, 
and the excess return, if it; does materic:lise, TTcl_:c:t accrue to the 
residual O\mers s ivho, in tho circums·t.Pt.nces m·e the 'none on tribu tory 1 
equity Oimers. In other vrordfJ, uhere di~equil:'Ll::rium returns are 
pos~3il)le, a company iihich starts off as e. pure debt company, in the 
sense that all the funds needed inihally to purchase its plo.nt and 
machinery are supplied by bondholders, ceases to be a pure debt 
company as soon as it accepts a. project 1·1hose exj)ected IRR./kB. 
This paradox is a direct re~ml t of the residual nature of eqo.ity' s 
claim in market conditions v1hich create a eli ve:cgeYlce between tl:e 
expected IRRs of acceptable projects and the requi:J:ed rates of 
return for the ca})i tal instrL.unents used to finance those projects. 
The significant point for present purposes, ho~-rever, is that 
even under imperfect conditions, the relevant cost of capital for 
determining the conh•ibution vrhich a project makes to the value 
of tbe firm remains the expected rather than the promised rate. On 
the other hand, it is a reasonable assumption that the nominal rate 
is used by lendero in their evaluation of a firm's capacity to pay 
the expected rate, although we do not know precisely what criteria 
are used by them in deciding whether bankruptcy proceedings are 
justified. It has been argued that under perfect conditions the 
probability of bankruptcy would be no greater for a pure debt 
company than for a pure equity company of the same class, because 
investors in both sections of the security market iWUld be guided 
only by the prospects of achieving the expected return, which per 
unit of risk, 1-rould be the same for each type of security. If under 
imperfect -~ondi tions, the probability of bankruptcy appears to be 
increased by the degree of leverage, the implication is that leverage 
leads to premature bankruptcy, because lenders use failure to achieve 
the promised rate as the signal for action, or alternatively that 
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equityho)ders aro 1 in fact, dilatory in their response to the 
appropriate si(.','l1Cl,1~J and permit their firm to continue operating 
beyond the yJOint v:here it is justified on economic grounds. \•Thichever 
exp.l~mc.-1tion is correct, the p:comised rate may acquire a more significant 
role than has hj_ therto been identified, and a risk·-averse management, 
interested in survivalt may use the nominal rate as the relevant 
hurdle for ne'1l investment;:; to minimise the possi})ili ty of banlcruptcy. 
But if Dianac;c;;meJJ t vlishes to shield the firm against the consequences 
of b::mkruptcy t the usc of the promised rate as the minimum acceptance 
rate does not thereby make it the correct rate for me;:umring the 
project's contribution to the value of the firm. It is no more than 
one of a series of measures vrhich they might adopt, such as employing 
a lovr level of leverage, or engaging in firm diversification, and 
which may lead to a suboptimal position in relation to shareholders' 
w·elfare. l~or example, firm diversification, in itself, produces no 
benefit for shareholders Hhich they could not have achieved through 
their mm portfolios, and may lead to the rejection of otherwise 
pr·ofi table projects >'l"hich might upset the balance of the portfolio. 
A low debt-s qui ty ratio might reduce the _.,value of the firm as a 
result of the loss of tax benefits. Laotly, the use of the promised 
rate as the acceptance criterion might lead to the rejection of 
projects capable of contributing to the value of the sb.areholders 1 
portfolios., Nonetheless, it cannot be said that anyone of the above 
strategies necessarily affects the return required by bondholders. 
\'lhatever screening device is employed by management to determine 
the acceptability of projects, the magnitude of the contribution 
\vhich a project makes to the value of the firm can only be measured 
by discoup.ting the project's cash flm.; at the return required by 
the suppliers of capital. 
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RankrvDtcv costs -~-----~- --l.:-·----------~ 
So far, it ha.s been ass\imed that no costs are j_ncurred by the fir hi 
at the })Oint of bankruptcy. Brennan argues ( 5) that such costs, 
together vr:i_ th the tax deductibility of interest payments, make the 
promiseo. rather than the expected rate .the relevant one. This can 
only be correct, hoNever, if the promised rate is equivalent to the 
expected rate plus a premium sufficient to cover the expected costs 
of bankruptcy, and it is argued that this could be so only if the bonds 
are riDlcless, that is~ that bankruptcy can be assured of being declared 
before the value of the firm~ af~ payment of bankruptcy costs, falls 
belo>·r a level sufficient to give bondholders their required return. 
But a risky bond is one vlhich is capable of yielding, after all costs 
have been paid., a rEturn which is less than the minimum required by 
the bondholders. Therefor·e, to compensate, the lender must be capable 
of earning a rate of return greater than the expected rate plus any 
ban1cnlptcy premium, otherwise he cannot hope, on averafte, to achieve 
the expected rate. It follo,·Ts that the promised rate must exceed 
the relevant rate for capital budgeting purposes, and that its function 
io fundamentally no different than vrhen bar!kruptcy costs are assumed 
., 
not to exist, namely to provide an mnbrella to capture deviations 
from the mean. By stating that ~ rate higher than the bondholders' 
expected rate is the appropriate one for management to discount the 
firm 1 s cash flovrs in order to cover expected bankruptcy costs, Brennan 
is merely suggesting that the best way to allo-vr for bankruptcy costs 
is not to include them in the probability distribution of cash flows, 
but to adjust the expected rate upwards so that sufficient returns will 
be earned to meet the additional costs. NOi·T, that may be a useful 
practical device, but it is no more theoretically valid than omitting 
the project's installation expenses and then applying a higher discount 
(5) Brennan, page 27 
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rate to the subsequent inflol1fJ to compensate for the omission. 
Bankruptcy costs, like the installation costs of a project, or the 
chairman's salary, should be included in the probability distribution 
of tbe firm's ca,sh flo>'TS, and. therefore, affect the expected value 
of the firm, but, per se, they do not change bondholders' required 
return, vlhich is the rate a.p11licable to the residue of cash floviS 
available to the bondholders from the firm's projects, after deducting 
all prior expenses" The costs affect the value of the terminal cash 
flovr v;hich the bondholders are entitled to receive, but they do not 
affect the di::;oount rate Hhich the bondholders' apply to that cash 
flovr. 'rherefore, even \'lith bankruptcy costs, the relevant decision 
criterion for measuring a project's \vorth is the expected or required 
rate. 
Brennan also argues that the promised cost is the more relevant 
cost \vith corporate taxes, "since the tax savings from debt issuance 
depend upon the promised return and not the expected return to 
bondholders. 11 But since the promised return is the maximum 1·rhich 
the bondholder can hope to receive, then the tax savings associated 
vii th that return are the maximum which the firm can hope to achieve. 
The present value of the tax savings from a bond issued at par is 
either the value of the promised cash benefits discounted at the 
· d t trD t t prom1se ra .e, -r- = D, or, equivalently, he value of the expected 
cash benefits discounted at the expected rate, tkBD :=: tD. 
-r 
B 
If we perceive the stream of cash benefits from a project as being 
composed of tvTO elements, namely 
( 1) the after-tax flovrs expected to arise from the project computed 
on the basis that the project is purely equity financed, and 
(2) the tax savings expected to arise from the use of debt capital 
to finance the project 
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it is clear that the first stream is unaffected by the tax 
deductibility of interest payments, and should therefore be 
discounted at the expected rate, whilst the present value of 
the second stream equals tB, \1hich has been sho1m to equal 
the value of the expected tax benefits discounted at the expected 
rate of interest. It follows that the relevant rate, even with 
corporate taxes, is the expected rate and not the promised rate. 
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The conventional definition of the cost of debt as the yield 
to maturity VIas examined and found deficient for two reasons. 
Firstlyf the yield to maturity is an expression of the promised 
rate of interest vrhich is no more than an umbrella rate to ensure 
that bondholders have the expectation of earning the return required 
by them. The promised rate is the maximum rate vrhich can be earned 
by bondholders, vrhilst the relevant criterion for measuring the 
value of new projects. and for discriminating between them is the 
minimum rate acceptable to bondholders, namely the default-free 
rate, plus, if appropriate, a premiwn to compensate for nondiversifiable 
risk. The cost of o.ebt therefore 9 like the cost of equity, cannot 
be directly observed in the market and depends for its precise 
derivation on the decision-maker's ability to measure the market 
price of risk. 
Secondly, the >veighted average cost of capital as a decision 
tool in investment appraisal, is either one of a series of short-
term rates calculated for each year under review or a single long-
term average of the future short-term rates expected to prevail 
during the Hhole period under review-. It cannot be composed of a 
mixture of redemption yields of securities of different maturities. 
If the single long-term average approach is adopted, then the 
relevant cost of a debt security of any maturity is the t:tme-· 
weighted average of its own cost to maturity and of the cost of the 
securities which are expected to succeed it. If the firm intends 
to maintain its existing debt equity ratio, then the effective cost 
of debt is the expected return from a long-term security of the 
same class. 
It was argued that the existence of bar~ruptcy costs and tax 
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benefits for debt do not directly affect the return required by 
bondholde1·s. Therefore, given the opportunities to construct 
a well diversified portfolio of bonds, the degree of nondiversifiable 
risk for any particular bond should be insignificant, and for 
practical })Urposes the return expected may be assumed to be equal 
to the default-free rate. In that event, the effective cost of 
debt may be taken to be equal to the yielcl of a long-term Government 
bond, \'lhatever the coupon rate of the individual debt security or 
its length of time to maturity. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE DEB'i'-EQUITY. NIX AND THE COST OF CAPITAL 
In chapter 6, v7e examined the cost of debt and ho1:1 it responded 
to varying degrees of leverage. It i'TaS argued that although the 
rate of interest could be expected to increase as the proportion 
of debt in the capital structure increased, it did not follo1v that 
the cost of debt proper, that is, the rsturn expected to be earned 
by lenders, increased given the opportunities to diversify the risk 
away. 
In chapters 4 and 5, vre examined the cost of equity and concluded 
that there >vas no firm evidence that in cm'rent markets a risk-
premium needs to be added to the pure rate of interest to attract 
equity investors into a well diversified portfolio of risky assets. 
This chapter is concerned ·Hi th the effect I'Thich the debt-equity 
mix in the firill 1 s capital structure has on the cost of equity. If 
a pure equity stream of a given class is.subject to risk, the effect 
of introducing leverage into the capital structure is to nu:gnify the 
riskiness of the levered equity stream. If the market places a 
price on risk, then, as leverage increases, the cost of equity rises 
correspondingly. The traditional vim·r ( 1) implies that the rise in 
the cost of equity initially for moderate amounts of debt is not 
such as to cancel out all benefits of debt, and that leverage can 
therefore produce a reduction in the overall cost of capital. 
Hodigliani and Hiller( 2) argue that since equity investors can 
engage in homemade leverage, the rise in the cost of equity is 
directly proportional to the increase in leverage and therefore 
the overall cost of capital will be unaffected. Therefore, i-Thilst 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
e.g. See Durand, page 108 of The Theory of Business Finance. 
A Book of Readings, by Archer and D 1 Arabrosio 
Nodigliani and Hiller, 1958 
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the hw viev/S diverge about the 1)recise effect of levero.ge on the 
cost of equity, both vievrs imply that the cost of equity rises 
vd. th leverOJ.ga. In this chapter, Hhilst +;he u]ove principle is 
aecepted that if a pure equity stream has a capitalisation rate 
vrhich includes a risk premium, the introduction of leverage 1'Till 
magnify the risks and therefore magnify the premium, it vrill be 
argued that if the pure equity stream has a degree of risk w·hich is 
insignificant and clO.es not necessitate a risk premium, the introduction 
of leverage will Lot necessitate a risk premium for the equity even 
if the risk of the residual equity stream is magnified to a degree 
uhich causes it to become significant. 
it will 1)e argued that 
To establish this proposition, 
(a) because investors can, in their personal portfolios, 'undo' 
corporate leverage by lending to the company in the proportion in 
which the company issues debt, if the level of risk for an 
unlevered stream is insignificant, then the combined debt-equity invest-
ment in the levered company vrill also be insignificant. 
(b) the benefit to shareholders resulting from being entitled to 
receive a project's excess returns (+ve l~Vs) increases proportionally 
l'Ti th the level employed. 
Undoing_ J.ev!'lra,££. 
The risk class of a company is determined by its business risk, 
that is, the character of its investments. Leverage affects the 
risk components of the capital structure but does not affect the 
total business risk. Shareholders can, if they vTish, avoid the 
effect on the components of the capital structure by investing 
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in -tl1oE:e components in the i)roportions in Hhich they are issuedc 
AssUJne that there are hm qompanie s of the same risk class, l'Ti th 
identieal gross earnings X, except that 0omrany A is purely eqvity-
financed anci. company B has a mix of debt DB and equity SB. If 
company 'A' 's shares are not considered to be sufficiently risky 1-rhen 
included in a 1vell diversified portfolio to justify a risk premium, 
that is k = k. t the cost of debt, then it can be shm·m that for e J. 
com:pany :s k = k. = k 
o' 
and that, ignoring bankruptcy costs, the market 
' e J. 
values of the hro companies, VA and VB must be the same. Thus, if, as 
a result of leverage, B's equity capitalisatio:a rate kB is higher 
e 
thank~ then VB (VA. A shareholder in company A could sell the 
proportio:a 0( of company A's shares S 1·1hich he mms and id th the proceeds 
he could undo B' s leverage by p11rchasing the shares and. bonds of B as 
folloivs: sharE:s o(sB; bonds o((sA- sB). His new return will be 
o(~- kiDB) + ki(SA- SB~ 
= d.._x + o(k. (sA (sB + DB) 
.J. 
= o(X +o(ki (VA v ) 
'B 
>·rhich, if VA / VB' is clearly greater than c-(X, thE: investor's 
previous income from holding A's shB:res. 
Since the risk of the hm portfolios is the same and investors 
gain income fvom suitching from company A's shares into the mixture 
of company B's shares and bonds, then, in equilibrium, VA must 
It follm·rs that, in order to justify the risk-premium 
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hypothesir:, it is not sufficient to demom;Lrt>.tc tl1nt an internationally 
diversified portfolio of marke-table egu:i ty secLlrit:i.;~s in significantly 
riskier than a default-free bond. It lG nacessa~y to establish 
that such a po~tfolio would be significantly riskier even if each 
component company had no debt in its capital st:r-u.ctu.r·e. 'rhcrofore, 
even if every company adopted the Hodigliani and Nillel' recommcndaJcion 
of em})loying extremely high :levels of del;t to e:q)lcit the associated 
tax act-v-antages, the fact that the resulh:ng port£' olio of levered 
shares might be highly vola tile Hould not be suff:iciont to induce 
the portfolio-holder to seek a risk premiUitly since by acljusting 
his portfolio to include loans to the consti tue:nt cm;lpanies he 
could construct a portfolio uhich would be identical in risk-return 
terms to one composed of unlevered sharen. Henco, if the 
volatility of the purely unlevered portfolio 11ere :i.:mdgnificc:mt 
or vli thin the tolerance level of investoTs, the voJ a U.li ty of a 
portfolio composed of levered shares and loans to the levered 
companies 1Wuld be equally insignificant in total, e\ren although 
the equity segment of the latter portfolio might in itself be 
significantly volatile. 
Thus the yield of a levered s-hare according to lilodigliani 
and Miller's Proposition II(3) is as follm,rs: 
(k* 
D 
k = lc-1(- + - k.) e e e c< ~ ;:, 
'IIThere k* is the required return from the share in the absence of 
e 
* leverageo If the required return from a pure eq·uity stream k is 
e 
D 
insignificantly distinguishable from ki, then, hm·Jever large S is, 
ke remains tmaffectedo 
(3) Ibid, page 134 of the The Theory of Business ]'inancc. A 
Book of Readings, by Archer and D1Arnbrosio. 
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This section seeks to demonstrate that tho operation of the 
+ve NPV ru1•3 t)hould cause leverage to be positively beneficial to 
shareholders~ 11ithout in any r.:my destroying the Jllodigliani and 
Niller proposition that corporate leverage is irrelevant to the 
value of the firm. 
Assume t once again, that there are ·hw com.panies in the same 
risk class, but A has only equity, SA' in its capital structure, 
and B has a capital structure SB + DB, vlhere S and D equal the 
respective market values of the equity and debt. If both companies 
are presented ui th identical projects, each of vThich has a +ve NPV 
or wealth increment Z, then the market values of the two firms "!'Till 
rise to SB + DB + Z and SA + Z respectively, assuming that the 
financial data concerning the new· projects is fully communicated to 
the market. 'l'he 1-1eal th increments are identical for the tvro firms 
because the cost of capital is assumed to be independent of the 
differences in the capital structUl·e, as implied by the Modigliani 
and 11 iller framework. Since the henefit of Z is entirely 
attributed to the equity holders, the shares of the levered company 
i-Till rise by the ratio 
SB + Z 
eempany by and those of the unlevered company by 
s A 
Given that SB < SA' then the former ratio is greater 
than the latter. It is true that if Z turns out to be negative, 
the adverse effect on SB idll be greater than on SA' but the fact 
that the 1R.lance of probabilities is that Z will on aver_~ be 
positive if firms as a rule accept only projects which are expected 
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to yield a retu::.cn in exccr0s of tho cv.t--off rn~L:e. Tb.1s, if the 
price of the ~1hares in tho hio firm:i )Jcior to DCCS!~;tL'1g the 
s s 
projects 'l'ras,_J., and A 1·rhere n and 2n are the ::ccrJpecti VD 
n 2n 
s s 
numl1e:r. of shares issued in the compan:i.cr;, ancl \There B A 
n 2n 
then after u.ndortakine the projects vd.th Health increr:ents of Z, 
the price of tho respective shares 1ri1l rise to 
~ z 
'"c3 I + SA + Z and 
n 2n 
s + z A • 
2n 
rrhe price Of the levere(l share ha8 increased by a (Srea ter ai:lOUllt 
than that of the unleverecl share, although the increase in the 
total values of the t1'10 firms, Z, is -the same' o It is i:'1portant 
to note that the superior ]XHformance of the levered sh:::.res is not 
the reward for the a<l.ditional risk of leverae;o, since Z is the 
wealth increment after d:i.scountine a.t the 1·:eic;h ted average of B' s 
equity and debt. Thus, even if one l)ostulator~ a risk prer:-d.um for 
both companies' overall cost of capital, the relevant '.'Walth 
increment, Z, is determined after discounting at the risk-adjusted 
rate, and therefore Z vrould be surplm; to the re-vru::rcls needed to 
satisfy investors for accepting risk. The rm:oerior performance 
of the levered shares, in fact, highlights the disequilibrhun nature 
of the +ve NPV rule, and emphasises the advanta(;e to investors to 
make use of borrmred funds to finance projects uhic1; are expected 
to yield returns higher than can be accmmtcd for by their riskiness. 
The constant equality of the values of the hro fir:<:ls, on the other 
hand, confirms the Hodigliani and Hiller theornm that the advantage 
of leverage can be achieved by personal borrouing as effectively as 
it can by corporate borrmring. 
175 
Table 1 contains a numerical example of this C';ffect on the 
share price of adopting a project 1vi th B, positive net present 
value. M1sume that an Ullleve:r·ed company A ancl a le·..rored coffi})any B 
have been formed, each vri th a total cap:L tal of £1 00, to search 
for propex·ty development sites in the city of JJondon, a business 
activity for -vrhich the markeVs minimum acceptable rate of return 
is taken to be 12f'/o. ( 4 ) 
(4) For the moment, the existence of a risk-premium over the 
riskless rate of (say) 1 Ojb is assumed for the purpose of 
illustrating that the effect of the NPV rule on the price 
of levered shares applies even given the conventional risk 
premium hypothesis. 
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rJ'ABL11 1 
Capital stl'Ucture at for·mation 
Ordinary shares of £1 
Debt capital at 1 O}b 
Total m;u:·\:wt value (pre--project) 
NPV of project costing £100 
Total market value (post--project) 
Harket value of equity (post-project) 
Market value of debt (post-project) 
Share price (pre-project) 
Share price (post-project) 
Gain 
Personal leverage 
Harket value (post-project) of tvro shares 
(5) Less loan at 1 OJ~ to finance additional 
slw.re 
Company A 
£ 
100.00 
£100.00 
20.00 
£120.00 
120.00 
£120.00 
£ LOO 
£ 1.20 
2o% 
2.40 
1.00 
£1.40 
Gain 40 
Company B 
IY OJ 
50.00 
50.00 
--
£100.00 
20~00 
--
£120.00 
70.00 
50.00 
£120.00 
£ 1.00 
£ 1.40 
40';& 
( 5) Note that the prospective income streams of the ·bw portfolim are 
identical 
Earnings per share - original share 
additional share 
I,ess :i.nterest on personal loan at 1 O}b 
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Company A 
12-h 
12tp 
15p 
15p 
Company B 
15p 
25p 
fOp 
15p 
Given the usual assumptions about the absence of corporate taxes, 
that the business risk remains constant, and that all earnings are 
clistr:L buted :Ln full, then, in accordance v<i th the Nodigliani and 
Hiller proposition that the overall cost of capital is unaffected 
by the capital structure, the capitalisation rate for the shares of 
company A is 12-0b, and for company B, 15~;, such that the overall 
cost of capital remains at 12~/o. 
If both companies happen to be presented after formation vd. th 
projects vrhich are identical in respect of risk and earnings, and 
vThich promise a perpetuity of £1 5 per annum for an outlay of £1 00, 
then the present value of each of the t1vo projects, when discounted at 
12¥/o is £120, and, therefore, the market value of each firm vrill, 
ceteris paribus, rise by £20. The increase will accrue to existing 
shareholders of each company but the effect will be more favourable 
on the levered shares \'lhich will rise to £1 .40 compared to a rise of 
£1 .20 for the unlevered shares. At these prices, the prospective 
yields 'Will be 14.3% for company B's shares (reduced from 157~ in 
response to the nm·r debt-to-equity ratio) and 12-r% for company A's 
shares, both of 1·rh:Lch rates represent the market's required return 
from the shares in equilibrium. Although, the performance of 
B's shares is superior to that of A's, the same effect could have 
been achieved by A's shareholders if they had engaged in personal 
leverage as illustrated in the table. The conclusion, therefore, 
is not that corporate leverage has an advantage over homemade 
leverage, but that vrhen 1 excess' profits are available, it is 
beneficial to engage in any kind of leverage, whether homemade 
or corporate. :t:f, in the future, the CO!ilpanies further expand 
their activities, then, hm·rever the expansion is financed, any 
associated increase in vreal th >'lill again cause the respective 
share prices to be bid up to a higher level, with the levered 
shares rising more steeply than the unlevered shares. 
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It follo'I'Ts 
that the: at:::gregate of levered shares in the mr:rl-::et can be expected, 
on avero.ge, to outperform co:r.•rcsponding unlevered shares by an 
amount -vrhich exceeds that needed to compensate for risk. 
THo important conclusions can be dravm from the preceding 
analysi:'l. The first has no direct bearing on the main issue, 
that ist the derivation of the cost of capital, but is nonetheless 
worthy of note. It concerns the commonly held assumption )chat 
the Hodigl:Lani and Miller theorem which states that the value of 
the firm is independent of the firiJ 1 s capital structure implies 
equally that the value of the firm's shareo is independent of 
the capital structure. Thus, Van Horne states that "the financing 
decision does not matter ,from the standpoint of ou:r objective 
of maximising market price pe~ share."( 6) It has been 
demonstrated that this assumption is ummrranted, and that even 
vrithin the HI~ frameuork, the price of a firm 1 s share can be 
shmm to vary directly 1-ri th the degree of leverage employed by 
the firm. It follov1s that the text-books are incorrect in 
equating share-price maximisation 1-d th maximisation of the value 
of the firm. The 
(6) Van Horne, page 236 
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former objective vrould imply an advantage to corporate over 
personal leverage and must r therefore, be treated vri th reserve as 
an index of mano.gerio.l effectiveness. HmTGver, tha behaviour of 
the price of the levered shares does bear vlitness to the benefit 
Hhich equity--holders receive in having the exclusive right to 
all returns 'l'rhich are surplus to the required rate. 
The second conclusion has important implications for the 
empirical findings of chapter 5. In the survey carried out, 
investors vrere invited to expross their attitude to the volatility 
of the market portfolio as they kne'lv it to be. But the market's 
volatility is presumably, if anything, greater than it 'l'rould be 
if all firms ·vrere purely equity-financed. Since all that is 
required to validate the proposition that a risk premium is 
unnecessary is to sh01·r that investors do not perceive a pure 
equity portfolio as being significantly more risky than debt, 
then the findings of the survey '\vere all the mor·e persuasive, 
given that the portfolio presented in the questionnaire consisted 
of levered shares. It follov1s that those 'Vrho find it difficult 
to accept that a well diversified portfolio of shares is not 
significantly more risky in real te~ms than a government bond, must 
bear in mind that the relevant volatility to be considered is not that 
which confronts them in the market but the volatility vrhich 'lvould 
exist if all companies in the portfolio 'l'rere 1~Ti thout debt in 
their capital structure, or equivalently bear in mind that the 
relevant portfolio is one which contains every security in the 
market, including all corporate bonds in the proportions in which 
they are issued by the respective companies. 
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SUHfTARY 
.~.,.,.,.,..-..---"""~----"' 
The chapter con.sidored tho effect of introcludng de1)t into the 
It ·was argued. that for the purposes of determinil1g 
Hhether the nondivorsifiD.ble risk of the market portfolio is or is 
not significaDt t the por-t;folio should be envisaged as containing a 
l)roportion of all marketD.ble equity c.:apita:l in the vrorld assuming 
that none of tho companie::.-1 8lilp1oyod aay leverage, or equivalently as 
one containing every ma1'!~etable secu:c:L ty in the 1rorld including all 
corporate bonds in the proportion in -vrhich they are issued by the 
constituent companies. If the relevant risk of such a portfolio 
is not considered to be sufficiently material to warrant forfeiting 
the objectivity of the market ra·i:;e o:f interest vrhen operating the 
present value criterion, then vrhatover the degree of leverage 
employed by a company, the cost of equity ancl the cost of debt can 
each be assun1ed to be unaffectedt since the investor is able to 
1 undo 1 such leverage as l1as been c:cea ted. 
It -vms also observed that vrhilst the market value of the company 
is independent of the capital structm"e the market value of the 
company's shares is not, and it vras concluded, therefrn·e, that 
share price maximisation is not equivalent to maximisation of the 
value of the firm. 
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DIV:m;~ND POLICY AllD 'l'lm CC,JT O:F' CAPI'rH 
This chapter is concerned with the impact which the firm's 
dividend policy has on the cost of capitol. (1) Dividends clearly 
affect shareholdero 1 wealth~ but the extent to which dividend policy 
does is not clear. Moreover, even if dividend policy can be shown 
to affect shareholders 1 ·Neal th~ it does not follm·r that it necessarily 
affects the cost of capital. 'J'hus, if dividen:l policy is capable of 
affecting the value of the firm it must be because one policy rather 
than another causes investors 
( 1) to .E~ (or loi~er) the rate of return vrhich they require from 
the firm's investments, and or 
(2) to lower (or raise) their estimate of the rate of return which 
is expected to be earned from the firm's investments. 
Hodigliani and Miller ( 2) have demonstrated, under conditions 
of certainty, that the firm's dividend decision is not relevant 
because it cannot aff::;ct the :return requir8c1 by investors or the 
rate of return earned on the firm's assets. In tho absence of 
certainty, hov1ever, Gordon ( 3) and others h:we argu.ed that the 
dividend decision is relevant on the grounds that investors value 
a pound of dividends more highly than a pound of retained earnings. 
The purpose of this chapter is to challenge the proposition 
that investo:rs, vihcm confronted vri th uncertainty, adjust their 
required return according to the firm 1 s dividend policy. It vTill 
be argued that, although the dividend docision may be an important 
(11 Taxation considerations are deferred until the next chapter. 
(2 Miller and Modigliani, 1961. 
(3 Gordon, 1963. 
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consideration for shareholders' welfare, the financial manager 
need not concern himself vii th dividend policy, as such, vThen faced. 
with the problem of establishing the cut-off rate for new projects. 
Gordon's argument rests on the proposition that investors are 
not indifferent behreen cash payments and increases in the market 
v-alue of their shares, and that, 1-ri th uncertainty, future dividends 
are discounted at a rate which increases with the distance in the 
future. 
vThere 
Gordon rellresents · (4) the value of a share as 
p 
0 
P = Share price 
0 
Y = Annual earnings and payout 
0 
k > k - 1 t t 
+ ••• • • • (I) 
The return required by shareholders = k, which is 'an average of the k. 
-r 
with Y , the weight assigned to each i tern 1 • If the company ret8.ins 
0 
Y1 = Y0 and invests it to earn kY0 per period in perpetuity, equation (I) 
becomes 
Y + kY 
+ 
0· 0 
+ 
Y + kY 
0 0 
----- + ••• 
(I + k )3 3 
Y + kY 
_o __ o ...... + • • • • •• (2) 
(I + k )t 
t 
He concludes that 'the shareholder gives up Y and gets kY in perpetuity, 
0 0 
but the latter is nOiT discounted at the rates kt' t = 24- c::.oand it can 
,I 
be shovm that kY , so discounted is less than Y • Hence P <" P and 
o o o'\. o 
dividend policy influences share price.' 
(4) Gordon, page 368. 
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Gordon's assertion that the discount rate used by investors 
with an ave:csion to risk vrill rise Hi th the distance in the future 
can be interpreted in any one of three 1·TEtys: 
1. Investors discount at timet== o the dividends expected in t ==I, 
t == 2, t = 3, ••. at the rates k1, k2, 
dividends expected in t = 2, t = 3 
and at t = I the k.7.&Cilft, 
) 
at the rates k2 , 1c3 ••• 
and at t = 2 ••• the dividends expected in t = 3 ••• at the rate 
1c3 • • • This i·Tould imply more tha,n simply that investors .:Qfrcei VA 
risk as an increasing function of time, but that risk in fact does 
increase over time. It ·would follow that 1·rhatever the dividend 
pol:i.cy of the company might be, the company \'TOuld cease to exist 
in time ·when kt reached higher levels than reinvestment opportunities 
vTOuld justify. 
2. Investors discount at t = o the dividends expected in t = I, t = 2 
and t = 3, at the rates kp k2 and k3 but at t = I the disco1mt 
rate for t 
-
2 and t = 3 will drop to k1 and k2, and at t == 2 
the discount rate for t = 3 will drop to k1. In other vTOrds, if 
Gordon's assumption is correct that the discount rate is initially 
perceived as an increasing function of time, it follows that over 
the life of the company the rate applied to any specific expected 
dividend decreases i'lith the passage of time. As a result, although 
kY in perpetuity is worth less than Y at time o by reason of being 
0 0 
discounted at the rates kt' t ~ 2 ~oo, its value will increase to 
Y in time I, because at time t = I the perpetuity of kY is 
0 0 
discour1ted at the rates kt' t ~ I ~ ~ Therefore the 
announcement of the dividend reduction 1dll cause only a temporary 
dislocation of the share price which will 'right' itself after 
a year. But this temporary dislocation arises not from the fact 
that dividends matter but from Gordon's assumption of an increasing 
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discount rate. The cli:1location \-J01J.ld eo,•.w11y re:~nl t from the 
announcement at t = c that a rights issue of an ru~ount equal to Y 
0 
·was going to be mnde at t = I to finance the pro})<J,:;pd investment. 
If a rights issue is made at t - I to raise a sum of money Y , the 
0 
market value of the assoeia ted share issued. at t = I will be ec1ual 
toY, being the perpetuity of leY discounted at kt 9 t =I __,....,.t>"~. 0 0 
But if the rights issue (to be made at t = 1) is anttounced at t = o, 
then according to Gordon 1 s assUlll})tion of increaE;ing discount rates, 
the present value at t = o, of the future perpetuity of kY , nncl 
0 
therefore of the future new share, will be less than Y
0
/(I + k1). 
But the present value at t = o of the sub;o>cription price vlill equal 
Y0/(I. + k1) and therefore the existing shaTe price 1r:Lll fall to 
P at time t = o to reflect the difference bet·ween tr1e present 
0 
value of the prospective subscription price and the prospective 
new share. Hov1ever, as i'lith the dividend-reduction proposal, the 
share price P 
0 
at t = o will rise to P 
0 
at t ~-= I when the 'value 1 
of the perpetuity is restored to Y • 
0 
If maximization of the present value of the shareholders' wealth 
is assumed to be the objectivet then it ia apparent from Table I that 
the optimal policy \'IOUld be for the comr;any to eBbark on single period 
investments 1d th a return); k and to repay the entire capital at the 
end of the period (and presumably start again). Companies A, Band C 
are identical in every respect except that their respective share 
capitals are invested in projects lasting 1, 2 and 3 years respectively. 
If the capital is repaid at the end of each project's life, then the 
present value of the shares Hill be inversely related to the life of 
the project. 
Table 1 
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Time 
Discount 
rate (~b) A 
~~able 1 
B c 
0 PV = £100 PV == £98.3 PV = £95.4 
Flo·ws Flmm Flo·ws 
10 + 110 + 10 + 10 
2 11 + 110 + 10 
3 12 + 110 
In practice. sh~reholders apply a flat rate k to discount all 
dividends emanating from an investment financed by retentions, in 
contrast to k the rate applicable to dividends from investments 
financed by rights issues or ne1v issues. T·111 l'lOUld argue that this 
vTOuld be irrational because the present value of the investment is 
independent not only of the type of security used to finance it, but 
presumably also of the method of raising that security (rights, 
retentions, or ne1v issues). It is true that the riskiness of an 
investment remains unaffected by the method of finance, but it is 
not necessarily true that the market's perception of the riskiness 
of the investment should be so unaffected. r~m' s assumption of a perfect 
capital market implies that \·Then a new project is being undertaken, 
there is no distinction made by management or investors about the 
quality of information required under different methods of raising 
the associated finance. In that respect, the market is distinctly 
imperfect. Stock Exchange regulations impose severe minimum 
disclosure requirements for share issues to assist prospective 
investors to assess the future. For investments financed by 
retention0, no such information is required and company annual 
reports typically provide scant information about the intended 
uses of retained funds. It follows, therefore, that although the 
method of raising the finance cannot affect the attractiveness of 
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an investment proposal, the extent of investors 1 kno1dedge may 
vary v1i th the method used. ~'hus if a positive dividend policy 
has the effect of causing management to retain funds v1hich cannot 
be productively employed, or vihich tend not to be subjected to the 
same critical investment appraisal analysis as funds from more 
formal sources, the result may be to cause low payout firms to 
perform unfavourably by comparison \·ii th high payout firms. Or, 
even if management does apply the normal.rigorous criteria for 
retained funds, if it is the practice not to communicate to the 
ma~cket the same quality of information concerning the intended 
uses of the retained funds as is required for external issues of 
capHal, it is possible that investors tend to assume a lower 
reinvestment rate than is actually the case, and to cause the 
lo>·T payout firm, temp<?rarily, at least, to have a lovrer market 
value than equivalent high payout firms. 
These considerations alone are sufficient to make the dividend 
decision an important one for management. But they do not, in 
themselves, affect the investment criterion which the firm should 
use for assessing nm·T projects. Rather, they indicate the 
importance of applying the existing criteria more effectively 
to projects financed by retained earnings, and to the need by 
firms to support their decision to retain funds vii th adequate 
relevant information about the intended uses of the funds. But 
in order to sustain the argument that dividend policy can effect 
the cut-off rate itself, it would need to be shovm that rational 
investors seek a higher rate of return from projects financed by 
retained earnings than from projects financed by rights issues. 
This is not to say that shareholders are indifferent to the 
firms' payout policy. But it is a reasonable assumption that 
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The empirical tests which have bee~ conducted to support a 
po.rticular tl1C?0-1'J of dividends have been obnerved (6) to contain 
a number of staListical bio..ses, and sucL evidence as there is to 
indicate a relationship between the firm's dividend policy and 
the market vr,lue of its shares is insubstantial. It has been 
[H'gued in thif3 chapter that if there appears to be a preference 
for a higl1 11n.yout policy, this preference can be attributed to a 
reaction agnjnst the informational deficiencies associated with 
internally f:in~>ncerl projects, and to the tendency by some firms 
to regard rcto1:Lned funds as merely the residue after payout, and, 
as such, nol re:ruiring to be subjected to the same rigorous tests 
as funds frolfl other sources. The danger of pursuing a policy of 
maintaining o. regular,_ slowly groviing, dividend payout policy is 
that earnings may be retained within the firm 1·1ithout any economic 
justification other than that they are the residue after the 
dividend is paid. If there are firms vrhich are prepared to retain 
what is 'left over' after the desired trend of dividend payout has 
been e.chieved, 1·1hether or not there are profitable opportunities 
for reinvestment, it l'iOUld not be surprising if such firms 1 performance 
over time is inferior to that of others vrhich retain no earnings 
unless they have a profitable outlet. It is not dividend policy 
as such vrhich is the cause of the inferior performance, but the 
decision to anply capital (whether obtained internally or 
externally) to nonprofitable projects or other uses which have 
inadequate returns. 
It is concluded, therefore, that hov1ever important the dividend 
decision might be indirectly to shareholders' wealth, the issues 
(6) Friend and Puckett, 1964. 
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jnvolve<l are not ones 1vhich need concern management when 
determining the appropriate criterion for investment selection. 
vi hen abstracted from taxation consiclera tions' the choice of 
investment cut-off rate can be assumed to be independent of the 
firm's dividend policy. 
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TAXNriOlT AND ~:lli'i CO~'J'l: O}i' CAPI'l'AL 
This chapter is concerned 1dth the pro1)loras of combining the 
costs of dAbt and equity, given 'Lhe Jcax advantaees of the former, 
to establi~~h 1·rhat has como to 1)n kno-vm lW tho >veighted average 
cost of capital (I~.ACC), The U/\.CC has been traditionally used 
for two purposes first a.s a too1 to choose tho firm 1 s optimal 
capital structure~ and cecondly to act a::-1 a C<.Jt-off rate in 
planning the firm 1 s invo,:;tmen"tf.;, The discussion will focus 
primarily on I'JACC as the investment cut-off rate. 
\~ri ters have failed to agree upon the best definition of vlACC, 
and there appear to be three por::::ible candidates: 
(1) The 11eighted averRge of the cost of debt and of the before-tax 
cost of equity 
vrhere 
K (1 -0) 
s 
TT (\ + l\., \7 
J. 
K = shareholders' required return before corporate 
s 
taxes 
K. = cost of debt ~ 
9 D 
--
~ 
s + D 
s = market value of the equity 
D market value of the debt 
(2) The -vwighted average of the cost of debt and of the after-tax 
cost of equity 
K ( 1 - (:i) 
e 
+ K.& 
~ 
where K = K (i - t) 
e s 
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C5) The vreigh tecl 8Verace of the aftE!r~l:ax cost of equity and of 
the cost of debt as adjusted by tho corporate tax rate 
i'l'dt = K (1 - tJ) + K. (1 - t)9 e l 
Pe1·J IH'iJcers support the use of \'l' although A:rd:L tti ( 1 ) 
recommends its use in choosing the optill1al capital structure. 
i·fdt :i.s the gene:rally accepted definition 9 and is altnost universally 
advocated in finance textbooks. The purpose of this chapter 
is to propor;e \·Tvt as being the more readily comprehensible and 
theoretically valid definition. 
In order to dernonstra te the behaviou:L' of each of the three 
vJACCs, a numerical example is developed( 2 ) in tables 1 and 2, based 
ini ·U.ally on the conventional assumption that the cost of equity 
is distinguishable from the cost of debt. Vle will then examine 
the significance of the findings in the context of the hypothesis 
that for practical purposes there is only one cost of capital. 
A. pl'Oject is expected to generate an annual cash flo>v of X =-= £200. 
The cost of a pure equity stream of the class, K , = 1CT,h, the 
u 
riskless rate, i = 6)\S, and t = 5o%. 
(1) See Arditti 
(2) Note the exm:1ple is developed vri thin the r1odigliani and I·Iiller 
framework that taxes apart, capital structure is irrelevant. 
This is for convenience and the argument in no \·ray depends on 
this assumption. 
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The respective values of K and K. for vc-,rying levels of 9 
e :t. 
are given in table 1, (3) together vrith the rele-mnt values of 
In table 2, the present value of the perpetuity 
of £200 :i.s given for each of the three definitions of IVACC for 
different values of B. Because each definition produces the 
same presont value, it appears to be a matter of indifference 
-vrhich of them is used. Hm<Iever, it ·Hill be argued in a later 
section that both VI and vr d t are valid only on the assumption that 
the firm's tax obligation is paid concurrently with the relevant 
income. In this section the primary concern is vrhich of the 
three methods is most consistent 1·rith the economic objective 
and is most likely to have intuitive appeal to the ncn-specialist 
decision-maker. 
\'lith vr, the project 1 s cash flo>·Ts are oversta ten. by being 
computed as if there viere no corporate taxes and are then 
discounted at a discoQ~t rate which is proportionally overstated 
to compensate for this assumption. vli th w d t, the tradi tiona 1 
method, the cash flows are understated by not reflecting the 
tax advantages of debt financ:ing and are then discounted at a 
rate of return which, by way of compensation, understates the 
market required rate of return. With wvt on the other hand, 
the relevant cash flows 
(3) Hovr K. varies i<Ii th tf is of course unk:no1-m, and is assumed ). 
here to vary according to the equation proposed by Haley and 
Schall page 304 
K. == i + (K - i) 8 2, and 
l. u 
K == ( 1 - t \1 )Ku - ( 1 - t) 9 Ki 
e 
1 - g 
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e 
o.o 
0.1 
0.5 
0.7 
0.9 
1.0 
Table 'i 
K< K 5; c:r \·f;~ vr cb vr . :· i/' c vt' dt" 
(6.0) 10 10 20 10 
6.04 10.2 9.8 18.96 9.5 
7.0 11.~ 9.25 15 7.5 
8.0 12.) 9.29 13 6.5 
9.2 13 ('6 9.64 11 5c5 
1 o.o (1LL c' ' • J) 10 10 5.0 
Values of 1·r t-' vi, and vrcl·L for varyinr:; levels 
v·v 
of leverage e 
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x( i 
-
,L) 
l· + tR X X( 1 - t) 
........ ="""-·~-·4--~~_,..~* ~"""'--"'"'_..,._._~ 
----
6 
0 100 
.1 0 
.1 i 03.17 
~---••.-u~ 
·098 
~5 123.29 
-~~-""'~'"' 
·Q925 
.7 143 
•0929 
.9 175.25 
·0964 
1.0 200 
.1 0 
Table 2 
VI 
vt vT 
·- £1 ,ooo 200 == 
.20 
::::: £1 ,053 200 -
.189 
-- £1,333 200 = 
.1 5 
-- £1,540 200 = 
.13 
= £1,818 200 = 
.11 
= £2,000 200 = 
.10 
X = £200, 
1~'dt 
£i,OOO 100 = £1 ,ooo 
.1 0 
£:1 ,053' 100 = £1,053 
'Cl-95 
£1t::5)3 100 :::::£1,333 
•075 
£1 ,540 100 "'' £1 ,540 
·065 
£1,818 100 = £1,818 
·055 
£2,000 100 :.= £2,000 
·05 
t = .50, K = .10 
u 
Present value of perpetuity of £200 for varying 
levels of leverage and for each of three definitions 
of vTACC 
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are the actual net of tax cash flo-vrs expected to be received, tak:ing 
into account the tax-deductibility of the incremental interest 
payments, &net the relevant discount rate is the rate of return 
required by the suppliers of capital. \'Then one considers the 
hesitancy vii th 1vhich DCF criteria have been adopted in indus try 
and the desirability, once adopted, of be.ing able to present the 
results in a form vihich is meaningful to a b:;.·oad spectru.'ll of 
decision-makers, it is difficult to understand vrhy vr dt has become 
the generally accepted method. 'rhe validity of the present value 
approach rests on the simple principle that the cash flows from 
the firm's investments should, after deducting all costs including 
taxes, be sufficient to meet the returns :r.·equired oy those who 
supply the capital. It is hardly conducive to a better under-
standing of the principle if the data is presented in the form 
of a series of cash flows which exclude the tax benefits of debt 
and 1vhich are evaluated by reference to a cut-off rate >vhich is 
less than the market required return. 
Indeed this method of pre~entation has misleadingly given 
rise to the notion that the cost of debt is reduced 1)~r the tax 
deductibility of the interest payments. In table 2, for example, 
the cost of capital for 9 = 1 is presented as 55S, when the reality 
is that lenders continue to require 1 ()Jb, Even although debt 
carries with it tax advantages, the cost of debt in the pure 
sense of the rate of return required by lenders is independent of 
the firm 1 s tax obligation. But because it is conventional to 
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exprc:;t; the ~;fte:e·~tax floH8 of a )Jl'Oject as :i.f the project Here 
financed by equity only, it h1w 1)ecome necesf:wry to captul·e the 
t:1x aclvar>.t<c;.Ges of the relevant d.ebi; inputs by moclifying the 
lemlurD 1 required. return by the factor ( 1 - ·t;). This, in 
turn, ha~ led to the practice of describing K.(1 - t) as the 
l 
afte.c ten cost of debt, \'lhen, :i.n fact, it is no more than an arithmetic 
devicu to correct the 1:Jias in Jche cash flovrso K.(1 - t) is the 
J. 
ec1uivc_c;.lont cost 1·1hich debt would need to have if interest payments 
vrere nut ded:uc·U.ble fol.' tax, provided, once again, the payment of 
tax is siuu.l taneous ui th the receipt of the income. \'le are, 
hovrever :· unlikely to persuade unsophisticated users of the value of 
the DCP approach if it is neces~mry to accompany the conventional 
procedure vTith an explanation nhy it is useful to discount £100 
per o.nm.urr v;hen, in fact, vTe e::'~pect to receive £200 at a discount 
rate of 57:; vThen the market required return is 1 Cf/o. 
It follorrs then that "'vt is the more logically consistent of 
the three approaches and reflects more faithfully the underlying 
economic process. Its singJ.e disadvantage is that it l'equires 
an estinate of the actuv.l tax benefits which the financing inputs 
of the project are expected to generate, and, counterintuitively, 
these c~:·mnot be determined until the project's contribution has been 
assecsed, and vrhich itself, of course, depends upon the magnitude 
of the tax benefits. To illustrate this point, assume that the 
project evaluated in table 2 had an initial outlay of £1,000. If 
the firm has a debt-equity ratio of • 5 and vrishes to maintain that 
ratio, it must finance the project outlay of £1,000 by raising, not 
£500, but £667 debt. 
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'rhe essence of the +ve NPV rule is that a project is unacceptable 
unless it increases the market value of the firm's equity by more 
than the value of the equity employed to finance the })roject. 
ThereforeJ the ratio of the debt-equity inputs employed in 
financing the project's initial out1ay must inevitably differ from 
the expected debt-equity ratio resulting from the acceptance of 
the project. It is not the incremental capital mix (4) vrhich 
is the appropriate one to base the discount rate calculation upon 
but rather the target ratio vrhich the incremental capital is 
intended to bring about. 
This conclusion is not simply a repetition of the usual 'lmrning 
against the famous 11 Liquigas 11 fallacy of assuming that if a firm 
raises equity one year to finance a project, it is the cost of 
equity vrhich is the appropriate discount rate, and if it raises 
debt the succeeding year, the discount rate is the cost of debt. 
The Liquigas fallacy ignores the implication of raising capital 
in proportions which clearly disturb the desired rat:i.o. The 
point that is being made above, hovrever, is that vrhen finance is 
raised in proportions 1vhich are designed to achieve the desired 
ratio, the incremental proportions can seldom, if ever, be the 
same as those of the desired overall ratio. The +vc HPV criterion 
in essence implies that a project is undesirable U.."lless it vrould 
change the capital structure which preceded. it, if financed in the 
same proportions • 
. (4) Another vray of expressing the same argument consistently vri th 
the intuitively appealing asscwptio~ that it is the incremental 
capital which is the relevant base for vreighting, is to perceive 
the firm as raising £667 debt, explicitly to finance the project, 
and £666 equity, of vrhich £333 is explic:L t and £333 is consequential 
on acceptance of the project in the form of an expected increase 
in the market value of the equity. 
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Therefore, if a firm has a certain debt-equity ratio which 
it means to maintain, and raises capital in the same proportions 
to financ(;1 the outlay of the project, its debt-equity ratio on 
average 1·fill be different from the desired ratio, and the vTACC 
vrill be incorrect in relation to its ne'lv capital structure. 
Likev.rise, if the firm raises its marginal. capital in the 
proportions necessary to maintain its existints debt-equity ratio, 
and computes its UACC in relation to the marginal mix, the vlACC 
will again be incorrect. The correct solution is to compute the 
vlACC in relation to the target ratio and to raise the capt tal in 
the proportions needed to secure the target ratio, which 1·Till 
invariably be in different proportions. The firm 1 s financial 
strategy(9)Precedes the investment decision, but the financing 
inputs for a particular project depend on the expected outcome of 
the project. 
This, then, is the problem of applying vT . , namely that the 
vt 
cash floNs for I>Thich it is appropriate must include the tax 
benefits of the debt inputs. To overcome the problem, it is 
proposed that once the firm has established its optimum capital 
structure, it should calculate the 'effective' rate of tax on 
operating income and use that rate to compute the after tax cash 
flovrs. 
The effective rate of tax 
Although the rate of tax, t, is established for taxable 
income after interest payments have been deducted, the relevant 
income floi·: for most purposes in finance theory is the operating 
200 
income uh:Lch, vrhether before or after tax, :Ls measured before 
deducting interest. It has never been the practice in capital 
budgeting to deduct the interest payments from the annual cash 
f1olvS of a project in order to assess the present value of the 
flow. Vlhen the government decides that; the rate of tax for the 
taxable inCOJ-;Je of all companies is t, this is a convenient method 
of stating that the effective rate of tax, t on operating 
m' 
income is different for each company·according to its debt level. 
The process of requiring each firm to determine the proportion of 
its operating income 11rhich is taxable, and then applying to that 
proportion the universal tax rate t is clearly an essential exercise 
for the purpose of meo.suring the firm's tax obligation, but it is 
not necessarily the most relevant approach for the individual 
company seeking to evaluate its operating income flovrs. vlhen e == 
for example, the effective rate of tax is nil, and from the firm's 
point of viev< this is the relevant rate for decision-making purposes. 
It does not make s.ense, if 8 = 1, to state the cash floHs from a 
project as being X (1 t), as is the conventional practice, and 
to discount them then at k.(1 - t) instead of stating them to be 
J. 
vrhat they are, X, and discounting them at k .• 
J. 
If the effective 
rate of tax 1·rere kno-vm before undertaking the assessment, then the 
after tax flovrs could be readily calculated and expressed in a form 
which reflects the realities of the situation. Thus 
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if t - tho effective rate of tnx on opernting i~come 
Ill 
\')here y = -~he annual interest payccmtc.l (K.D) allo~·;ed for tax. 
. l 
If V == the p:csent value of the lJ:r·oject 
- (:"\ \7F' V - U Vll., 
.> :L 
and ( 1 - e) v 
9IL 
l 
(1 -G) 
= (1 - t) (x - y) 
yK 
e 
(1 - t) C{- y) 
or 
1\.. 
e 
y(K ( 1 ~ 9 ) ) 
e 
y = 
G K. ( 1 - t)X 
l 
~-- ( 1) 
K ( 1 - \1 ) +9rc ( 1 
e 1 
- t) 
But t = t(x - y) m 
X 
= t [1 \jKi(1 - t) 1 (2) K(1-9)+ K. ( 1 - t) e l 
-· 
t l Ki ( 1 - ~) 1 -----·-· ----K e ( 1 ~- 1 ) + K1 ( 1 - t) .., 
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e K~ 
.1 6o04 
.5 7.0 
.7 8.0 
.9 9.2 
Table 3 
Rate of company taxation 
---
I\.% 
e 
3CY}b 4Qlb 50/o 
1 o. 2 28.5 38.5 48.5 
11 • 5 21.0 29.0 38.5 
12.3 14.7 20.8 28.5 
13.6 5.5 8.5 '12.5 
Effective rates of tax on operating income 
for K = 1(ffS 
u 
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6CJfb 
58.5 
48.0 
38.0 
17.5 
Using Eq (2), a table can be constructed such as table 3 to 
provide app1·oxirno:te effective rates of tax for varying values 
of e, t anrl k • 
u 
Nm·T if the firm is pro8ent~d i·Ti th the project 
in table 2 and has a target {J:::: .5, the present value Cf.ln be 
calculated as folJ.mvs: 
Cash flows in perpetuity £200 
Effective rate of tax, as 
I per table , 38. 55o ?7 
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Cost of capital, per Table I .925 
Present value £1,333 
This compares i'li th the conventional method of discounting the 
incorrect after tax cash floi·Ts (£1 00) at an artificially reduced 
required rate of return (7.57&). Having computed the present 
value, the relevant proportion of debt to be raised can readily 
be calculated, i.e. e (£1 ,333) :::: £66'7. 
The superiority of vlvt over al terna ti ve approaches is more 
than just a matter of logical consistency. \'D.1ere there is a 
time lag betv;een the receipt of the relevant income flmm and 
the payment of the associated tax '" and w d t cease to provide 
correct solutions. In the United Statest prior to 1952, 
corporations paid their tax liabilities _in instalments in the 
year follm-1ing the year in vThich the income vms earned. Since 
that date the tax is paid in instalments during the relevant year 
on the basis of the estimated liability. Therefore, the tax payments 
effectively coincide with the receipt of the income. In the U.K., 
hovrever, there is a very definite time lag. 
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If the relevant income is asmuned to be earned on average half-
1vay durinG the firm's accounting year, pFiyment of tax is deferred ( 5) 
at least orw and possibly two years, 1'fith significant consequences 
in present value terms. Assume, for exclmple, that the payment 
of tax is delayed one year. If 8 = .5 and t = .5, the after tax 
cash flovrs for the project 1vill be £200r 123, 123, ••• etc., vrith 
the result that the present value of the project is increased. 
by £77 (1.0925)-1 = £70 (the present value of the corresponding 
terminal outflow of £77 is assumed to be insiglnificant). 
According to the vT method, the present value of the stream remains 
££QQ. 
unchanged at .15 = £1,333, because the method takes no 
cognizance of the delay in payment and therefore fails to capture 
the benefit. 
In applying the traditional approach, i·Tdt' the user is 
recommended to express the cash flows in terms which ignore the 
tax deductibility of the interest payments on the grounds that 
adjusting the cost of debt by the factor (1 - t) is intended to 
take care of this benefit. If the tax payments are delayed a 
year, the stream of after tax cash flov1s will be perceived by the 
decision-maker as £200, £100, £100, • • • • etc. and vrhen discmm ted 
£~ -1 
at 7.57& will produce a present value of .75 + £100 (1.075) = 
£1,333 + 93. Therefore, because the conventional method is based 
on an overstatement of the tax obligation, the effect is to overstate 
the advantage of deferring the payment of the obligation, the 
overstatement being magnified by the use of a discount rate -vrhich is 
itself 1mderstated. The correct solution, on the other hand, is 
reached by the use of the 'effective' rate of tax to establish the 
actual expected cash flmvs and then by discounting the flovrs at the 
(5) Apart from Advance Corporation Tax on dividends paid. 
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f:;o fa1·, nothing has boon said abo~.;:\; the implications of 
sh,cn·cholclers' personal tax position I'Jhon see~r..ing ·l;o determine 
the :cecroired rate of retu:r-n. Unde:r the classical system of 
cor])Orate ta:~GJt:i.on 9 t1w ::;chools of thought have developed. The 
ono( 6) eontcnds that the cost of retained earnings should reflect 
the clifferencc" ·b.?t\reen shareholders' marginal rate of income tax: 
and the capital gains tax rate. 'rhe o·l;her school ('1) emphasises 
the practical problems of determining shareholders' marginal 
rates of tax and the difficulty of resolving differences in 
shareho1c3.ers 1 tax rates, and advocates an 1 external yield' 
criterion. That is,. tho opport1mi ty cost for retained funcls 
is held to be rJrovicled by the rate of return vrhich could be 
achieved by investing in another company i'l'i th a similar level 
of risk. Thus, even if there is a tax advantage for some 
shareholders l'lhen funds are retained in the business to finance new 
proj8cts, the minimum acceptable rate of return f'or retained 
earnings should not be pel"cei ved as being less than k , the 
e 
cost of subscribed eq1.ti ty, because this return can be expected 
to be achieved externally in another enterprise. In effect, the 
problem of tax differentials for investors is not relevant. This 
second approach is the one ·which has been implicitly adopted in 
this study. 
Hovrever, a further complication is created in the U.K. by the 
fact that the c:lassical system of tax \·rhich operates in the United 
Sta·tes, and I'Thich operated in the U.K. behreen 1965 and 1973, has 
(6) i'Ierrett and Sykes, page 64 
(7) Van Horne, page 112 
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since been replaced by the imr,utat:Lon system, vrhich, 1.mfortunatoly, 
does not fit comfortably into the capital budgeting framework. 
Undor the imputation system, if the earnings after corporate taxes 
are distributed to the shareholders, they are deemed to be net of 
the basic rate of income tax in the hands of the recipients. That 
is to say, the effective income before tax to the shareholder is 
the amount 1t1hich he receives from the company multiplied by the 
100 
factor v1here td = the basic rate of income tax for 
shareholders. This has sometimes been interpreted to mean that 
shareholders 1vho are liable only to the basic tax rate, t d, are 
indifferent to the distribution-retention decision, since for 
them no additional tax liability arises on distribution. This, 
of course, ignores the fact that a potential tax liability arises 
for them on retention. If earnings are retained and (presumably) 
become reflected in the price of the share, they become a chargeable 
gain for capital gains tax on any subsequent disposal of the shares. 
If, on the other hand, they are distributed as a dividend a.nd 
iwnediately reinvested in a rights issue of the company, they 
become a nevr investment, that is a chargeable asset and, therefore, 
an allowable expense on any subsequent disposal of the shares. 
The reality is, of course, that shareholders' personal tax 
positions range from tax-exemption through to very high marginal 
tax rates, and that the effect of the imputation system on 
shareholders cannot be generalised in any way. If it is assumed 
that all earnings are paid out to shareholders then the relevant 
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return for all investors can be represented as the grossed up 
value of tl1"' cU.stributed ·earningst 'dhether tho shareholders are 
liable to oQditional tax thereafter or to a tax rebate. l.Tnci.er 
these cJ.rcuustances, the cost of eq_ui ty is the req_uired rate of 
·-2?~Cl__-_tcl. return, k 1 :cccluced by the factor - ·---· _ e On the other 
100 
hund, if all l'~:ofi ts are retained by the company, the return to 
:::;l!.a:r-ehold en:; ( novJ exclusively in the form of capital gains) is 
mll•joct to cDpi tal gains tax. As a result, the effective cost 
of eq_uity vr:Lll begin to approximate k , depending on the 
e 
difference,:J bo"n·;een the basic rate of tax and the capital gains 
rate, aml on slwrehol<lors 1 marginal rate of tax. For companies 
1·rhose payout ratio falls behreen 0 and 1, the effective cost of 
~::quity de1;ends on the payout ratio, the basic rate of tA.x, the 
capital gains rate of tax, and shareholders' assumed marginal 
re.te of tax. 
Clearly, the difficulties of estimating the appropriate 
factor to ap1)ly to k are enormous, -vrhether the risk-premium 
e 
hypothesis is acce.pted or rejected. All that can be said is 
that in mc>st cases the miniruum acceptable certainty-eq_uivalent 
rate of return from projects after corporate taxes will be lower 
than the rate of return from the default-free perpetuity. If, 
therefore, the d.ecis:ion-maker chooses to disregard the personal 
taxation issue and uses the default-free rate 1·ri thout adjustment 
as the relevant discotmt rate, he is erring on the 1 safe 1 side. 
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The analysis in this chapter has focused on the conventional 
frammmrk in 'I'Thich, taxes apart, the \'lAOO needs to be calculated 
to take accmm·C. of the individual costs of the different segments 
of the capital structure. However, in the context of the proposed 
:frarnelivork in 1:rhich it is argued that corporate-decision makers are 
;justified in recognising only one cost of capital, the need to 
compute a l'lACC is eliminated. The significance of this chapJGer 1 s 
findings are that the presence of corporate taxes and the 
existence of differential tax treatments for varying classes of 
securities does not affect the cost of capital. A methodology 
has been provided in ·which a project 1 s after tax cash flmr can be 
readily computed and vihere the market-determined discount rate 
remains undisturbed. 
eq. (2) reduces to 
t = t m [1 
Hence if K = K. 
e ~ 
K(1 - t) 
1 
K ( S- 1) + K(1 -
t [-
1 
- t ] - 1 - t --g 
J 
(3) 
t is, therefore, independent of the cost of capital, and a 
m 
relatively simple reference table, as in table 4, can be prepared 
to shovT the effective rates of tax for varying degrees of love rage o 
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B 20/o 
0 1 18.5 
.2 17.0 
.3 15 .o 
~4· 13.0 
.5 11.0 
.6 9.0 
.7 7.0 
.8 5.0 
.9 2.5 
Table 4 
RA'rE 01<' COHPAHY TAXA.TION 
30}b 4Cf;b 50}b 6o% 
28.0 37.5 47.5 57.5 
25.5 35.0 44.5 54.5 
23.0 32.0 41.0 51.0 
20.5 28.5 37.5 47.5 
17.5 25.0 33.0 43.0 
14.5 21.5 28.5 37.5 
11.5 16.5 23.0 31.0 
8.0 12.0 16.5 23.0 
4-.0 6.0 9.0 13.0 
Effective rates of tax on operati~~ income 
for varying degrees of leverage ( tJ ) 
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'l1he conventional pra.ciive of redu.cing the cost of debt 
by the far_ tor ( 1 ·- t) for discounting :p;u·poses is based on 
the premice th~t a project's after tax cash flows should be 
measured. as if they derive no benefit from the tax-deductibility 
of interest payments, and on the fiction, by \my of compensation, 
that the return required by lendel'::> i.s lmrer than it actually 
is by an amount equal to the corporate rate of tax. Apart from 
the difficulty of communicating the rationale of thi8 device to 
non-specialist users of DCF measurements, the method fails to 
produce correct solutions if, as in the U.K., there is a time 
lag behreen the payment of the firm's tax obligation and the 
receipt of the relevant income flows. The concept of an 
'effective rate of tax' for operating income 1-ras presented in 
order to make it possible to use the intuitively more appealing 
ancl theoretically superior approach of discou..'1ting the actual 
cash flovrs expected to be received at the return actually 
required by the suppliers of capital. In effect~ ths cost of 
capital and therefore the investment discount rate are 
unaffected by the tax benefits of debt financing. 
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Chapter 'l'en 
OTHBR ASPEC'l'S 01" THE COS'l' O:F' CAPITAL 
vle have argued that the effective cost of both equity and debt 
for the purposes of project selection c2.n be taken by firms to be a 
rate equal to the govern.,'Ilent bond yield, and that there is for 
practical purposes a single cost of capital for all companies which 
is either one of a series of short-term rates expected to operate 
dur1ng the decision-maker's time horizon or, more simply, a single 
rate comprising the average of short-term rates expected to operate 
in the future. Even differences in corporate tax privileges bet1·reen 
interest payments and dividends should not be used to differentiate 
betvreen the costs of debt and equity. The tax benefits associated 
with the former should be reflected in the stream of cash floHs 
expected from the project rather than in an artificial modification 
of the cost of debt. 
There remain, hovmver, two final aspects of the problem vThich 
need to be considered before the market cost of capital can be said 
to provide the decision-maker i'li th an immediately relevant discount 
rate. 
1. The yield on a government bond is a nominal or money rate not 
a real inflation-free rate of interest, and it has to be resolved 
whether the appropriate discount rate for selecting projects 
should be denominated in real or nominal terms. 
2. The observed yield on government bonds does not take into account 
the transaction costs incurred by the investor in buying his 
securities or the flotation costs incmTed by the company in 
raising new capital. The conventional practice is to adjust 
the basic cost of capital upwards to allow for these costs.( 1) 
(1) See, for example, Merrett and Sykes, page 66. 
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In the last decade fevr matterz. can have caused such concern 
to the financial and business community as inflation. Surprisingly, 
hovrever, significantly more research efforts have been directed by 
accountant:", to the problem of reporting financial events under 
inflation than have been undertaken by finance theorists to the 
problem of assessing the effect of inflation on the firm's project 
selection criterion. For exa~nple the 1975 edition of \•Teston and 
Brigham ( 915 pages), one of the lilOSt '-r:i.dely used text books in 
the United States, makes no mention of inflation. 
It >vas not until 1974. that any significant attempt >ms made to 
integrate uncertainty regarding inflation into the Sh~rpe-Lintner-
(2) 
Tllossin capital asset pricing model. Inevitably, the effect of 
this modification to the traditional model is to increase the 
complexity of the project selection procedure under the risk premium 
hypothesis and to make implementation of the traditional framework 
more difficult. But it also has the effect of increasing the 
doubts expressed in this study about the necessity of postulating 
a risk premium over the market rate of interest. 
In their paper Chen and Boness develop a project selection 
criterion for a value-maximising firm under uncertain inflation 
as follovrs: ( 3) 
= (R R ) ~ g Cov (i R )T z m z a'J 
(2) See Chen and Boness, pp. 469-483. 
(3) Ibid., PP• 474-475. 
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R 
z 
koX· 
z 
R f 
R 
m 
== 
== 
== 
::::: 
tho random internal rate of return of project z 
the cost of capital appropriate to project z 
under uncertain inflation 
the nominal risk-frea rate of return on bonds 
the price of risk in the ~arket under uncertain 
inflation 
the random return on the market 
R == the random rate of inflation 
a 
g == w/s 
\~ == the aggregate investable '\•real th 
S == the aggregate market value of all stocks. 
It is clear that the cost of capital under the traditional 
capital asset pricing model, namely 
\CoY .(R R ) /' zm 
is incomplete, and, of some significance for our purposes, overstates 
the market premium for risk if uncertain inflation is expected for 
two reasons: 
(a) because ~ov 
that under 1.mcertain inflation relevant risk is overstated, and 
(b) because ~ ( )\ as demonstrated by Chen and Boness,( 4) 
implying that the market price of risk is overstated. 
Under conditions of inflation k the return required from any 
financial security is conventionally assumed to be composed of tP~ee 
elements, e the pure time rate of money assuming prices are stable, oZ 
the rate needed to compensate for future changes in the price level 
and tthe premium needed to compensate the holder for nondiversifiable 
risk. 
(4) Ibid., page 476: 
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e + olof course = i the nominal market rate of interest. (5) In 
earlier chapters 1'le argued_ that because ~ is composed of tvro elemen tf·, 
variability risk and purchasing pov1er risk, and since it cannot be 
demonstra·::.ed that the purchasing p01·1er risk of a 1 risk-free' bond 
is materially d.istinguishable from the undiversifiable risk of an 
equity secm:i ty, we cannot expect corporate decision makers to 
attempt to distinguish bet1·1een the cost of eq_ui ty and the cost of 
debt. In this chapter we vrill therefore focus on the two elements 
e and oZ and proceed on the assumption that 
k = e +oC 
On the other hand, most of v1hat is to be said is eq_ually 
relevant even in the context of the traditional risk-premium model. 
11'he question \•iC arc concerned \·lith is 'l'lhether, for the purposes of 
measuring a project's contribution to the value of the firm, the 
nominal or real return is the appropriate discount rate. 
Before the present value formula can be correctly specified 
the assumptions about inflation must be clearly stated, that is 
it must be made clear whether forecasts of future sales and costs 
allo''' for price level changes. There are three possible approaches: 
1. To estimate future cash fluws in current monetary units on the 
assumption that future costs and revenues move in step with the 
general change in the price level, and then to discount them 
at the pure time rate e, excluding the inflation element 
2. To estimate future cash flows in the monetary unit of the year 
in >'lhich the flows are received, and then to stabilise the 
figures by deflating at an inflation die.count rate. The 
resulting flovrs are then discounted at the pure time rate e. 
(5) Strictly speaking (: to( t (:rJ.,., but for convenience E-d--1'l'ill be 
disregarded. 
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3. To estimate future cash flows in nominal terms, that is in the 
monetary unit of the year of receipt, but Hithout making any 
adjustment to the flows to convert them to a common monetary 
unit, The cash flows are then disootmted at the composite 
nominal rate k, Hhich includes both e and oZ • 
In the unlikely event that the project 1 s cash flol·lS move 
precisely in step with the general rate of inflation, method 1 
appears to have the virtue of simplicity. But, in fact, it involves 
expressing the projected cash flous in a form which does not permit 
them to be compared readily vri th the actual cash flo·ws ultimately 
received. Hore important, hovrever, it requires a departure from the 
market rate of interest. If, on the other hand, the third method is 
adopted, the cash flovm are expressed in inflated terms and can 
readily be compared 1d th subsequent flovrs received, and no adjustment 
needs to be made to tho market discount rate. 
If the project's cash floHs are not expected to keep in step 
with the general level of inflation, the choice is betvreen methods 
2 and 3. There are houever certain positive disadvantages to method 2, 
without any significant compensating advantages: 
(a) It is quite possible when the. inflation element o( is removed 
from k that i acquires a negative value. vTe have noted in 
chapter 3 that there is strong evidence that during periods of 
inflation the market rate of interest is not permitted to rise 
to a level Hhich fully reflects the expected rate of inflation. 
It follows under these circumstances that the expected 'real' 
cost of capital may be negative, and that if the cash flovlS 
are deflated at the expected rate of inflation c(, the deflated 
cash flovrs vrould need to be discounted at a negative rate. This 
would clearly be quite misleading to all but the most sophisticated 
decision-makers. 
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(b) Only the effects of inflation as they affect the cash flows 
of the project need be calculated if method 3 is adopted. 
If method 2 is used, it is necessary to analyse the market 
rate of interest into its two segments e and d., vlhich of 
course are not observable. This added complexity can be 
avoided if the market rate is left undisturbed and used 
to discount the 'inflated' cash flows. 
Underlying the double discounting approach there appears 
to be an implied assumption that a projoct should have a positive 
real rate of return. But no such :requirement is in fact necessary 
to make a project v.rorthvThile. It is sufficient that the project 
has a higher expected return that alternative investments, and 
of course the opportunity return from alternative non-equity 
investments is captured in the market discount rate. Therefore, 
if the market rate of interest is 'low' in relation to expected 
rates of inflation, for whatever reason, even to the extent 
that the real return is negative, it remains worth-vrhile to 
undertake projects vThich have a greater nominal return than 
the rate of interest notvlithstanding that the project fails 
to protect the investor fully from the effects of inflation. 
There is no absolute minimum acceptable real return vrhich must 
be earned to make a project desirable. The only absolute 
minimum requirement is that a project should have a positive 
nominal rate of return. 
Few finance text-books actually deal explicitly with the 
effects of inflation on the investment discount rate, but by 
implication they can be assumed to favour the third approach 
by failing to recommend making any adjustment to the discount 
rate o Merrett and Sykes ( 6) appear to be sympathetic vri th the 
(6) Op. cit., pp. 166-167. 
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double discounting method, as does Bromivich. ( ?) Vlilkes, (8) 
on the other hand, firmly rejects it in favour of the 
conventional a-pproach on the grounds of the "computational 
efficiency, clarity and minimal likelihood of misinterpretation" 
of the latter. 
Scholefield, l1cBain and Bagvlell (g) also favour the use 
of a nominal cost of capital rather than double discounting, 
but recommend that companies should adjust the market rate of 
interest Upi'Tards or dovrmrards if they feel that the market is 
being too optimistic or pessimistic about future inflation. 
B1,1t, as already suggested, if interest rates are lovr in 
relation to the company's expectation of future inflation, it 
is a matter of indifference whether the reason is that the 
market is over-optimistic or. that Government and social 
pressures have prevented the rate of interest from rising to 
their full level. If management has its o>m expectations 
about future inflation these expectations should be reflected 
in their estimates of the project's cash flo-vm. But the 
discount rate is a market-determined standard and it is 
irrelevant that management is of the opinion that the market 
standard is too high or too low. If interest rates are too 
high it is in the interest of investors that projects yielding 
less than the rate of interest should be rejected since 
investors could earn the rate of interest by investing in 
debt securities. If interest rates are too low, it is 
better that management should accept projects vrhich have 
positive NPVs vrhen discounted at the market rate of interest, 
even although, according to management's estimates, the 
(7) 
(8) 
(g) 
Bromvlich. 1g6q 
~lilkes, page 46. 
Scholefield McBain and Bagwell, page 45. 
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projects will fuil to protect the invested capital against 
iuflation, becm1se the inflation proteGtion, such as it is, 
is at le<:1.st greater than that provided by the return on fixed-
interest securities. 
A numerical example v1ill illustrate this argument. Assume 
a market !JIOney rate of interest of 1 O% during a period in vrhich 
the gcner2.l price level is expected by me..nagement to change 
by 15~{~ cxtcl that a company is presented vri th an investment 
costing £:·iOO at time 0 vrhich is expected to pay £110 in the 
folloviing year, time 1 , then, in real terms, the £110 has a 
value in time 1 of JJQ = £95.6. 
'I •. 15 The present value, however, 
at time 0 is nonetheless £100. In effect~ the time value of 
real money is approximately ~4.5~~. It is much more convenient 
to derive that present value by using the composite market 
rate of 1()7~ than to attempt to break the rate do1m into its 
component parts. 
A parallel can be dravm from the traditional risk premium 
framevrork. rrhe conventional risk adjusted discount a·pproach 
udvoeatc.Js discounting prospective cash floHs at (i +f). 
Abstracting from the risk adjusted discount rate versus 
certainty-equivalent approach as to 1·rhether it is valid to use 
a discount rate to allaH for risk unless risk is perceived to 
be a function of time, no1vhere is it suggested that it is desirable 
first to reduce the cash flovrs by the discount rate <f to their 
certainty equivalents and then to reduce the certainty 
equivalents to their present value by discounting at i. The 
interrnrHlial'Y step is unnecessary b0cause expressing the 
components of the cash flm'l series in CE terms serves no purpose 
other than to provide a base for conversion into present value, 
a conversion v1hich can be immedia tnly achieved by discounting 
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the expcc ted cash flovrs at the composite rate ( i +f). Likev1ise, 
reducing the money flows to their real Vdlue before discounting 
them at the pure time rate only imposes an unnecessary burden on 
the decision-maker of analysing the market rate into its constituent 
parts e and ol • 
'fhe question may be asked 1·1hy it is thought by some to be 
appropriate to adjust historic accounting reports to a single monetary 
unit as a means of reporting the consequences of the firm's 
investments decisions if it is desirable to base the decisions on a 
stream of cash flovrs de nomina ted in a variety of monetary units. 
The difference of course is that in the one case the relevant income 
flovr is profit and in the other case it is cash. The purpose of 
measuring annual prof:Lt is, among other things, to represent the 
effectiveness of the firm's use of its resources during a particular 
period. To appreciate the significance of the measure it is useful 
to be able to compare it with performances in other periods and 
therefore conversion into a common monetary unit may facilitate 
comparison. But at the original decision-making stage, establishing 
the series of cash flows which a project is expected to generate is 
no more than a step in the evaluation process. The cash flovlS 
computed for a particular period are not measures of the project's 
performance during that period, and there is no purpose in seeking 
to compare one year's flo\vS with another's. The only economic 
significance of the series for decision-making purposes is its 
present value, vlhich is effectively and conveniently arrived at 
by discounting the actual cash expected to be received at the 
market mor,ey rate. 
In conclusion, then, inflation is a consideration which cannot 
be ignored in the investment selection process. It affects both 
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the d:Lscount rate and the projected cash flovrs. But its effect on 
the former :i.s detennirv3d irt the market place and it is unnecessary 
to depart from that rate. The relevant decision variable for 
management is the s1gni:ficance of inflation as it affects the 
particular cash flOioJS of the project, and although this is clearly 
a difficult decision, it :i.s not one \·lhich involves modification of 
the basic selection procedure. 
II. flotation cost~ 
In this section we consider the impact of investors• transaction 
costs and company flotation costs on the cost of capital. It \·Till 
be argued that the conventional practice of revising the basic cost 
of capital upv;ards to take account of transaction and flotation costs 
is invalid and leads to incorrect solutions. 
Assu~e that a company raises £1,000 to finance a project costing 
£1,000 and that the company incurs £50 flotation costs. Assume also 
that the basic cost of capital is 10%. Textbooks ( 10) recommend that 
the basic cost of capital k should be increased to reflect the percentage 
which the flotation costs bear to the cauital sum raised. If c = the 
percentage cost of flotation expenses, then the adjusted cost of 
capital k* is such that 
k* k = .1 0 10.5% 
- c 
- .05 
(10) Nerrett and Sykes, page 66; and Weston and Brigham, page 603. 
Note: Weston and Brigham mistakenly state that k* = D + g, 
p o rr.:c) 
. implying that the lower the current dividend is, the loi·Ter is 
the cost of equity. But if P = the net price received by the 
n 
firm, then P ::: P ( 1-c). '\•Teston and Brigham fail to observe 
n o 
that if P 
0 
is expected to grovT by g then Pn must be expected 
to grmv by 
k* ::: 1 (1-c) 
a greater rate, 
c~o +g) = 
viz. 
.Ji_ therefore, 
1-c 
k 
f-c 
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rrhus if the project ·were expected to generate £105 in porpetui ty 
the l'JPV would be £.122. - £1 ,000 = 0, implying that sufficient flm'ls 
.1 05 
have been gene:rated to meet the annual cost of servicing the capital 
raised plus the amount needed to recover the flotation costs of £50. 
An alternative procedure, vrhich i'Till be shmm subsequently to 
. I 
be the only valid one is to treat the flot~tion costs as additional 
outlay and to leave the cost of capital undisturbed. Thus: 
Initial Outlay (£1,000 +£50) £1 ,050 
Annual cash flov1s £105 
Discount rate .10 
Present value £1,050 
NPV 0 
It would appear to be a matter of arithmetic indifference which 
of the two approaches is adopted. However the former traditional 
approach is valid only under the very restrictive assumption that 
the project has a NPV = 0. This can be illustrated in the above 
example if we assume that the project generates a perpetuity of 
£157.5., The NPV according to the traditional approach is 
~127·2. 
.1 05 
£1,000 = £500 
According to the alternative method proposed the NPV is 
£~ - £1,050 = £525 
.1 0 
The NPV under the second method is the correct solution. The reason 
is that adjustment of the discount rate is merely an arithmetic 
device which ceases to be valid if the present value of the cash 
flows diff0rs from the initial outlay, that is if the NPV is positive 
or negative. Raising the discount rate has the effect of penalising 
the cash flo1·rs. In the example the rationale of the device is to 
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penalise the flows to the extent of £50 in present value terms, 
namely 5~b of £1,000. But because the cas:1 flovl stream is such 
as to have a present value greater than £1.000 then the upvmrds 
adjustment of 0.5~~ on the basic rate v1ill exact a penalty greater 
than £50. In the example the excess penalty is £25 which is 5% 
of the NPV £500. 
To use the traditional device correctly it would be necessary 
to compute c by relating the flotation costs of £50 to the present 
value of the projeot, £1,575, that is 3.2% approximately. Using 
this rate to discount the cash flows the present value= £157.2 = £1,525 • 
• 1 032 
Since however, the adjusted discount rate can only be calculated by 
reference to the present value calculated on the basis of the 
unadjusted market rate, it is clearly impractical to use the 
adjusted discount rate.approach. It follows that flotation costs ( 11 ) 
should be dealt with as additions to the capital outlay anu do not 
necessitate departure from the observed market rate of interest. 
This is consistent vri th the practice recommended in earlier chapters 
of treating bankruptcy costs and the tax benefits of debt financing 
"VIi thin the caf;h flow stream rather than by adjusting the discount 
ra.te. 
(11) For this purpose, brokerage fees etc. incurred by the investor 
can be dealt with in the same 11ay as flotation costs incurred 
by the company, that is, as an addition to the capital outlay. 
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SUHI·h"-Tl.Y 
-----
Inflation adds significantly to the :problems of forecasting 
future cash flmm, although it is not necessarily a greater source 
of difficulty than forecasting other uncertain events. In recent 
years it has in fact dominated financial affairs, and it is not 
po<mible to examine its full i:nplica tions within a single chapter. 
But it has not been the pul'pose of the chapter to consider the 
causes of inflation or its cures, or to examine the problems of 
reporting financial events vrhich have been affected by it. The 
purpose has simply been to consider vThether the existence of 
inflation calls for a refinement of the market rate of interest 
in establh;hing a yardstick for measuring investment vrorth. 
It '\'las concluded that no such adjustment is required and that 
the conventional practice of expressing a project's cash floHs in 
the monetary units of the year in which they are received, and 
then discounting them at the market rate, including tb.e inflation 
element, is vrell-found.ed. The alternative procedure of 
expressing fut1.tre cash flows in a com.L'lon monetary uhi t and of 
discm.mting these stabilised floHs at i·rhat is perceived to be 
the 1real 1 rate of interest was rejected. Furthermore, the rate 
determined by the market mechanism was found to be appropriate 
even if the company 1 s decision-makers take the vievT that such a 
rate indicates an under- or over-estimation by the market of the 
future rate of inflation. The NPV criterion is concerned \'l'i th 
the contribution to value in relation to the actual return by 
the suppliers of capital and not vTi th the return \'Thich might 
have been required by them had circumstances beeP. different. 
The chapter also considered the validity of the accepted 
practice of adjusting the market rate of interest to take account 
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of flotation and transaction costs incurred in raising capital. 
It 1vas concluclecl that this leads to incorrect solutions and 
that if instead such costs are treated as an integral part of 
the capit~l outlay the correct NPV can be found by discounting 
the cash flovlS at the market rate 1vi thout making any adjustment. 
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Chapter Eleven 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE POLICY AND THE COST OF CAPITAL 
Corporate managers are intermediaries between the holders of 
the company's financial securities and the investment of capital 
in real productive assets. As far as possible, it would seem 
desirable that the knO\'lledge and future expectations of the one 
group should be communicated on an ongoing basis to the other. 
That is to say the flov1 of financial data from the management 
group reporting past and future estimated returns from the firm's 
projects should be reciprocated by a communication from the 
shareholder group of their required cut-off rate for marginal 
. + prOJ6CuSo In reality, of course. a constantly changing 
heterogeneo~s body of shareholders is unable to articulate its 
required returns in ~recise terms and to communicate them to 
management, and therefore the information flow tends for the main 
part to be one vmy. 
The preceding chapters have been largely concerned with 
finding a solution to management's problems of discovering 
investors' required return when no formal communication system 
exists, and by necessity this has involved searching for a method 
of interpreting observable market signals which does not place 
unreasonable demands on management's analytical ability. The 
hypothesis was presented that the interest rate on Government 
bonds has a valid claim to be the most effective yardstick for 
this purpose. This chapter is concerned with the contribution 
which management can make to the validity of this claim in 
particular and to the investment process in general by providing 
investors with the data relevant to their needs. 
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It is recognised that the holders of the firm's securities are 
only one of a number of user groups, and the observations 'llhich are 
made are not intended to be general but rathor to focus on the effect 
that the supply of information can have on investors' requirements 
since it is their needs which are relevant to the determination of 
the discount rate. The term investors in this context includes 
noneq_uity investors, because the provision of adeq_uate information to 
them is no less important in influencing their req_uired return than 
it is for eq_uity investors. 
A number of factors operate to inhibit management from implementing 
fully its information-provision role, but two factors are especially 
relevant. Hanagers are exhorted to pursue a policy of maximising the 
value of the company's shares, and it is understandable that at times 
they should hesitate to disclose da.ta, ho1·rever relevant, which might 
have the effect of adversely affecting the price of the shares. The 
hesitancy, for example, of the great majority of companies to present 
statements indicating the effect of changes in the purchasing power 
of money during periods in 1·1hich such changes have been substantial 
must in part be due to the fear of a possible depressing effect on 
the share price of reporting lower earnings. The second factoT is 
that because information is addressed to a heterogeneous group of 
shareholders, some assumption about the level of sophistication in 
financial matters needs to be made. Traditionally, the weight of 
opinion has appeared to favour restricting the q_uantity and q_uality 
of information to the level of interpretative skill of the 
'reasonably informed investor' ( 1) rather than the expert. (2) 
( 1) See, ·for example, Eldon S. Hendriksen, page 561. 
( 2) Hovrever, see the Report of the Committee on Research 
Methodology in Accounting, pp. 426-427. 
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'rher(_" is therefore a potential source of conflict betHeen the 
fundamental need to provide investors ~~i t:C. the information they need 
to select their portfolios, and the desire by management to protect 
investors from falls in the market value of their shares or of being 
disadvantaged in relation to more sophisticateci. users. 'rhe significance 
of this potential conflict has, ho'l·lever, considerably declined in the 
light of modern capital market theory, and it \'lill novT be contended 
that the desire to protect investors from the effects of unfavou-rable 
or excessive disclosure can no longer validly be used as a reason for 
withholding relevant data. As a precondition, however, it is essential 
to recognise that it is no longer possible to pursue shareholders' 
welfare effectively on the assumption that their interests are 
exclusively tied up vli th the destiny of one company's shares. It is, 
of course, not practicaple and would probably not_be useful for 
management to ascertain precisely how the portfolios of their 
shareholders are constituted. But if >-Ie assume that investors have 
some degree of aversion to risk, it is sensible to operate on the 
basis that the shareholders hold diversified portfolios composed 
potentially of every security in the market. It follm·lS that management: 
must recognise that shareholders' welfare is dependent upon the 
efficiency of the market. In reality, of course, investors tend not 
to have portfolios so Hidely based, partly because they may not be as 
averse to volatility as the conventional framework assUJ."'les and partly 
because it is possible to achieve a high proportion of the diversification 
effect with a relatively small number of securities. (3) Therefore to 
construct a surrogate market portfolio it is important for the investor 
to be able to make a judgement about the desirability of potential 
candidates, in particular to satisfy hims-elf that 
(3) See Francis and Archer, page 155. 
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(1) the price of the shares is fair and does not overstate their 
value in relation to expected returns, 
(2) the coiiipany's dividend policy meets his particular income 
preferences 
(3) the covariance of the share's returns with other potential 
components is such as to achieve his desired goal 
(4) the social and environmental policies of the company are 
acceptable to him to the extent that he \Wuld i·Tish to be 
associated vri th the company. 
It is naive to assume that once an investor has foxmed his 
portfolio his primary interest is to see the value of his shares 
raised even.beyond their 'intrinsic' value. In order to maintain 
the balance of his portfolio, the investor needs periodically to 
revise his holdings and to sell securities vThich have disproportionately 
increased in size and correspondingly to augment his holding in other 
securities to restore the balance. This periodic adjustment process 
makes it important to him that the exchange price is fair. He is 
both a buyer and a seller, and because the ;:;hare price is the entry 
value for the purchaser in addition to being the exit value for the 
seller it is in the investor's best interests that the capital market 
is adequately served with the information needed to establish a fair 
value, and not vri th information designed to create as high an ent:cy 
price as possible to the newcomer. The only investors i'Tho can 
reasonably object to that criterion are those who propose to disinvest 
and to cease to be participants in the capital market. 
The desire to be fair to all investors has undoubtedly influenced 
the development of accounting disclosure practices and deterred 
managers at times from disclosing da.ta i'lhich might yield an advantage 
to the skilled interpreter. In order to demonstrate that it serves 
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shareholders' intereDts better that companies publish all information 
which contributes to the efficiency of the market rather than to 
\'lithhold data which might be beyond the understanding even of the 
reasonably informed investor, it is necessary to take account of the 
evidence in support of vrhat has come to be knovm as the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
There is a strong body of empirical evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the market for securities is efficient in the 'semi-
strong' form ( 4) that is, that all publicly available information 
is instantaneously impounded in the share price, and that the analysis 
of published information cannot per•mi t an investor to achieve returns 
in excess of a naive buy-and-hold strategy, using a dart for selection. 
There are no superior trading rules and therefore the search for 
undervalued or overvalued securities will not yield a higher than 
average return, except by short runs of good luck. Only if investors 
are privy to inside information can abnormal returns be achieved over 
the long term. 
There has been and undoubtedly vrill continue to be a marked 
resistance, outside the academic world, to accepting the evidence of 
the efficient-market hypothesis. Indeed the securities market's 
infrastructure has been erected on the basic assumption of the 
market's inefficiency in the semi-strong form, insofar as the vast 
number of fundamental analysts, chartists, stock-market periodicals 
etc. all bear witness to the entrenched belief that the collection 
and skilful appraisal of published data can assist investors to 
discover and profit from transacting in under and overvalued stocks. 
(4) For example, see Fama, 1970. 
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Despite several studies published over a period of years vihich 
indicate that investment institutions are unable to achieve superior 
returns over the long term, the fact that over short lJeriods of 
time some institutions (and individuals) must inevitably perform 
better than others makes the acceptance of the long term statistical 
evidence difficult for market participants. It requires a heroic 
effort on their part to approach >vi th the necessary perspective and 
independence of mind a body of evidence which supports the YievT 
that their judgement can do no better than chance. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the findings of the efficient-
market surveys are accepted as being substantially validated. That 
is not to say that it is essential that one should believe that no 
individual exists or might exist who can on average outguess the 
market in identifying. undervalued or overvalued securities without 
the benefit of insider information, but simply that the evidence 
points firmly to the rarity and exceptional nature of such 
individuals, if they do exist. 
Thus although corporate financial reports are conventionally 
addressed to the company's shareholders, their primary function 
is to provide the market vri th data needed to establish the price 
of the shares. The conventional notion of providing information 
for investors to evaluate the shares and to compare their valuation 
with the market price to produce a basis for their buy-sell hold 
decisions has ceased to have any real significance in the face of 
the efficient market evidence. By the 'market' in this context is 
meant the stock exchange jobbers who adjust the share price in 
response to mn; information, and the sophistic.s.ted investors who 
act instantaneously on publication of the data. Since their 
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analysis and response effectively adjusts the price to its 'intrinsic' 
valu.o, it follO\iS that they are the primary users of accounting data. 
It might be asked what advantage is there for investors to press for 
more disclosure of information if it will be instantaneously reflectei 
in the share price. Clearly to the investment analyst seeking to 
outguess the market there is no advantage~ and to the privileged 
insider there is a positive disadvantage. By providing more complete 
information more quickly-the market price of the shares at any time 
will represent not only the 'intrinsic' value in relation to all 
published information, but more closely to the value given by all 
potential information. As the published data becomes more technical 
and complex, the gulf which separates the naive outsider from the 
informed outsider is widened. But, equally, as it becomes more 
complete, the gulf which separates the privileged insider from the 
informed outsider is narrowed. There is no advantage for the naive 
outsider to demand that published information should be tailored to 
suit his limited understanding. The more efficiently the price-
setting mechanism operates, the greater assurance has he that the 
market price is fair, and the less need for him to consider '\'Thether 
the share is over or undervalued in relation to othel' securities. 
If it could be demonstrated that the market rms not so efficient 
as to cause prices to adjust instantaneously to new information, then 
the publication of complex tecrmical data could be viewed as conceding 
an advantage to the specialist investor. But such an advantage would 
be preferable from the point of view of the ordinary investor than 
the alternative of maintaining an advantage for the unscrupulous 
insider. \Vi thholding relevant data vlhich becB.use of its technical 
nature might have given privileged and profitable insights into the 
intrinsic value of the share to a few specialist investors cannot 
.234 
actually benefit less skilled investors or enable them to make 
more useful ev8luntions of share price<>. The~_r welfare vTOuld still 
depend on the allocational efficiency of the capital market. 'rhe 
granting of a revmrd to investors with specialist knowledge 
legitimately acquired is a small price to p1·omote that efficiency. 
The long term interests of the ordinary investor are best served 
by an imp1·ovement in the price-setting mechanism, combined 1d th a 
clear recognition of his ovm analytical limitations and that if he 
wishes to engage in serious investment rather than speculative 
ventures he should do so under the guidance of an informed adviser. 
Since it is the sophisticated interpreter v1ho determines 
market share prices it follo;vs that it is his level of comprehension 
which is relevant. Any effort directed towards making accounting 
statements understandable to the average or even to the well-informed 
investor (for example, by providing simplistic data such as earnings 
per share) ~ay do a disservice to him by implying that there is a 
shortcut method of carrying out the highly complex process of 
valuation more efficiently than the market. 
There is evidence to suggest that information processors' 
judgement is diminished beyond a certain level of complexity. 
H. 1-liller, ( 5) for example, has expressed concern that if tests 
carried out by behavioural scientists can be shown to be applicable 
to the financial reporting environment, there may be an optimal 
loading of financial data beyond which there is tendency for the 
user to resort to fixed decision rules such as price-earnings 
ratios with a consequent deterioration in decision-making. If it 
can be ass'.L'Iled thA. t the optimal level of complexity varies v1i th the 
decision-maker's capabilities, there are significant implications 
for disclosure policies. Miller observes, ( 6 ) 
(5) H. Miller, 1972 
(6) Miller, page 35 
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11 lf the theorist is to design an optimal environment for 
financial reports and optimal levels vary for different processors, 
which optimal level is he to choose as his goal? The choices range 
from the most concrete to the most abstract processor with perhaps 
some average as an inviting possibility." 
Miller's choice of processor fortun~tely accords with the 
implications of the efficient market hypothesis, and the most 
skilled investor is se1ected. "It seems intuitively wise to select 
the most abstract investor's decision model for financial reports. 
The selection of a more concrete processor •••• ·would deprive the 
sophisticated investor of information which might be crucial to 
his decision 11 and because of the widespread use of analysts' advice 
"it appears likely that the creation of an information environment 
that is optimal for the analyst \'Till serve other investors as well. 11 ( 7 ). 
Miller concludes that because more sophisticated users of 
financial statements have made repeated requests for additional 
information we have yet to exceed the analyst's optimal conceptual 
level and can therefore probably follo\'T a data expansion policy n0\1. 
However, he vrarns, "we will eventually·· be limited and continual 
haphazard expansion will inevitably cause superoptimality and a 
reduction in the usefulness of financial reports for decision-making."(s) 
Whilst endorsing rhller' s concern about the dangers of haphazard 
expansion, doubt must be expressed about his anxiety concerning the 
provision of excessive relevant data. The only effective evidence 
that relevant data is excessive is to show that market efficiency 
has diminished as a result of the increased information load, and 
that market share prices have ceased to approximate the intrinsic 
values as determined by published data. But that would presuppose 
the existence of a sufficient number of sophisticated analysts \'Tho 
could process the increased informational load to determine the 
(7) Miller, page 36. 
(8) Miller, page 37. 
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'correct' intrinsic value and so secure an insight from which they 
could profit and, in so doing, eliminate the disparity between the 
market price and the intrinsic value. It is true that as the 
informational load is increased some processors of a lower conceptual 
level than others would cease to rank among tl1e body of 'efficient' 
conceptual processors, but provided the price of shares continues 
to be determined by the most efficient information processors, the 
loss in status by the former processors would affect only their 
responsibility to recognise their limitations. If the increased 
load diminished market efficiency in the sense that there developed 
a time-lag in \·That had previously been an instantaneous adjustment 
to new information, then, as stated earlier, such a concession to 
skilled analysts vrould be preferable to the alternative of maintaining 
a privilege for informed insiders and of reducing the efficiency of 
resource allocation. 
Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters it vlas contended that because investors 
are to a large extent capable of exercising control over their risk-
exposure by constructing and monitoring their portfolio so as to 
reflect the degree of volatility which they desire, it follows that 
their role in the company's investment decision process is more active 
than has been traditionally assumed. It is only a matter of a few 
years since text-books (9) taught that one of the goals of financial 
management should be to combine its investments in such a way as to 
minimise the overall return required by its shareholders. This exercise 
(9) For example, see J.C. Van Horne, 1st edition 1968, page 483. 
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is no longer seen to produce any benefit for shareholders \·Tho are 
no'lr assumed to be able to carry out the dive:t"sification wore 
efficiently. ( 10 ) 'I'here may of course be other good reasons why a 
measure of firm diversification is desirable, but the fact remains 
that the impact of diversification on the investment discount rate 
is determined by "\'That shareholders do, or more precisely ~ do in 
their portfolios rather than what management do. 
It follovTS that management has a responsibility to disclose any 
information (other than commercial secrets) 1.;hich is material and 
relevant to shareholders' portfolio needs, that is to provide the 
market with all data, however technical or apparently incomprehensible 
to the 1 ordinary investor', ( 11 ) vJhich affect the market value of the 
shares and the allocation of ca-pital to the company, and to provide 
the individual investor or his adviser with 
(a) a statement of the company's future dividend policy, 
(b) information which will enable the investor to place the shares 
in a 1 covariance 1 category. 'rnis might include a breakdovm of 
sales into product lines, an analysis of the firms activities 
into geographical or economic regions, and possibly a 
probabilistic analysis of future returns, 
(c) a profile of the firm's social and environmental policies. 
There are, of course, practical difficulties in implementing 
these recommendations, but it is on the basis of this kind of 
(10) See Haley and Schall, page 195. 
( 11) This conflicts l·ri th the Accounting Standards Steering Comrni ttee 1 s 
publication 'The corporate report' 1975, \•Ihich indicates that the 
information should be directed at the 'reasonably instructed 
reader' (page 29), although elsewhere (page 22) it is recognised 
that the existence of an analyst-adviser group fulfilling an 
interpretative function will 'lead to a demand for more elaborate 
information than otherwise would be the case'. 
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information flow that the investor is best equipped to select a 
portfolio which he finds acceptable in relation to his time-horizon 
and risk-tolerance level. 
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SUJ:.H1lf1HY 
--~-·-~-
The fundamental lesson of portfolio theory is that rational 
investors lvithout inside information or special insights will hold 
well-diversified portfolios. As a result, corporate shareholder 
objectiveH need to be framed in terms which take account of the 
fact that ·the company's shares are a constituent element of a 
portfolio. The implication of the previous chapters is that 
shareholders have a more positive role in the investment process 
than has hitherto been attributed to them insofar as the risk 
dimension of investment decisions can be left to them to regulate 
within their o\m portfolios, thus enabling management to select 
the firm's investments on the basis of expected return only. But 
in order to implement this role effectively investors have a 
corresponding right to receive from management the information 
needed by them or their advisers to evaluate existing and potential 
candidates for their portfolios, in particular to be able to form 
a judgment about the covariance characteristics of the company's 
expected returns. If necessary, this may require the publication 
of probabilistic data and details of the firm's various activities. 
The disclosure of information should not be inhibited in any way by 
the fear of placing less sophisticated investors at a disadvantage, 
or of adversely affecting the market value of the shares, because 
in the framevrork of an efficient market where information is observed 
to be impcunded instantaneously in the share price, portfolio-
holders 1 vrelfare is better served by having an adequate flow of 
relevant information from companies to the rnarket to enable it to 
perform its dual function of establishing a fair exchange price for 
the shares, and of providing a vehicle for allocating capital to the 
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most profitable users. The more efficient corporate disclosure 
practices are the more effectively can investors set about 
constructing portfolios which accord with their individual income 
and volatility preferences, and in so doing carry out their function 
of simplifying the investment selection process for management. 
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Chap·ter T1·1el ve 
The oricinal purpose of this thesis vras stated to be 
concerned 1·ri th the communication of the economic principles of 
investment al)}lraisal to those -vrho have the responsibility of 
translating thGm into operational terms. It has been argued 
that, although theorists have developed an elegant framevrork 
for making investment decisions 1·rhich seeks to be exhaustive, 
significant aspects of the procedures recommended can only be 
applied o~ the basis of guessuork or arbitrary rules of thmnb, 
i'li th the result that the economic principles are vulnerable to 
outright rejection by those vrho take the vie1-r -that the proposed 
procedures are in fact inoperable. It has been the specific 
objective, therefore, to try to develop guidelines which can be 
substantially reconciled i·ri th theoretical and empirical data, 
and v1hich at the same time are readily understood and capable of 
implementation ivi thou t undue difficulty. This fina 1 chapter, 
therefcre, seeks to integrate and smTI:mrise the findings of 
the previous chapters 1vi thout, as far as possible, resorting to 
financial jargon or mathematical notations, in an attempt to convey 
the basic principles of the argument in a form vrhich is at once 
acceptable to the specialist and, at the same time, intuitively 
accessible to the nonspecialist, and -vrhich will enable the 
latter to participate meaningfully in the decision-making process. 
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Under conditions of certainty, the r·eturn required by those 1·rho 
supply the capital to finance industry and comnerce vroulcl be a 
single rate of interest, observable in the market, and common 
to every security w·ha tever characteristics the security might have. 
Differences in security types would be essentially related to 
differences in the n1anner in which the return is achieved. 
Hanagement, therefore, 1muld use this unique rate of intereot to 
evaluate prospective investments, and projects 1muld be accepted 
j_f the yield vrhich they of:fered equalled the interest rate, or, 
equivalently, if the contribution (net present value) vrhich the 
project made to the firm vras non-negative. One of the 
consequences of the assumption of perfect certainty is that if 
some innovation is undertaken which appears to give the innovator 
the opportunity to achieve exces8 returns, that is, to obtain a 
+ve NPV, competition from other sources, the unions or competing 
firms, vrould eliminate the excess returns instantaneously. The 
opportunity, therefore, to make excess returns 1muld not present 
itself, and the basic criterion of selection would be that the 
internal rate of return equals the required rate of interest, k, 
or the project's net present value equals 0. It would be a 
matter of indifference Hhich of the two techniques, IRR or NPV, 
were used to make the selection. Horeover, the goal of business 
enterprise -vrould be simply to achieve the required return for the 
suppliers of capital, and not, as is generally assumed, the 
maximisation of \'Teal th (in the sense of maximising projects 1 
+ve NPVs) 
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Under condi t:i.ons of uncertainty, l!erfect competition does not 
in fact exist, and the possibil:L ty of discrepancies betvmen the 
returns required by lenders versus equ_L ty-holders, the supplj_ers 
of capital versus labour, and one firm versus another, becomes a 
reality. Since virtually no business can operate 1·ri thout capital, 
the western capitalist system has developed on the basis that, 
al thougb there arc a munber of groups which are interested in the 
outcome of business enterprise the primary goal of business is 
concerned vri th making profit. It might be that society is in 
the process of change to the extent that the profit goal will cease 
to be a significant consideration, in •·rhich case a different 
framework from that presented by finance theorists nay need to be 
developed. But on the assumption that the decision to bring a 
business into existence, or to te!minate its life, rests with the 
suppliers of capital, investment decision theory has developed on 
the basis that the primary goal should be directed tovrards 
furthering the interests of those vrho supply the residual capital. 
One of the consequences of imperfect competition is that the 
division of operating 1 profits' beh1een labour, creditors and 
equity cannot be achieved with perfect harmony. The equity-
holder has been perceived to have a unique relationship to the other 
factors of production in that he can propose not to advance his 
capital to any business unless the return expected is at least 
equal to a certain minimun after satisfying the claims of the 
other claimants. Hence the rule of acceptance has evolved 1·1hich 
states that those vrho are entrusted ;'lith equity capital, nar:1ely 
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management, ::~hould not accept projec·b~ unless their return is 
expected to &.2fS: .. t.c.:.cl the amount necessary to satisfy all factors 
of production, that is, unless the nm > K or NPV) 0. In effect, 
the decision rule states that projects are unacceptable unless 
they are expected to yield more than is necessary to satisfy the 
suppliers of equity capital. vlri ters have presented this rule 
as appropriate even undeJ? conditions of certainty, but it is clear 
that the rule depends on uncertainty to have any significance. 
The rule has also been elevated by theorists into the assumed 
objective of business enterprise, namely the maxiraioation of 
shareholders.' s vrea.l th. But this too clearly depends on the 
existence of uncertainty and imperfect markets, because the 
opportunity to earn excess returns ancl therefore to add ¥Tealth 
(+ve NPVs) to the value of the firru 1wuld not exist 1·iith 
certainty. 
Given uncertainty and imperfect 1narkets, therefore, the 
wealth-maximisation objec·bi ve and the excess-return decision 
rule have become accepted as axiomatic in finance theory. 
How·ever, even if the overall required return were kno-vm, it 
ceases to be a matter of indifference vrhether the IRR or NPV 
approach is used to select projects. Either method can be 
used to signal that a project is acceptable, but if ever a 
choice has to be made between projects, the NPV method alone 
is valid. If one perceives the IRR as the highest cost of 
capital vrhich a project could sustain without making a loss, it 
begins to become apparent that a project -vri th a higher IRR 
than another is not necessarily preferable. 
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It may be an interesting statistic to knovr that if the rate of 
interest had been much higher, the project i'lOUld still have been 
acceptable, but the relevant question is, given that K has the 
0 
value it has, 1·1hat contribution does the project actually make to 
the value of the firmo It is true that the IHR technique is 
used in the stock exchange to differentiate behmen securities, 
but there is an essential difference. It is possible to invest 
virtually any desired amount of capital in any secu:rity for any 
length of time, and therefore the rate of return per unit of 
capital invested initially can be used as a guide to the relative 
desirability of the alternative investments. Rut with real 
investments in machinery, buildings, etc the amount of capital 
is not a matter of choice, nor is the lifespan or pattern of the 
cash floVIs. Al ternf:l.tive real investments nearly ahrays require 
different inputs of capital, and £(p) invested more 'profitably' 
than £(p+q) is not necessarily more desirable. \fua t is more , 
the amount of capital invested in a project cannot be determined 
by reference to the initial outlay alone, but depends on the 
pattern of the cash flovrs and the length of time involved. If 
a project differs from another in relation to any one of these 
aspects, the projects can be assumed to have different arnounts 
of capital invested in them, and the IRR ceases to be valid. 
It follovTs that if the goal is to contribute vreal th to the 
shareholder, the selection of projects should be made on the 
basis of the project or combination of projects >vhich make the 
greatest contribution (+ve NPV). 
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Application of the NPV technique, hoHever, is not the straightfor1-mrd 
process implied under conditions of certainty. It is first necessary 
to apply a probabilistic approach to determine the expected stream 
of cash flov1s. Secondlyf and a much mo:re problematic issue, the 
pure rate of interest may not be the arJpropriate discount rate for 
an uncertain stream of cash flov;s, if investors require some form 
of compensation to induce them to accept the risk of variation from 
the expected return. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind 
that the implication of the +ve HPV rule is that acceptable 
projocts are expected to earn more than the discount rate and it 
may be that the simple prospect of achieving more than the pure 
rate of interest is sufficient to induce investors to purchase 
equity securities. 
If there is reason to believe that the prospect of participating 
in the excess returns is not sufficient inducement, it may be 
necessary to adjust the pure rate of interest for each project 
tmder revievr, according to the project's risk characteristics. 
In practice, hm·rever, it is a very difficult task to decide 
precisely 1vha t adjustment sh.ould be made, because the price of 
risk cannot be observed in the market. One recommended solution 
is to examine the returns achieved by companies engaged in a 
similar operation, but this presents a n~~ber of problems. Firstly, 
it is unlikely that there exists a company whose share returns are 
determined by a single project. Secondly, if management accepts 
only projects vrhich are expected to earn more than the minimum 
required return, it uould seem that the only asswnption that could 
reasonably be made about the returns actually achieved in the past 
is that they exceed the required returns. 
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Thirdly, it may not be that 1·rhat investors \·ranted, on avera(';e, in 
' 
the past is relevant to what they want today. For example, in 
vie1·r of the significant increases in the tefault-free rate of 
interest in recent years, it is doubtful whether analysis of the 
returns of any securities in previous years is relevant to 
today's conditions. In addition, the capitalnarkets have undergone 
significant changes in recent years, vrhich may have affected 
investors' attitude to risk. Not only is the portfolio effect 
more widely recognised as a risk-reducing operation, but the 
opportunities to diversify have been enormously enhanced by the 
development of intermediary institutions such as unit trusts, pension 
funds etc. Investors may not ahmys choose to avail of this 
facility to diversify so widely, but if they do not, it is reasonable 
to assume that it is because they do not fully apprec.i.ate the port-
folio effect, or because they prefer not to diversify all risk 
away. If l'le accept the proposition that the only risk ·which 
matters to an investor is the risk vrhich he cannot diversify avray 
as distinct from the risk Hhich he chooses not to, then it is 
probable that investors 1 perception of risk is undergoing cons·~ant 
change. 
Clearly, then, the derivation of the correct discount rate 
is an exceedingly complicated issue, so much so that it has become 
the central issue of finance theory. Because the solution is so 
inaccessible, the fundamental question has to be raised 1rhether it 
is necessary or even responsible for theorists to expect practitioners 
to undertake the search, 1·rhen so little :9ractical guidance is 
available to them. If theorists cannot agree on the size of 
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risk premium for the market portfolio, may it not be that its 
size, if it exists at all, is imnuficiently significant to merit 
imposing on practitioners the burden of searching for it? For 
the risk premi.um to be significant, it :nust be ~shmm that a 1'IOrld-
wide portfolio of risky assets, including shares, bonds, land, 
property, etc., is significa.ntly riskier than a government bond, 
bearing in m:i.nd that risk must be perceived in -\;erDs ·which take 
account of inflation. lioreover, 1·rhen making this judgment, it 
is necessary to be certain that investors are intolerant of any 
degree of risk 11i thout compensation. 
The evidence for the existence of risk preuiums is, in fact, 
far from·conclusive. In the bond market it is generally assv1u.ed 
that because inteJ.'est rates appear to vary according to the risk 
status of the borrower, this beaPs witness to the existence of 
a premimafor risk. This, hO\·rever, is an un\mrran ted conclusion. 
The promised rate of interest does vary with risk, and must do so, 
even if it can be shovm that lenders are indifferent to risk. 
It can, hm<Tever, be il.emonstrated that the expected rate is 
independent of the nominal interest rate charged. Given that 
lenders have substantial oppor+.uni ty to diversify risk m·ray and 
that they receive sufficient data to determine the appropriate 
promised rate of interest, there is no reason to believe that the 
return required by lenders significantly exceeds the default-free 
rate. 
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The evidence in the equity market is no less inco~clusive. 
Theorists have based their l)elief in the existence of risk premiums 
on the ob8ervation that shares have on average earned more than 
the default-free return. But it has al:r:-eaciy been noted that 
this superior performance of shares is virtually an inevitable 
effect of the NPV rule, where management accepts only projects 
which are expected to exceed the default-free rate. A number 
of empirical studies have indicated that higher returns can be 
expected from shares i'Tith a high beta or risk factor, that is, a 
high correlation -vri th the market portfolio of shares. This has 
been interpreted to confirm the risk premium hypothesis. Apart 
from the fundamental deficiencies of past data observations as 
outlined ·above, hro addi tiorw.l points need to be made. One 
recent major empirical study( 1) analysed portfolio performances into 
subperiods ancl the results indicated a steady decline in the significance 
of the beta factor. Indeed, beta appeared to have no influence at all 
in recent decades, implying that differences in volatility do not enter 
into investors' calculations. Secondly, the fact that achieved 
returns appear to have been consistent viith the beta facto1." does not 
establish that this relationship exists for ex ante required returns. 
It is probable that management has a higher degree of risk aversion 
than investors have, because of the former's inferior opportunities 
for diversification. If this is the case, the degree of competition 
amongst firms in industries vrhich have a high degree of risk may be 
less severe 
(1) F. Black, M. Jensen and H. Scholes, see chapter 5 
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than in less volatile industrier>. Hence the returns obtained from 
companies :i_n the risky gr.oup might be expf)Cted to be greater than 
in the safer group. If shareholders' recrv1ired returns were in 
fact unaffected by differences in risk characteristics, the typical 
project of the risky firm I'TOUlcl have a higher +ve lJPV than the 
projects of the safer firms. Bx post analysis, houever, reveals 
only the total earnings including the basic required element and 
the excess elcnent. Since the1·e is no recognised method of 
distinguishing betvreen the hm elements, the fact that the total 
returns of the risky firms are observed to be higher is 
insufficient evidence that the basic required eler:1ent itself is 
higher. To the extent that com1)anies have becone larger and more 
internationally diversified, the level of undiversified risk is 
likely to have declined for management as \·;ell as shareholders. 
Hence the apparent stgnificance of beta ancl its sutseq_uent decline 
can equally be attributed to man9.gement's attitudes to risk as they 
can to shareholders attitudes. 
Finally, for the purposes of the present studys intervievTS 
were conducted w·i th a group of investors to find o~1t Hhether their 
perception of risk conformed to the conventionally assumed pattern. 
The results strongly supported the view· that investors do not 
perceive a v!ell di ver·sified portfolio of equity securities as 
being any riskier in real te1·ms than a default-free bond. The 
investors, moreover, expressed a willingness to absorb a certain 
amount of volatility vTi thout any risk premium, and indicated that 
they vmuld accept the default-free rate as the mininun cut-off rate 
for risky projects, especially if they held a vrell diversified 
portfolio. 
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There is, unfortmmtely, no single defauH~-:free yield Hhich 
provides a totally satisfactory rnte :for di.scounting capital 
projects. A <ride range of default-free rates can be observed 
to exist, varying from short--terh1 to perpetuity rates, and therefore 
there is a ·uide range of potential discount rates. Lilcewise, 
although it is the pra.ctice to speak of the Teturn on the mal'ket 
portfolio, there is in fact no single market return. The return 
required by investors in the year ahead is rmlikely to be the same 
as the return required for the hro year period ahead, and still 
less likely to be the same as the ten year period. If any single 
bond rate. can be said to correspond to 'the market portfolio' rate 
it is the consol or perpetuity rate because that alone reflects 
the El.Verage of all future short, ~1edhun and long term rates 
expected to operate during the presmned perpetual life of the market 
portfolio. 
On the other hand, '·Then translating the market required 
returns into discormt terns for evaluating particular projGcts, 
account must be taken of the fact that most projects occupy only a 
finite period in the market 1 s perpetual flm·r. The only theoretically 
correct approach is to discount each cash flo1·r of the series at the 
one year bond rate expected to operate during that year. This 
approach has, of course, never been strongly advocated because of 
the very onerous task of predicting futt~e short-term rates. Hence, 
the use of a single average rate is almost universally recommended. 
In chapter 6, hoHever, we rejected the conventional practice of 
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computing such an average on the basis of the maturity structure of 
the financial instruments uhich the company happens to have issued 
because such an approach implies that a project 1 s desirability 
depends on the individual company's financial strategy rather than 
on an extraneous, objective yardstick. The choice must therefore 
be behreen using the yield of a government bond which matches the 
maturity of the project, or choosing a single bond rate vvhich 
represents the expected average matuxity of all projects, presumably 
the long-te:cm bond yield if 1ve assume that the average capital 
investment is long-term. 
Both these approaches of course suffer from the disadvantages 
as so cia te.d vri th any averaging process and have the effect of 
penalising early cash flovrs and of favouring later flows during 
periods of expected interest rate rises and vice-versa during 
periods of expected interest rate falls. The use of a matching 
bond yield has an intuitive appeal, but it involves selecting 
a different bond yield for every project i'lith the result that the 
cash flows in year 1 , for example, of tvro co:npeting projects will 
be discoQ~ted at separate rates according to the length of time 
over which the subsequent cash flo11s happen to be extended. In 
-· 
addition, the selection of the appropriate bond must be made i'li th 
care to avoid a yield vrhich is distorted by capital gains tax 
considerations. The choice of a single long-term bond yield for 
all projects is crude but has the virtue of simplicity and of 
being relatively freer from capital gains tax distortions. 
\'lhichever approach :i..s adopted, it must be borne in mind that 
the problems present themselves equally id thin the risk-premium 
framework, although they are obscured by its overall complexity. 
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Indeed the pro1Jloms are magnified i:C an appropriate risk-premiwn 
has to be calculated for each maturity classo The issues therefore 
do not affect the fundamental thesis thct:~: the default-free rate is 
·~he appropriate one for evaluating risky projects. 
The follmdng are the bo.s:Lc steps necessary to evaluate a 
capital investment proposal: 
( 1) The initial cost outlay of the I)roject should be measured 
including the f~~tig~ts incurred in raising the funds 
needed to finance the project. 
(2) The expected net cash flovrs re::m.l ting from the project and 
from other projects uniquely as so cia ted 1·1i th it should be 
computed by 
(a) estimating the §fter-tax returns, taking into account 
the level of leverage employed, under different states 
of the economy (including the state of bankruptcy '\lith 
its associated costs) \'There the rettrrns are denom:i.na ted 
in the monetary unit of the year in which the cash 
returns are expected to be received 
(b) assigning a probability to each state's occurrence, and 
(c) obtaining the weighted average of the possible states to 
arrive at the expected value of the cash flows. 
(3) The expected net cash f1ovrs should then be discounted at a rate 
equal to the relevant government bond yield. The market rate 
should be used in its pure state \vi thout modification to take 
account of the project's risk characteristics or the decision-
makers' estimate of the future general rate of inflation 
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or the firm 1 s A~ vidend _]olJ..c.Y.:,, or any of the other· items underlined 
above, each of Hhich has variously been held in the capital budgeting 
1i teraturo to necessitate adjustment of the market rate, but i•rh1ch 
for reasons advanced in the text are best dealt i'li th in the cash 
flovr stream or (on the grounds of irrelevance or immateriality) 
disregarded entirely. 
The net present value so calculated represents the increase 
in value to the firm which the project should produce if the 
marke·t had access to the same information and shared the same 
expectations as the firm 1 s decision--makers. A project is 
acceptable if the net present value is positive. 1Vhere a 
conflict arises, the project or combination of projects vrhich 
produces the highest net present value should be chosen. 
The conventional capital budgeting framei·rork presents 
practitioners vri th hm distinct approaches 'l'rhich are capable of 
producing conflicting solutions, namely the relative profitability 
approach as characterised by the IRR and the absolute contribution 
approach as represented by the NPV method. T~lri ters, conscious of 
the limitations of the former, have, in fact, tended to give 
incorrect reasons to explain them, and have sought to devise a 
complex set of rules to assist in identifying the conditions in 
which the IRR can be assumed to give the same solutions as the lf.PV 
method. They have failed to observe, hovrever, that even \fhen 
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the IRR does provide a correct solution, it is never correct in 
principle. l!'urthe:rmore, effoTts to validate the IRR have been 
largely counterproductive by making the selection procedure 
appear considerably more comple~ than it need be. It is 
concluded that the only relevant criteriop. for measuring a project's 
contribution is provicled by the NPV approachf and that the IRR 
is no more than a ratio indicating the project's sensitivity 
to changes in the required rate of return, and should be accorded 
no higher a status than that. 
In addition, the search for the correct discount rate has not 
progressed much in practical terms since the discounting approach 
'\'Tas first applied to business decisions. Because there is 
insufficient evidence that a market risk premium exicts, or if it 
exists that it is significant, it is argued that there is no 
virtue in exhorting practitioners to use a discount 1<1hich cannot 
be precisely defined and which .c.annot be observed in the market 
whilst there remains serious doubt \'l'hether departing from the 
market rate of interest is in fact necessary. It is proposed, 
therefore, that until the academic literature succeeds in firmly 
justifying and establishing an operational solution to the risk-
premium hypothesis, the contribution which a pr·oject makes to 
shareholders' wealth can most effectively be measured by using 
the yield on Government bonds as the relevant discount rate. The 
flotation costs, taxation and bankruptcy implications of the 
financing strategy employed should be incorporated into the 
project's cash flovrs, '\'lith the result that the discount rate 
should require no further adjustment. 
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The contribution ·which this thesis :Ls intewlecl to make to the 
decision-ma.king process terminates at this IJOint. Hovwver, it 
is not argu~;d that, in practice, the dedsion to undertake one 
investment rather than another should be made uholly on the basis 
of the criterion w·hich has been proposed. The theory of capital 
budgeting has traditionally focused almost exclusively on the 
significance of financial decisions from the point of view of those 
who supply the equity capital funds, and tho procedures outlined above 
have sought to remain vri thin that frame1-rork. But this na.rrow focus 
fits uncomfortably into the modern conception of corporate respons-
ibility which reflects a shift away from the shareholder-centred 
emphasis to the \·rider taF>k of balancing the interests of all 
groups v1hich participate in or are affected by the business enterprise. 
The mandate issued to management i's today perceived as being far 
more complex than the simple goal of maximising the wealth of one 
single group. Nonetheless, it is in the interests of all 
participants that the scarce resource of capital entrusted to 
management should be used effectively, and to do this, management 
must have a yardstick by vrhich to judge that effectiveness. 
Free enterprise cannot be exrJected to survive if the suppliers of 
capital are unable to expect to achieve at least the return v;hich 
the state is prepared to pay for borrovred funds, and the criterion 
vrhich has been proposed seeks to measure the contribution i·rhich a 
project makes above that minimum standard of effectiveness. But 
there are other considerations which Hill influence management's 
selection of investments and ivhich may conflict 1-Ti th, and in 
practice.override, the preferences indicated by the basic economic 
model. The decision to undertake a particular investment may have 
social costs vrhich should properly be excluded from the cash flows 
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'\'lhen evaluating the project's potential contribution to share-
holders 1 Health, but Hhich should be taken into account v1hen 
manaeement exercises its judgment about the overall desirability 
of the project. Of even more immediate sigllificancc to 
management, indeed, is that the choice of investment may have 
far-reaching conseq_uences for the economic survival of the 
company and for the security of those uho are employed by it. 
vlhen the principles of investment decision theory ivere first 
conceivedt the risk of the business unit and that of the ovmers 
were perceived to be broadly eq_uivalent. But the development 
of portfolio theory and capital asset theory has destroyed that 
eq_uivalence, and vrhereas the opportunities for diver3ification 
are extensive for the suppliers of capital, the opportunities open 
to management are far more restricted. Theorists, indeed, argue 
that firm diversification provides no benefit to shareholders and 
that the diversification process is best left to the latter on the 
grounds that they can regulate it more effectively, But this 
recownendation ignores the fact that the relevant risk to managers 
and their fellow employees is not the risk which shareholders are 
unable to diversify avray, but the -risk \'rhich the corporate entity 
has not diversified mmy. It follo1·rs that, although the basic 
model :LmpJ.ies that differences in project variability should be 
ignored, that is not to say that risk has ceased to be a relevant 
dimension in the decision process. But the risk vrhich management 
must evaluate is the risk to uhich the company is exposed and 
those whose livelihood, etc., is dependent upon it. The incidence 
of risk has shifted substantially avmy from the portfolio-holder 
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to the employees of the corpor·a te units 1·1hich con prise tho portfolio, 
and in the process the character of relevant risk has altered. The 
measures vrhich are appropriate for the one are not necessarily so fm~ 
the other. Therefore, when the shareholders' contribution has been 
assessed, it remains for management to measure the social costs and 
benefits of the decision and to balance the clai:1s of the various 
participating groups. PreciseJy how the effect of these benefits 
and costs should be incorporated into the decision process is not 
clear. i'Jhether they f:::hould be expro<>sed as a va1ue to be added 
or deducted from the basic economic net present value, and 1-rhether 
the resulting measurement should be used as the basis of selection 
is outside the scope of this study. Huch research requires to 
be done before it is possible to quantify the social costs and 
benefits. In the mea!ltime, management must exercise its ju.dg:nent 
about the desirability of adhering to or departiD_g from the 
indications given by the basic model. 
The usefulness of the recommended measure, therefore, is not 
that it provides a compelling basis of selection, but that it 
indicates to management the basis of selection 1·1hich best 
promotes the interests of the shal'eholder group. For the run-of-
the-mill project this basis may be sufficient. If other factors 
are brought to bear uhich lead management to select othenrise, 
they have, at least, a measure of the cost to shareholders of 
choosing the alternative path. 
In conclusion, this thesis has argued that, on balance, the 
benefits of a ·vrider acceptance of the discounting model vrhich could 
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be expected. to result from adopting the E>implified approach, and 
the advantages for effective allocation of capital in having an 
objective~ observable yardstick rather than "Hhat at best must 
be a crude attempt to implement the rislc-preminm hypothesis, 
should prevail over the doctrine that practitioners must make 
some adjustment to the market rate of interest even if they have 
no realistic guidance as to hOv·T much the adjustment should be. 
\•lhat is certainly clear is that if futu_re efforts are directed 
tol'rards improving the quality of forecasting techniques vrithin 
companies, and tovmrds improving the quality of the inform;:>, tional 
flovr from companies to the vwrld 1 s capital markets 1 and if progress 
in facilitating the flow of capital behreen nations continues to 
be made, the hypothesis that project variability has ceased to be 
a significant :factor in evaluating the impact on the suppliers of 
capital of the firm's investment decisions 1vill become 
progressively a more appealing ancl defensible propoGitiQ.ll. 
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APPENDIX 
Questionnaire (Chapter 5) 
Note: The term 'risky' will be ured in the following 
questionnaire. When an investment is described as 'risky' lC 
means that there is more than one possible return that can be 
achieved fro1: tho invostmc"nt. If we define the 'expected 
return 1 as tLe average (or mean) of trte ra.nge of possible 
returns, (whether from dividends, interest received, or capital 
gains) then the riskiness of the investment is related to the 
dispersion of the possible returns about this average (or mean). 
The total riskiness of a portfolio of investments is less than 
the aggregate ris~ of each individual investment, provided the 
returns from each invest~ent do not depend entirely on the same 
set of events. Therefore the chances of doing exceptionally 
badly are diminished as the number of securities in the portfolio 
is increased, and of course the chances of doing exceptionally 
well are also diminished. 
In the course of the questionnaire you will be asked to 
rank or to state a prefercnce.for one of a number of investment 
alternatives. It may be that you happen to believe that at the 
present time one section of the stock market is undervalued in 
relation to another, and your decision would therefore be 
influenced by the desire to exploit such an imperfection. Since, 
however, the object is not to examine your views about a 
particular market situation but to learn something about your 
general attitude to different media, please try to give your 
answers on the br.tsj_s that you have no reason to suppose that 
any section of the market is temporarily under or overvalued 
in relation to other sections. 
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Ignore transaction costs and taxation aspects 
1. Have you ever 
(a) purchased equity securities for yourself? yes 
no 
(b) recommended the purchase of equity securities 
for someone else or on behalf of some fund? yes 
2. Have you ever 
(a) pure hased fixed inter8 r3t sec uri ties for 
yourself? 
(b) recommended the purchase of fixed interest 
securities for someone else or on behalf of some 
fund 
3. If your answer to l(a) 'Nas yes, ·."hat appro:xim:Jtely 
was the fe'?E,st m1mber or companies in 'Nhicb you 
had an investment at any point of time. 
Approximately for how long a period did your 
portfolio consist of that number? 
4. Assume that you had say £5,000 which you did not 
immediately need for any special purpose, and your 
choice of investment was limited to one of the 
following portfolios 
A = 
B 
--
c = 
3t% War Loan 
A portfolio composed of shares in every 
company quoted in the U.K. Stock Exchange 
A portfolio composed of a professionally 
selected represent~tive cross section of 
companies quoted in the U.K., U.S. and 
Australian Stock Exchanges together with 
some investments exuertly selected in land, 
property and some works of art. 
na 
:}res 
no 
yes 
r;_o 
Taking into account all uncertainties including 
future inflationary trends, state the order of riskiness 
(1, 2 or 3)* which you consider the portfolios have in 
relation to their expected real net-of-inflation returns: 
(a) assuming that you could invest for no more than two A 
years but could sell the portfolio at any time, if B 
you believed it were to your advantage C 
(b) assuming that you could invest for up to five years A 
but could sell the portfolio at CJ.ny time if you B 
believed it to your advantage C 
* 1 = most risky, 2 = second most risky, 3 = least risky 
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(c) assuming that :you could :Lnver:t for ten :years or A 
more, but could sell the portfolio at any time, B 
if you believed it were to your advantage. C 
Do you believe that your choice of the second most risky 
(No. 2) in each of the above circumstances js significantly 
or just marginally more risky than the least risky (No.j) 
(a) 
(b) 
( c) 
H.:1r[';inally 
Moderately 
Si,~;ni fj_can t ly 
Harginally 
Hodora.tely 
Sic;nif:Lcantly 
l1arginally 
Hoderately 
Significantly 
5. Which portfolio would you select using the notional 
£5,000 that you had and did not require im~ediately? 
(a) assuming that you could invest 
for no more than two yeari 
(b) assuming that you could invest for up 
to fjve years 
(c) assuming that you could invest for 
ten or more years. 
6. Indicate your reasons for selecting the above 
portfolios 
A 
B 
c 
Combination 
of A & B 
Combibntion 
of A & C 
A 
B 
c 
Combinatj_on 
of A & B 
Co:nbina tion 
of A & C 
A 
B 
c 
Combination 
of A & B 
Combination 
of A & C 
7. Are there any circumstances in which your selection 
would be different? If so, indicate briefly. 
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8. Again assume that you have £5,000 which you do not 
need i.n the near future, ancl you have a. chotec of the 
following portfolios 
A - 3!% War Loan 
B = a portfolio composed of shares in every company quoted 
in the U.K. Stock Exchange, assuming that the management 
of each company accepted projects only which Tiere 
expected to yield a return equal to the yield on 3-}% 
War Loan or more. 
C = a portfolio composed of a representative cross section 
of companies quoted in the U.K., U.s. and Australian 
Stack Exchanc;e s, t.og0 ther with investments 11ro fessione.lly 
selected in land, property, and works of art, assuming 
that the management of each company accepted only 
projects which were expected to yield a return equal to 
the return on 3+~'b 'Nar Loan or more. The land etc. was 
also expected to yield at least the yield on 3j-<!,(, War Loan. 
Which portfolio would you select 
a) assuming that you could invest for 
no more than two years 
b) assuming that you could invest for 
up to five yee.rs 
c) assuming that you could invest for ten 
years or more? 
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A 
B 
c 
Combination 
of A & B 
Combination 
of A & C 
A 
B 
G 
Combination 
of A & B 
Comb ina -d. on 
of A & C 
A 
B 
c 
Combination 
of A & B 
Combination 
of A & C 
9. Again, a~:~sumj_ng that you had f.')sOOO that you did not 
expect to have to call on fo-r· any purpose for several yec>l'f:3 
and your choicG was as follows: 
A - a portfolio of shares EO constructed that all ups 
and downs were ex~ected to balance each other out. The 
return to be obtained could be e~)ected to be equal 
to 10% per annum with virtual certainty, that is, ~hatever 
booms mi~ht occur in the market or whatever depressions, 
this portfolio would not be affected and could be 
depended upon to yield 10%, whether from dividends 
or capit~l gains, or both. 
B = a portfolio of shares which would broadly move with 
the Financial Times Share In~ex, that is, which would 
rise ~ith economic booms and go down during depressions, 
but .Q..I!_aver:r~£Q. over the long term might be expected to 
yield 10% whether from dividends, or capital gains or both. 
Which portfolio would you choose, bearing in mind that 
you would expect to be free to sell the portfolio 
whenever you thin_k j_ t to your advantage. 
A 
B 
Combination of A and B 
10. How would your choice in question 9 be affected if the 
return on portfolio B was expected to be 
ll. 
(a) 9% 
(b) ll% 
Would you der;cribe 
(a) High-risk 
yourself as 
taker 
(b) Moderate-risk taker 
(c) Low-risk taker 
(d) Risk-a voider 
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